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Preface 
In summer 2004, I had the pleasure of attending a seminar by Julian Savulescu and Nick 
Bostrom about "Human Enhancement, Artificial Beings, and the Future of Humanity" at 
the University of Oxford. Among other quite exotic topics, chimeras were the subject 
matter of one of our seminar meetings. This was a concept that was completely new to me 
at the time and apparently denoted some kind of mixture between human and animal, 
which was to be used in biological research. What struck me about the seminar was the 
immediate, visceral and resolute reaction the topic aroused in many of my fellow students, 
at a time when none of us were actually very informed about chimeras. While the typical 
discussion in a philosophy seminar allows for grey areas, undecidedness and reserved 
interest, even regarding hotly debated issues like abortion or death penalty, the topic of 
mixing humans and animals elicited immediate rejection and concern in most of us – 
excluding Savulescu and Bostrom, who tried to frame the topic in neutral or positive terms. 
Since then, I have made a very similar observation in countless situations whenever casually 
introducing a colleague, friend or acquaintance to the subject of chimeras: most will have 
an immediate, strong and negative response to the idea of mixing animals with humans. 
Yet at the same time, few can produce arguments to support this knee-jerk reaction, even 
among bioethicists.  
It was this discrepancy between a strong, unambiguous intuitive reaction to chimeras and 
the diffuseness and vagueness of the arguments brought forward that made me become 
(and stay) interested in the topic. In 2005, human-animal mixtures became relevant for my 
M.Phil. thesis, where I discussed whether the ethical position that being human makes a 
difference in regard to the moral status of a being ("speciesism") is defensible.1 The notion 
that there could be beings in between human and animal, after all, should be thrilling for 
anyone who is concerned with the question of moral status difference between humans and 
animals. Accordingly, a short excursus in my M.Phil. thesis was devoted to human-animal 
chimeras: I argued that speciesist approaches had difficulties coping with species-
ambiguous individuals, and that, in a nutshell, chimeras were a point in case for giving up 
                                                 
1 In the following, "speciesism" will denote any general attitude or approach which assumes that being human 
makes a difference in regard to how we should treat an entity. The ethical principle of Speciesism and its 
different varieties will be properly introduced, defined and analyzed in chapter 3, section B.  
The concept of moral status will also be used losely up until its explanation and definition in chapter 3, 
section A. 
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speciesism (I will come back to this question in chapter 3, section B below). The topic of 
chimeras remained in the focus of my philosophical work after my M.Phil. and I 
immediately settled on this area for my dissertation.  
At the centre of this thesis is the question whether there is one, persuasive moral argument 
that can be used to veto the creation of (human-animal) chimeras or similar interspecifics. 
While responses to the issue of creating human-animal chimeras are almost univocally and 
strongly negative, at a second glance it seems at least extremely hard, if not impossible, to 
come up with such a fundamental argument against chimera creation – a result I hope to 
establish in chapter 2, where a variety of possible arguments are closely scrutinised.  
Before working on moral aspects of chimeras, it is crucial to lay out the biological basics. A 
considerable portion of this dissertation is therefore devoted to making clear what chimeras 
actually are, what other interspecific constellations exist naturally, artificially and which 
interspecific entities might come to exist in the future. By this, I hope to avoid the 
allegation of writing about speculative, hypothetical Science Fiction. Also, I want to clear 
the path for philosophical discussion by visibly laying out what is at issue. In a debate as 
young as the one about chimeras, many philosophical problems are at risk of being 
obscured by conceptual vagueness or misunderstandings, e.g. about the concepts 
"chimera", "hybrid", "species membership" etc., but also about the actual research done 
and its motives. This is problematic not only because it leads to futile debates about non-
topics, but also because there is actually urgent demand for ethical guidance and analysis in 
the field of interspecific research.  
An issue that is a necessary corollary to the analysis of arguments against chimera creation 
is that of human-animal chimeras' moral status, and that of speciesism. Moral status will be 
discussed not only in the limited context of the question whether the creation of human-
animal chimeras should be prohibited or allowed, but also from a more abstract point of 
view, regarding the advantages and disadvantages of using this concept. A connected 
question that I will look at in an in-depth excursus is that of speciesism, i.e. the idea that 
the moral status of humans is fundamentally different from that of nonhumans. I will show 
that the very idea of mixtures between humans and animals, and our reaction to this idea, 
tells us something meaningful about our understanding of the moral status of animals as 
opposed to that of humans. It questions and may even undermine our way of seeing the 
world in categories of "human" and "nonhuman". The question of defensibility of 
speciesism is, as I will show, at the bottom of several of the typical objections to chimera 
creation.  
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Scientists working in the various fields of research that involve the creation of human-
animal mixtures have pointed out that they are in need of ethical ground rules, and, even 
more urgently, concepts and methods to work with when discussing the issue of human-
animal mixtures from an ethical standpoint. So the issue of chimeras is directly, practically 
relevant in the sense that society will have to decide on whether and how to regulate or 
prohibit the creation of such beings, and needs toe-holds (and maybe whole new 
conceptual step irons) in order to enter an informed debate. I hope to deliver such starting 
points and contribute to this debate in a way that elucidates the ethical questions that arise 
from the creation of chimeras. Rather than persuading the reader of my specific personal 
views (although these will necessarily influence my analysis), I would mainly like to help 
them with reaching their own conclusions regarding this complex issue by giving an 
objective and detailed overview of the field. 
In retrospect, the topic of chimeras has turned out to be an exciting, at times surprising, 
complex and often mind-blowing subject that kept me fascinated until the very last page of 
this dissertation. I hope that some of my enthusiasm for this area of bioethics will rub off 
on my readers. 
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Chapter 1: Biological Basics 
This chapter will offer a comprehensive overview of chimeras and a whole array of other 
mixed organisms or entities. These preparations are necessary for a reasonable discussion 
of the "chimera" debate, which, as we will see, actually concerns only some types of 
chimeras, but includes several types of non-chimeric interspecific beings.  
Section A will give an outline of natural occurrences of chimerism, distinguishing it from 
other forms of mixing, while section B will address artificial chimeras and mixtures of all 
kinds. The primary focus of this section will be on providing an insight into technical 
possibilities in experimental biology's employment of chimeras, and explaining the motives 
behind chimera and other interspecific research. In section C, I will assess currently used 
definitions of the term "chimera" and try to offer suitable concepts of "chimera" and 
"interspecific" for bioethical debate. Section D will give a short introduction to the legal 
and political situation of (human-animal) interspecific research, especially regarding 
embryonic chimeras and so-called cybrids. 
A. Naturally occurring chimeras and other mixtures 
Biological laymen understand the expression "chimera" to denote either figures of Greek 
mythology or phantasms and illusions.2 In common usage, the term "chimera" denotes 
impossible beings which, by their very existence, disrupt categories. 
In biology, "chimera" is a technical term.3 It denotes, as we will see, not only creatures 
whose mixed and artificial nature is obvious, but also inconspicuous beings and entities 
that result from natural processes. The concept and use of "chimera" in biology is complex 
and multiple. Settling on a definition seems not advisable at this point. In this and the 
following section I will give an overview of possible mixtures, and explain what chimeras 
are not by distinguishing them from other mixtures – not all mixed beings are chimeras. By 
Section C, we will have an outline of this complex area at hand that should suffice for 
assessing possible definitions of "chimera" and for settling on the future use of "chimera" 
and related terms. 
                                                 
2 In German, the latter meaning is distinguished from the former by a different spelling - "Schimäre" denotes 
the phantasm, "Chimäre" the mythological (or actual) being. 
3 The somewhat antiquated spelling "chimaera" is used rarely today. Confusingly, "chimaera" also denotes a 
type of cartilaginous fish (order Chimaeriformes) which is related to sharks. 
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As a crude first approximation, one can say that chimeras are organisms which are the 
product of mixing materials from two (or more) genetically different organisms. (As you 
may have noticed, this approximation includes all organisms that are a product of sexual 
reproduction, but let us set this objection aside for the moment.) 
Rather, let us have a look at what biologists consider naturally occurring chimeric 
organisms: both in animals and humans, twin embryos often exchange cells in the womb, 
sometimes leading to intra-species chimeras whose chimerism usually goes undetected, only 
sometimes showing in the form of strange iris coloration or fur patterns. Chimerism, on a 
small level, also occurs when fetal cells enter the maternal organism ("fetomaternal 
microchimerism"). Twin embryos also sometimes fuse in the uterus. These cases of so-
called "disappearing twins" can result in an adult that carries a "parasitic" twin in its body 
(which leads to strange results in blood tests); it can also in rarer cases lead to noticeable 
deformations like hermaphroditism or supernumerous limbs. Likewise, conjoined twins 
exhibit a composition resulting from a fusion of two embryos. They are not regarded as 
chimeras, though, because they are the product of identical twins' fusion: unlike normal 
twins, identical twins stem from one common zygote (fertilized egg). 
Probably the most well-known and obvious chimeras within the human species are patients 
who have undergone transplantation of tissues, body parts or organs from other (deceased 
or alive) human beings. Human-to-human transplantation is nowadays so common that 
allocation of organs is almost the only ethical question discussed in this area (maybe with 
the exception of the transplantation of whole body parts, specifically the face, which raises 
other issues as well). By contrast, animal-to-human transplantation or xenotransplantation, 
which produces animal-to-human interspecific chimeras, is still regarded as highly 
controversial – apparently not only because of its medical riskiness (for an overview of 
xenotransplantation research, see B.5). 
Note that genetically differing sets of cells are not only found in chimeric organisms. 
Chimerism should not be confused with mosaicism, i.e. organisms which have genetically 
distinct sets of cells, but whose differing cell populations originate from just one zygote. 
Mosaicism is normal in female mammals, where x-chromosome inactivation leads to an 
organism which partly consists of cells where, randomly, either the paternal or maternal X 
chromosome is inactivated. These two cell types are scattered over the female mammal's 
body (visibly so in female cats with tortoiseshell or calico fur patterns). Mosaicism does 
also occur when identical twins exchange cells in the womb. 
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We can note that chimeric organisms consist of cells that have differing genetic 
information. These genetically differing cells do not originate from one zygote, as is the 
case with female mosaicism and mosaicism in identical twins, but from two or more 
differing sources. 
In Greek mythology, the main 
characteristic of chimeras is their 
compositeness, or more specifically, that 
they are made from different species of 
animal, human or mythological creature. 
According to Homer, the original 
Chimera was slain by Bellerophon with 
the help of Pegasus (another chimeric 
creature!) in Asia Minor. The mythical 
monster consisted of lion, goat and dragon or snake.4 A village on the south coast of turkey 
is still called "Chimaira" in honour of the mythical Chimera. The naturally occurring 
chimeras I mentioned above do not exhibit other species' characteristics because they are 
intraspecific chimeras, and, as such, wholly inconspicuous to layman observers (apart from 
conditions like hermaphroditism that are present in some of them). Are there naturally 
occurring mixtures between species at all? Some think that lichen can be regarded as the 
chimeric symbiosis of algae and fungus. And in plants, production of interspecific chimeric 
organisms is not restricted to high-tech laboratories: graftage of fruit trees is a low-tech, 
traditional method resulting in chimeric plants which – for example – lets us grow pears on 
one and apples on another branch of a tree, or different-coloured roses on one rose stem. 
The bioethical debate about chimeras is focused on animal chimerism, as we will see in the 
discussion below. So, do inter-species animal chimeras occur naturally, too? 
There are, indeed, mixes between different species: interspecific hybrids. These hybrids – 
also called "cross" or "bastard" – result from sexual reproduction between individuals of 
different, but closely related species and are often (not always) sterile themselves. To give 
but two examples, mules are the offspring of female horses and male donkeys, ligers and 
tions result from crossing tigers with lions. Many undomesticated species produce hybrids 
in the wild, without human intervention. Hybrids are not regarded as chimeras because 
                                                 
4 Homer, in the Illiad (VI. 179-182), describes the chimera as "lion-fronted and snake behind, a goat in the 
middle, and snorting out the breath of the terrible flame of bright fire." For a comprehensive overview of 
mythological chimeric creatures' appearance in art, see Mode (1974), Fabeltiere und Dämonen in der Kunst. 
Die fantastische Welt der Mischwesen. 
 
Picture 1: Chimera. Etruscan Bronze, 5th century BC. 
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they do not contain genetically distinct cell populations. Instead of consisting of 
inhomogeneous sets of genetically different cells, they are wholly composed of 
homogenous cells that are (genetically) intermediary in type. This is because they result 
from the fusion of an egg and a sperm of different species into a single zygote, from which 
all other cells of the hybrid organism originate. In hybrids, the mixture takes place on inner-
cell level, typologically resulting in an animal which is sui generis but not a mixture on the cell 
or organ level, since all cells of the hybrid animal carry the same genetic fingerprint. In 
chimeras, the mixture takes place on the level of cells, resulting in an organism whose cells 
keep their disparate genetic identity. If we, because of this difference, exclude hybrids from 
the area of chimeric beings, it becomes apparent that interspecies animal chimeras 
exclusively come to exist through artificial means. 
Artificial chimeras – especially animal-human chimeras resulting from manipulation and 
mixing of embryos and stem cells – are at the centre of the bioethical chimera debate. Why, 
how and under what circumstances those creatures are, today, produced and used in 
research laboratories all over the world will be described in the next section. 
B. Human-made chimeras and other interspecifics 
1. Roots of chimera research 
What scientific roots did current chimera research, especially inter-species chimera 
research, emerge from, and what are the deeper motivations for today's experiments with 
human-nonhuman mixtures? One can subsume current chimera research under three areas 
of particular interest. 
Firstly, researchers have been trying for several decades to create animal models for all 
kinds of diseases; i.e. animals in which human diseases can be emulated. Many of the 
chimera experiments that are done today, especially human-animal chimera experiments, 
are directed towards imitating human diseases in animals. One prominent example of this 
practice is the SCID-hu mouse, a scientific breakthrough of the 1980s, which is regarded as 
a cornerstone of immunology research. Researchers grafted human stem cells as well as 
human fetal liver cells, fetal thymus cells and bone marrow into immuno-deficient mice in 
order to "humanize" the animals. The resulting mice have a human immune system.5 The 
SCID-hu model was necessary to isolate human hematopoietic stem cells that are now 
                                                 
5 McCune, Namikawa, et al. (1988), "The SCID-hu mouse: murine model for the analysis of human 
hematolymphoid differentiation and function", Science, 241(4873). 
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commonly used in therapies of leukaemia.6 It is also still widely used in HIV and other 
immune system research.7 Newer chimeric models are often used to emulate 
neurodegenerative and psychiatric diseases.8 Creation of "humanized" disease models is 
also done with methods of genetic engineering – a prominent example is the Harvard 
OncoMouse, which was "genetically engineered to contain a human cancer-causing gene" 
in 1988.9 Transgenically humanized animals – which are not chimeric beings – will be 
further discussed in section 6.a below. 
A second strain of research that lead towards today's chimera experiments is that of 
developmental biology, which has, over the last 150 years, introduced methods of tissue 
transplantation in order to find out about various developmental phenomena.10 Some 
chimera experiments continue this search for explanations of how and why different types 
of cells (e.g. varying somatic cells, precursor cells or stem cells) develop, fuse, aggregate, 
diversify, change their level of potency, develop anomalies, or are influenced by their 
microenvironment, offering a model for research which cannot be done in human beings 
for ethical reasons and is carried out in animals instead.11 
Another motive for induction of chimerism in research is due to the fact that scientific 
consensus and regulation (e.g. by the United States Food and Drug Administration, FDA) 
requires that stem cell therapies, before being applied to human subjects, first be tested in 
animals. Such testing results in human-to-animal chimeras. This is specifically relevant for 
the development of treatments for neurodegenerative disorders.12 Chimeras as assay 
systems, which are used to find out about tumorigenicity and to test stem cell applications 
with therapeutic potential, can be created in adult and fetal animals in vivo, but also in 
embryonic in vitro experiments. The chimeric subjects are usually euthanized after 
                                                 
6 Greely, Cho, et al. (2007b), "Thinking About the Human Neuron Mouse", American Journal of Bioethics, 
7(5), p. 31. 
7 Ibid., p. 32. 
8Cf. Muotri, Nakashima, et al. (2005), "Development of functional human embryonic stem cell-derived 
neurons in mouse brain", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102. 
9 Sagoff (2003), "Transgenic Chimeras", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3). 
10 Robert (2004), "Model Systems in Stem Cell Biology", Bioessays, 26, p. 1010. 
11 Examples: Stern (1973), "Chimaeras obtained by aggregation of mouse eggs with rat eggs", Nature, 
243(5408); Fehilly, Willadsen, et al. (1984), "Interspecific chimaerism between sheep and goat", Nature, 307; 
Brüstle, Choudhary, et al. (1998), "Chimeric brains generated by intraventricular transplantation of fetal 
human brain cells into embryonic rats", Nature Biotechnology, 16; Ourednik, Ourednik, et al. (2001), 
"Segregation of human neural stem cells in the developing primate forebrain", Science, 293. 
12 Baylis and Fenton (2007), "Chimera Research and Stem Cell Therapies for Human Neurodegenerative 
Disorders", Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 16(2), p. 196f; Greely, Cho, et al. (2007b), "Thinking 
About the Human Neuron Mouse", American Journal of Bioethics, 7(5), p. 28. 
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transplantation of human cells and undergo histological or genetic analysis.13 This motive 
of testing of possible hESC treatment methods can be subsumed under the second branch 
of finding out how human cells develop and differentiate in vivo. 
The third root of chimera research prevalent today can be found in the search for 
substitute tissue or organs for patients in need of transplantation due to illness or injury. 
Although porcine heart valves are nowadays routinely used as replacement for human heart 
valves, the use of living animal organs and tissues, in the past, has not been as successful as 
one had hoped for, since animal organs, unfortunately, do not properly integrate into the 
human organism. Therefore, human-animal chimeras are created in order to grow human 
organs or tissues within animal organisms.14 In the future this method could be used for 
more successful xenotransplantations due to a reduced immune response of the human 
host (for further discussion, see 5 below). 
Accordingly, one can see current chimera research as contributing to three main projects: 
that of emulating human diseases in animals, that of finding out about (human) cell 
development in vivo without harming human beings, and that of producing human organs 
or tissue substitutes in vivo. These research interests frequently overlap: research with 
human stem cells introduced in injured animal organisms (e.g. in stroke-affected brains of 
mice15 and damaged spinal cords of mice16) is as interesting from the viewpoint of stem cell 
development as it is from the viewpoint of replacing damaged tissue in human organisms 
in the future.  
Let us now look at the different types of entities that are created in these branches of 
research. They will be arranged in order of the direction of the chimeric manipulation (i.e. 
animal-to-animal, animal-to-human, or human-to-animal) and the developmental stage of 
the recipient. After analyzing chimeras, we will also have a look at non-chimeric animal and 
human-animal interspecifics, including hybrids and "transgenic chimeras". 
                                                 
13 Robert (2006), "The science and ethics of making part-human chimeras in stem cell biology", Journal of the 
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, 20 p. 840. 
14 Bianco and Robey (2001), "Stem cells in tissue engineering", Nature, 414; Dekel, Burakova, et al. (2003), 
"Human and porcine early kidney precursors as a new source for transplantation", Nature Medicine, 9; 
Almeida-Porada, Porada, et al. (2004), "Formation of human hepatocytes by human hematopoietic stem cells 
in sheep", Blood, 104(8); Taylor, Cowin, et al. (2006), "Formation of human prostate tissue from embryonic 
stem cells", Nature Methods, 3(3). 
15 Kelly, Bliss, et al. (2004), "Transplanted human fetal neural stem cells survive, migrate, and differentiate in 
ischemic rat cerebral cortex", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(32). 
16 Cummings, Uchida, et al. (2004), "Behavioral improvement, differentiation, and immuno-electron 
microscopy of human central nervous system stem cells in spinal cord injured NOD-Scid and NOD-
Scid/Shiverer mice", Society For Neuroscience Abstracts. 
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2. Intraspecific animal-to-animal (and human-to-human) chimeras 
The beginnings of animal-to-animal chimera research within species (intraspecific animal-
to-animal chimeras) are in the grafting experiments of Murray and Huxley, in the 1920s,17 
and the first embryonic mouse chimeras, created by Andrzej Tarkowski18 and Beatrice 
Mintz in 1960s.19 Intraspecific mouse chimeras were made by fusing two mouse embryos.20 
More elaborate techniques allowed not only the combination of two embryos, but also the 
combination of embryos with embryonic cells from a later stage (e.g. inner cell mass cells), 
cells from embryonic carcinoma, embryonic stem cells and embryonic germ cells.21 Modern 
techniques produce chimeras by "sandwiching" cells of different provenience in layers.22 
Many of these experiments do not only result in chimeric blastocysts or embryos, but also 
in viable adult chimeric mice; they were also carried out in animals other than mice, such as 
rats, sheep and bovines.23  
While the focus of the first intraspecific chimera experiments was on studying normal early 
development of cells and on finding out about phenomena such as hermaphroditism 
(which is sometimes based on intraspecific chimerism), intraspecific chimeras today often 
have a different role: transgenic germ line chimeras are used as carriers in the production of 
genetically modified animals. Manipulated embryonic stem cells are transplanted into host 
embryos which incorporate them into their germ line, producing genetically modified 
gametes.24 
This is by far not the only area of chimeric intra-species experimentation. To give another 
example for the utility of animal-to-animal chimerism in research, British scientists 
transplanted retina cells from a particular ontogenetic stage in murine fetal development 
("photo receptor precursors") to the retinae of blind adult mice in 2006 in an effort to 
advance the possible treatments for blindness. The cells apparently integrated into the adult 
mouse organism, enabling the transfer of information to nerve tissue and, accordingly, the 
                                                 
17 Murray and Huxley (1925), "Self-differentiation in the grafted limb bud of the chick", Journal of Anatomy, 
59. 
18 Tarkowski (1961), "Mouse chimaeras developed from fused eggs", Nature, 190. 
19 Mintz (1962), "Formation of genetically mosaic mouse embryos", American Zoologist, 2. 
20 Tarkowski (1998), "Mouse chimaeras revisited: recollections and reflections", International Journal of 
Developmental Biology, 42. 
21 Ibid., p. 904. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 906f. For an example of transgenic pig germ line chimeras, see Piedrahita, Moore, et al. (1998), 
"Generation of Transgenic Porcine Chimeras Using Primordinal Germ-Cell Derived Colonies", Biology of 
Reproduction, 58. 
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mouse brain.25 By determining the particular stage in development at which precursor cells 
succeed at integrating into the alien organism, the scientists hope to find out at which point 
in development stem-cell generated human cells should be transferred to blind patients' 
eyes (this would constitute a human-to-human, intraspecific chimera).26 
These are all quite foreign procedures for the non-bioengineer, and some might think that 
chimeras, apparently, are something that one rarely encounters as a layman. This is 
misleading: As mentioned above, there are also intraspecific human-to-human chimeras 
among us whose existence is well-known even to the non-expert. Allotransplantation, be it 
cardiac, renal, or hepatic, be it from a living or a deceased donor, leads to a human being 
whose cells are partly of a different genetic set-up. These cases of intraspecific chimerism 
within our own species lead to particular ethical problems, mainly, the problem of organ 
allocation, which shall not interest us here because it is not a corollary of chimerism as such 
but a matter of the scarcity of donor organs. Apart from allocation problems, human-to-
human transplantation nowadays rarely leads to reactions of horror or moral indignation. 
An exception to this rule might be face transplantation. The case of the first face transplant 
carried out on a Frenchwoman in 200527 demonstrates that, ultimately, loss of identity of 
the recipient or an inadvertent transfer of social identity of the deceased donor were not 
the central problems. The question whether informed consent actually took place or 
whether the patient was used as a guinea pig for not yet perfected therapeutic methods 
played a much greater role in this case.28  
Another spectacular case of allotransplantation practice that typically elicits ethical 
concerns is that of therapeutic use of human fetal tissue – e.g. transplants of fetal brain 
tissue into the brains of Parkinson's patients29 – which have, so far, been unsuccessful and 
even detrimental to the patients' health. One problematic aspect of this method is the use 
of human fetuses: it is feared that these fetuses could be reduced to their role as raw 
material for drugs, or that, in the case of scientific success, increasing demand could lead to 
induction of pregnancies for the sake of producing fetal material. There is a general debate 
around the propriety of use of fetal tissue in research, which also comes up regarding 
                                                 
25 Die Zeit (2006), "Erforscht und Erfunden: Blinde Mäuse", 2006/11/09; MacLaren, Pearson, et al. (2006), 
"Retinal repair by transplantation of photoreceptor precursors", Nature, 444. 
26 MacLaren, Pearson, et al. (2006), "Retinal repair by transplantation of photoreceptor precursors", Nature, 
444, p. 207. 
27 BBC News (2005), "Woman has first face transplant", 2005/11/30. 
28 For a discussion of ethical and psychological problems surrounding face transplantation, see Jungblut 
(2005), "Gesichtstransplantation - Ärztlicher Ehrgeiz oder Interesse des Patienten", ZeitWissen 2005 (2). 
29 Freed, Greene, et al. (2001), "Transplantation of Embryonic Dopamine Neurons for Severe Parkinson's 
Disease", New England Journal of Medicine, 344(10). 
Chapter 1: Biological Basics 
 9
interspecies xenografts (i.e. injection of fetal material into nonhuman materials) – for some 
comments on this problem, see chapter 2, section C.2.b below. In Germany, the ZEB 
(Zentrale Ethikkommission bei der Bundesärztekammer) dismissed therapeutic use of 
fetal/embryonic tissues in Parkinson's patients as ethically dubious out of a combination of 
numerous reasons and voiced a square refusal to such practices in 1998.30 The transfer of 
material from one organism to another (i.e. the causation of chimerism per se) was not an 
issue in the moral concerns regarding neural transplants; the debate focused on the proper 
management of health risks. 
My focus in this work will, as I have previously pointed out, be on interspecific chimeras, 
i.e. a type of creature where the individual being contains live material from two or more 
species. Let us first have a look at animal-to-animal chimeras which do not involve human 
material and then, in sections 4 and 5 below, at chimeras between humans and animals. 
3. Interspecific animal-to-animal chimeras 
Since the 1970s, numerous experiments have been carried out that resulted in interspecific 
chimeras. One of the first interspecific chimeras was brought about by M. Susan Stern, 
who created a chimeric rat-mouse blastocyst in 1973.31 Many interspecific chimeras have 
been created since then; many of them reached adulthood and some were even fertile.  
One experiment of this kind 
which gives a very tangible 
illustration of chimerism was 
the sheep-goat chimera (see 
picture 2). In 1984 such an 
animal was created by 
artificially fusing a sheep and a 
goat embryo, which was then 
brought to term.32 The 
creature, which is sometimes 
called "geep", displays 
characteristics of both sheep 
                                                 
30 Zentrale Ethikkommisson bei der Bundesärztekammer (1998), "Übertragung von Nervenzellen in das 
Gehirn von Menschen." 
31 Stern (1973), "Chimaeras obtained by aggregation of mouse eggs with rat eggs", Nature, 243(5408). 
32 Fehilly, Willadsen, et al. (1984), "Interspecific chimaerism between sheep and goat", Nature, 307. 
Picture 2: Sheep-goat chimera  
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and goat, but these are not evenly distributed, resulting in an intermediate type (as would be 
the case in a sheep-goat hybrid). Instead, they are scattered, puzzle-like, over the animal's 
body depending on where in the organism sheep cells or goat cells prevailed. Thus, a geep 
has sheep parts which are woolly (or display other sheep characteristics) and goat parts that 
are hairy (or display other goat characteristics). 
The creation of interspecific chimeras which live to later embryonic or even adult stages 
does not work between randomly selected species. Veteran chimerism researcher Andrzej 
Tarkowski notes that the attempt of a colleague at creating sheep-cow chimeras resulted in 
severely malformed lambs, and that reabsorption of implanted, non-viable chimeric 
blastocysts is a very common occurrence.33 It soon became clear that the viability of such 
interspecific chimeric embryos depends mainly on whether the two species are closely 
genetically related.34 
A notable step in chimera research – which might be especially interesting in regard to 
ethical questions – was the creation of "quail-brained chicken" by Balaban, Teillet and Le 
Douarin in 1988.35 Parts of the neural tube of quail embryos (the structure that later 
develops into the central nervous system) were implanted in chick embryos. This resulted 
in chicks whose behaviour indicated a transfer of species-specific inborn properties: The 
quail-chick chimeras crowed similarly to quails. The extent of this chicken-atypical 
behaviour depended on how extensive the insertion of quail cells had been. This was "the 
first demonstration of cross-species behavioral transfer brought about by neuronal 
transplantation."36 A transfer of "inborn auditory perceptual preference"– i.e. response to 
species-specific maternal calls – in the brain-transplanted chicks was observed in later 
experiments.37 The example of the quail-brained chicken is often used to demonstrate that 
a transfer of behavioural characteristics from one species to another is possible, in 
principle. 
                                                 
33 Tarkowski (1998), "Mouse chimaeras revisited: recollections and reflections", International Journal of 
Developmental Biology, 42, p. 905. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Balaban, Teillet, et al. (1988), "Application of the quail-chick chimera system to the study of brain 
development and behavior", Science, 241. 
36 Ibid., p. 1341. 
37 Long, Kennedy, et al. (2001), "Transferring an inborn auditory perceptual preference with interspecies 
brain transplants", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98. 
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4. Human-to-animal chimeras  
The development and possibilities of artificial manipulation of diverse human cells, above 
all, stem cells, is of great interest to researchers. Because there obviously are ethical limits 
regarding the study of such cells within the human body, many scientists have seized the 
opportunity to create human-to-animal chimeras – i.e. chimeras consisting of an adult, fetal 
or embryonic animal host into which genetically human parts of cells, unconnected single 
cells or cell structures/tissues are artificially introduced. 
a. Human-to-animal chimeras (adult recipient) 
An (alleged) example of this development which stays 
in collective memory was the infamous "earmouse", a 
naked mouse with an ear-like structure on its back, 
created by Charles Vacanti and Linda Griffith-Cima in 
1997.38 Iconic pictures of the "earmouse" (see picture 
3) were publicized widely via the internet, allegedly 
symbolizing the horrors of "genetic manipulation". 
How and why did this strange creature come into 
being? Vacanti and Griffith-Cima seeded a scaffold of 
biodegradable polymer with cartilage cells and 
transplanted it onto the back of an immunodeficient mouse, whose organism then nurtured 
the auricle. Their research was aimed at the future possibility of re-growing ears or other 
cartilage structures in vitro, or even directly on human patients who need such a substitute 
because of accidents or genetic defects. Charles Vacanti is still working on making this 
"tissue engineering" approach ready for application in humans. Because the host, in the 
case of Vacanti's and Griffith-Cima's mouse, was an adult individual, this kind of chimera 
would be called an adult chimera. It was not a human-to-animal chimera, though. Despite 
its appearance, the ear on the mouse's back did not contain human, but bovine cartilage 
cells. The iconic image of the "earmouse" may be a powerful symbol for human-animal 
mixing, but the creature in question did not even contain human material. 
Experiments resulting in actual human-to-animal adult chimeras employ techniques that 
differ from Vacanti's tissue engineering approach. Human material is introduced in animal 
organisms, but instead of somatic human cells, researchers use precursor cells or stem 
                                                 
38 Cao, Vacanti, et al. (1997), "Transplantation of Chondrocytes Utilizing a Polymer-Cell Construct to 
Produce Tissue-Engineered Cartilage in the Shape of a Human Ear." Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery, 
100(2). 
Picture 3: "Vacanti Mouse" 
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cells.39 Let me first give some examples for the use of human precursor cells in 
transplantations to nonhuman hosts: 
In 2002, Benjamin Dekel and colleagues from the Weizman Institute in Israel succeeded in 
inducing the growth of miniature kidneys in mice by transplantation of kidney precursor 
cells taken from human and pig embryos.40 This experiment ultimately aims at the 
production of substitute organs for humans in need of transplantation, and it was a main 
point of interest for researchers to find out at what point in time kidney precursor cells are 
best transplanted to the alien organism in order to flourish.  
To give another example of this kind of research, Angioi and colleagues transferred 
embryonic human stomachs, tracheas, intestine and lungs into adult mice in 2002, which 
led to the development of functional "micro-organs".41  
Another human-to-animal chimerism experiment in which precursor cells were used 
focused on growing human prostrate tissue in mice by implanting specially manipulated 
human embryonic stem cells ("prostate tissue precursor cells"). This experiment was 
carried out by Renea Taylor and Prue Cowin in Melbourne in 2005.42 Here, the focus was 
on finding out how benign prostate disease (BPH) and prostate cancer develops in order to 
be able to treat it more successfully in the future.  
Similar research has also been carried out in Germany. Scientists at the Max Delbrück 
Center for Molecular Medicine (Berlin) transplanted liver cells derived from human 
embryonic stem cells into mice with partially damaged livers. Among other objectives, the 
researchers wanted to find out whether transplantations of liver cells prepared in this 
manner could be used for liver regeneration therapy in human patients.43 
Ahmed Mansouri at the Max Planck Institute for Biophysical Chemistry (Göttingen) 
obtained a licence to conduct similar research in 2003. The MPIbpc project involved the 
                                                 
39 Stem cells are less developed than progenitor cells and have greater potential for differentiation. In 
technical terms, progenitor cells are "multipotent" (can create only some kinds of cells), while stem cells are 
"pluripotent" (can develop into all kinds of cells). "Precursor cell" is a generic term for both "stem cells" and 
"progenitor cells", used in cases where it is not clear whether the cells at issue have stem cell or progenitor 
cell properties, i.e. are pluripotent or multipotent, which can be hard or impossible to ascertain. For a detailed 
explanation of terminology and an overview of current stem cell research, see Kempermann (2008), Neue 
Zellen braucht der Mensch: Die Stammzellforschung und die Revolution der Medizin. 
40 Dekel, Burakova, et al. (2003), "Human and porcine early kidney precursors as a new source for 
transplantation", Nature Medicine, 9. 
41 Angioi, Hatier, et al. (2002), "Xenografted Human Whole Embryonic and Fetal Entoblastic Organs 
Develop and Become Functional Adult-Like Micro-Organs", Journal Of Surgical Research, 102. 
42 Taylor, Cowin, et al. (2006), "Formation of human prostate tissue from embryonic stem cells", Nature 
Methods, 3(3). 
43 Robert-Koch-Institut (2004), "7. Genehmigung nach dem Stammzellgesetz (erteilt am 21.10.2004)", 
Register genehmigter Anträge nach §11 Stammzellengesetz. 
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implantation of dopamine-producing human neural precursor cells obtained from human 
embryonic stem cells in fetal rats' brains (for this part of the project, done by Oliver 
Brüstle, see p. 16), and implantation of similar human cells into marmoset monkeys' brains 
which have been manipulated to mimic Parkinson's.44 A somewhat sensational report45 on 
these experiments (describing them as injection of human embryonic stem cells, while 
actually only differentiated cells were transplanted, and mentioning the startled and 
appalled reaction of the president of the "Nationaler Ethikrat" to these allegations) was 
vehemently disputed by the MPIbpc.46 The institution's assertion that only blastocysts 
fused with alien cells lead to chimerism while the experiments discussed were "just 
transplantations"47 is not without controversy: common definitions of "chimera" would 
include the creatures created in the MPIbpc experiments (cf. section C below). 
Researchers also make use of chimeras to test stem cell-based therapies for diabetes – one 
U.S. research team based in San Diego derived a cell type from human embryonic stem 
cells that was capable of synthesizing pancreatic hormones, such as insulin. These insulin-
expressing cells were implanted into mice with diabetes and damaged kidneys, leading to 
improved blood sugar levels – it is suspected that this was caused by the human stem cells 
integrating into and thereby repairing the mouse kidneys.48 Similar experiments were 
carried out by a team of researchers at Tulane University, who used multipotent human 
stem cells derived from bone marrow which they injected in diabetic mice.49 Diabetes 
researchers hope that in the future, cells derived from the patients' own bone marrow 
could be used to treat diabetes.50 
Regarding spinal cord injuries (the cause of paraplegia), Cummings, Uchida et al., 
transplanted human stem cells to the injured portion of a mouse's spinal cord in order to 
                                                 
44 See Robert-Koch-Institut (2003), "5. Genehmigung nach dem Stammzellgesetz (erteilt am 27.10.2003)", 
Register genehmigter Anträge nach §11 Stammzellengesetz. 
45 Traufetter (2005), "Der Mensch im Tier", Der Spiegel, 2005/05/02. On the events that followed the 
SPIEGEL article, see also Löhr (2005), "Chimären aus dem Labor", die tageszeitung, 2005/05/06. 
46 Max-Planck-Institut für biophysikalische Chemie (MPIbpc) (2005), "Richtigstellung und Stellungnahme - 
Informationen zum SPIEGEL-Artikel 'Der Mensch im Tier' und zur dpa-Meldung 'Nationaler Ethikrat will 
sich mit Chimären-Experimenten befassen'." 
47 "Bei den genannten Versuchen handelt es sich keineswegs um die Generierung von Chimären, sondern 
lediglich um eine Transplantation. Chimären sind Organismen, deren Gewebe nach der Injektion von 
undifferenzierten Stammzellen in den frühen Embryo (Blastocyste) aus unterschiedlichem Erbgut 
zusammengesetzt sind." - Ibid., p. 2. 
48 D'Amour, Bang, et al. (2006), "Production of pancreatic hormone-expressing endocrine cells from human 
embryonic stem cells", Nature Biotechnology, 24. 
49 Lee, Seo, et al. (2006), "Multipotent stromal cells from human marrow home to and promote repair of 
pancreatic islets and renal glomeruli in diabetic NOD/ scid mice", Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 103(46). 
50 BBC News (2006), "Stem cell cure hope for diabetes", 2006/11/12. 
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"repair" it in 2004. The transplanted material apparently differentiated and survived, and an 
improvement of the animal's ability to climb along a horizontal ladder could be observed.51  
Stem Cells Inc., a company that contributed to this research, and its leading scientist Irving 
Weissman, were also involved in a project researching the integration of human neural 
stem cells in the ischemic (post-stroke) brain of rats; the ultimate aim of the investigations 
was the question whether the transplantation of human stem cells into patients' brains 
could be a therapeutic option for stroke in the future.52  
Transplantation of human stem cells in adult animals' brains is not only done in mice, but 
also in primates: Yale psychiatrist Eugene Redmond hopes to contribute to finding a cure 
to Parkinson's by carrying out transplantations of human neural stem cells in adult African 
green monkeys' brains.53 The stem cells are hoped to morph into dopamine-producing cells 
when implanted at the right place. Dopamine is a substance that Parkinson's-affected 
brains lack, and the procedure apparently leads to an improvement of Parkinsonism in 
animals.54 Just like Mansouri's experiments, Weissman's and Redmond's neural stem- or 
precursor cell xenograft experiments have been discussed in the media55 and were ethically 
controversial enough to trigger a general interest of ethics' commissions regarding the topic 
of chimera research.56  
b. Human-to-animal chimeras (embryonic or fetal recipient) 
Many chimera experiments described so far involve only "discrete functions and organs" of 
the (adult) host, as Robert and Baylis put it.57 Such "old school" chimeras are basically just 
animals with a few human cells or humans with a few animal cells (even if these few cells 
are in the brain). When compared to the introduction of differentiated somatic cells, using 
human progenitor or stem cells as transplantation material leaves a much bigger margin for 
unforeseen reactions and interactions of the introduced cells. And as biotechnology 
                                                 
51 Cummings, Uchida, et al. (2005), Human neural stem cells differentiate and promote locomotor recovery in 
spinal cord-injured mice", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102 (39). 
52 Kelly, Bliss, et al. (2004), "Transplanted human fetal neural stem cells survive, migrate, and differentiate in 
ischemic rat cerebral cortex", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(32). 
53 For coverage of Redmond's experiments, see Bearden (2005a), "Extendend Interview: Eugene Redmond", 
Online NewsHour - A NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript; Shreeve (2005), "The Other Stem-Cell 
Debate", The New York Times Magazine, 2005/04/10. 
54 For background information on Redmond's approach, see Redmond (2002), "Cellular Replacement 
Therapy for Parkinson's Disease: Where We Are Today?" The Neuroscientist, 8(5). 
55 See e.g. Bearden (2005b), "Extendend Interview: Irving Weissman", Online NewsHour - A NewsHour 
with Jim Lehrer Transcript; Shreeve (2005), "The Other Stem-Cell Debate", The New York Times Magazine, 
2005/04/10; Traufetter (2005), "Der Mensch im Tier", Der Spiegel, 2005/05/02. 
56 Greene, Schill, et al. (2005), "The Working Group on the Criteria for Cell-Based Therapies, John Hopkins 
University: Moral Issues of Human-Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting", Science, 309; Nationaler Ethikrat 
(2005), "Wortprotokoll - Niederschrift über den öffentlichen Teil der Sitzung am 25. August 2005", p. 7. 
57 Robert and Baylis (2003), "Crossing Species Boundaries", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3), p. 1. 
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develops over the years, even more intricate (and less controllable) mixtures are within 
reach. When alien cells or materials are introduced in a host organism that is not adult and 
differentiated, but still in early developmental stages itself – e.g. fetal, embryonic, zygote or 
even gamete –, the integration and influence of alien cells or materials on the novel 
organism brings pronounced uncertainties. The earlier alien materials are implanted, the 
bigger and harder to predict the potential consequences for the developing organism.58 This 
point is particularly applicable in regard to pluripotent cells (i.e. some types of stem cells) 
that have the ability to differentiate into basically all kinds of cells. 
Experiments where human cells were introduced in animal recipients in the fetal stage 
include Evan Snyder's 2001 project at Harvard University. Snyder's team implanted human 
neural stem cells into the brain of fetal bonnet monkeys. The scientists waited until the 
monkeys' cerebral cortex was developed and then carried out a histological examination of 
the fetal animals: the human cells had widely migrated, survived and integrated to great 
extent.59 This experiment improved the prognosis for success of gene therapy or cell-
substitution approaches via neural stem cell transplantation to the brain of large nonhuman 
primates or – as the ultimate goal – humans.  
German stem cell pioneer Oliver Brüstle, working at the MPIbpc's project on 
differentiation of human embryonic stem cells and xenografts of dopamine-producing 
precursor cells into marmoset monkeys, and his colleague Ahmed Mansouri, obtained a 
licence for transplantation of human neural progenitor cells in fetal rat brains in 2003.60  
In another experiment utilizing fetal chimeras, Esmail Zanjani of the University of Nevada 
and his research group implanted human hematopoietic stem cells, extracted from bone 
marrow or cord blood, in fetal sheep, during the stage of development where the immune 
system of the fetuses had not yet developed. This resulted in adult sheep whose livers 
contained up to 20% human cells.61 While Zanjani was initially just interested in gene 
therapy of genetically defective (human) fetuses, he soon discovered that using animals to 
                                                 
58 Greely (2003), "Defining Chimeras…and Chimeric Concerns", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3), p. 18. 
59 Ourednik, Ourednik, et al. (2001), "Segregation of human neural stem cells in the developing primate 
forebrain", Science, 293; Robert and Baylis (2003), "Crossing Species Boundaries", American Journal of 
Bioethics, 3(3), p. 1. 
60 Robert-Koch-Institut (2003), "5. Genehmigung nach dem Stammzellgesetz (erteilt am 27.10.2003)", 
Register genehmigter Anträge nach §11 Stammzellengesetz; Nationaler Ethikrat (2005), "Wortprotokoll - 
Niederschrift über den öffentlichen Teil der Sitzung am 25. August 2005", p. 7. 
61 Almeida-Porada, Porada, et al. (2004), "Formation of human hepatocytes by human hematopoietic stem 
cells in sheep", Blood, 104(8). 
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grow human organs or tissues for transplantation might be very promising.62 Zanjani's 
group also did similar work on the heart.63 
Using even less developed recipients, scientists have transplanted human cells into animal 
embryos. Brüstle, Choudari and Karram, for example, created rats with chimeric brains by 
transplanting fetal human neural progenitor cells into embryonic rats in 1998.64 This 
resulted in extensive integration of the human progenitor cells in the rats' brains, which 
were killed and examined after one to seven weeks, but not – as opposed to the 
behavioural transfer in the quail-chick chimeras described on p. 11 – in change of 
behaviour.65 For researchers, it is highly interesting to see how human neural cells migrate 
and develop in a living organ, that is, an animal brain, and how they respond to the 
multiple developmental cues they are given by the host brain in order to be integrated in 
the cell structure. In a similar experiment, scientists of the University of Jerusalem 
implanted human embryonic stem cells in chick embryos in 2002, summing up:  
"Our results show that human ES cells transplanted in ovo survive, divide, 
differentiate, and integrate with host tissues and that the host embryonic 
environment may modulate their differentiation. The chick embryo, therefore, 
may serve as an accessible and unique experimental system for the study of in 
vivo development of human ES cells."66 
In 2005, Fred H. Gage from the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California and Japanese 
collaborators injected 100000 human embryonic stem cells into the brain of 14-day-old 
mouse embryos. These chimeras were brought to term and contamination with genetically 
human neurons in the brains of the resulting mice amounted to 0.1%. Using patch 
clamping, it was shown that the human neurons inside the mouse brain were actually firing, 
which can be regarded as proof for (at least limited) function, rather than mere survival, of 
the neurons.67 Apart from hopefully furthering fundamental knowledge of human neural 
development, the experiments are thought to contribute to the future creation of chimera 
                                                 
62 Pagán Westphal (2003), "'Humanised' organs can be grown in animals", The New Scientist, 2003/12/17. 
63 Airey, Almeida-Porada, et al. (2004), "Human Mesenchymal Stem Cells Form Purkinje Fibers in Fetal 
Sheep Heart", Circulation, 109. 
64 Brüstle, Choudhary, et al. (1998), "Chimeric brains generated by intraventricular transplantation of fetal 
human brain cells into embryonic rats", Nature Biotechnology, 16. 
65 Greene, Schill, et al. (2005), "The Working Group on the Criteria for Cell-Based Therapies, John Hopkins 
University: Moral Issues of Human-Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting", Science, 309, p. 386. 
66 Goldstein, Drukker, et al. (2002), "Integration and differentiation of human embryonic stem cells 
transplanted to the chick embryo", Developmental Dynamics, 225. 
67 Muotri, Nakashima, et al. (2005), "Development of functional human embryonic stem cell-derived neurons 
in mouse brain", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102. 
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models for emulating human neurodegenerative and psychiatric diseases and for assessing 
the effectiveness of new drugs. Gage's work gained a lot of publicity.68 
Similarly to Fred Gage, Irving Weissman is a scientist whose actual experiments, as well as 
possible research scenarios, have stirred up a lot of discussion. Involved in the research of 
the human lymphoid and hematopoietic system, Weissman helped develop the "SCID-hu 
mouse" in the 1980s (see p. 5). Experiments that were much more challenging from the 
bioethicist's standpoint were proposed by Weissman some years ago (but never actually 
implemented). Because of the apparent ethical import of the experiments he was 
considering, Weissman contacted Henry Greely of Stanford University Law School in 
order to find out whether what he was planning could be done ethically. Weissman's 
scenarios were discussed in 2002 by a working group assembled by Greely, resulting in a 
report analysing the ethical implications and possible problems of such research. The 
report remained unpublished, yet Weissman's research plans and the results of the working 
group were summed up (and updated) in an American Journal of Bioethics target article in 
2007.69 According to this source, Irving Weissman was confronted with the finding of 
human "brain stem cells" and their successful isolation from human fetuses. At this point, 
it must have seemed to be a tantalizing prospect to create a mouse model that could 
accommodate a human neuronal system (or even just some living human neurons): just as 
the SCID-hu model offers new possibilities of doing research on the immune system, such 
a "human neuron mouse" would enable research on living, in vivo human neurons that 
could otherwise not be done. Additionally, in 2003, it had been shown that human brain 
stem cells can survive, migrate and even connect in the (SCID) mouse brain.70 So 
Weissman devised two setups that would go even further. In one scenario, he was planning 
to use a mouse strain whose cerebellum neurons had the propensity to die off some weeks 
after birth. The cerebellum is the part of the brain which is otherwise responsible for 
movement and coordination. Accordingly, the deficient mice show symptoms that closely 
resemble those of human patients who suffer from Friedrich's Ataxia, i.e. severe motor 
deficits. Shortly before the expected death of the mouse cerebellum neurons, Weissman 
would implant human brain stem cells (from aborted human fetuses) into this part of the 
                                                 
68 Editors of the American Journal Of Bioethics (2005), "Of Mice and Men", Bioethics.net Blog 2005/12/13; 
Spiegel Online (2005), "Mausgehirn: Menschliche Stammzellen werden zu Neuronen", 2005/12/14; The New 
York Times (2005), "Trace of Human Stem Cells Put in Unborn Mice Brains", 2005/12/13; Weiss (2005), 
"Human Brain Cells Are Grown In Mice", Washington Post, 2005/12/13. 
69 Greely, Cho, et al. (2007b), "Thinking About the Human Neuron Mouse", American Journal of Bioethics, 
7(5). 
70 Tamaki, Eckert, et al. (2002), "Engraftment of sorted/expanded human central nervous system stem cells 
from fetal brain", Journal of Neuroscience Research, 69. 
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mouse brain. By looking at the ensuing cerebellum activity, Weissman would then be able 
to see whether the implanted (human) cells actually functioned in the mouse brain (in this 
case, the ataxia symptoms of the mice would disappear or be alleviated). The experiment 
has not been done yet because the mouse strain proved unfit for this specific use. 
A second proposed scenario would have made use of an even more deficient strain of 
mice, in which all neurons die off already during embryonic development. These missing 
cells would then be substituted by human neurons from brain stem cells. This model would 
allow for a functioning formation of human neurons on an animal organism substrate 
(analogously to the SCID-hu mouse which models the human immune system in a mouse 
organism). Such a model, Weissman hopes, could not only be used for studying the 
behaviour of brain stem cells, human neurons in general or human neurodegenerative 
diseases, but also, in the long run, for drug testing regarding agents' influence on living 
human neurons in an organism (which can hardly be done today because of ethical 
boundaries regarding experimentation in humans). This experiment has also not been 
carried out because, so far, a mouse strain with complete neuronal death could not been 
found. It remains unclear whether Weissman will return to trying to conduct these 
experiments in the future.71 The second setup sounds particularly spectacular, but it would 
be inaccurate to call the resulting chimera a "mouse with a human brain". This is for two 
reasons: firstly, the brain does not only consist of neurons, but also of Glia cells, the 
structural cells of the brain which are a necessary substrate for the neurons. Glia cells 
would remain murine in Weissman's experiment and constitute up to 50% of the brain 
mass. Secondly, what makes a brain "human" is not the origin of the neurons in it, but 
rather the way they are assembled, i.e. their architecture. As long as a brain has a clearly 
murine architecture, in theory, it is not humanized and human attributes will not emerge. 
There is some scientific agreement regarding this architecture hypothesis, although it has, 
as Greely et al. point out, "not been tested."72 But even if we remain sceptical regarding the 
attribute "human", it is clearly not true that Weissman's "takeover" mouse would have a 
"100% human" brain, as Jeremy Rifkin claimed in a 2005 article.73 
Another chimera experiment involving embryonic animal recipients raised eyebrows in 
2006: Ali Brinvalou at New York Rockefeller University implanted human embryonic stem 
cells into mouse blastocysts (i.e. mouse embryos at a very early stage of development, 
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7(5), p. 32. 
72 Ibid., p. 35. 
73 Rifkin (2005), "Are you a man or a mouse?" Guardian, 2005/03/15. 
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before the usual time of implantation). Brinvalou's team then went a step further and 
proceeded to implant the chimeric human-mouse blastocyst into the uterus of a mouse in 
order to test the pluripotency of stem cell lines, which is hard to ascertain otherwise 
(human blastocysts cannot be used for this "test" for ethical reasons). Brinvalou and his 
colleagues stated that "Embryonic chimeras generated in this way offer the opportunity to 
study the behavior of specialized human cell types in a nonhuman animal model."74 
Brivanlou's plans for "human-mouse embryos" received attention and criticism even well 
before they were actually created. The New York Times' Jamie Shreeve pointed out what 
he called the "gonad quandary". This problem, he mused, could arise when implanting 
human stem cells at early stages of development and then letting the resulting adult 
chimeras breed: 
"If the experiment really works, the human cells should differentiate into all of 
the embryo's cell lineages, including the one that eventually forms the animal's 
reproductive cells. If the mouse were male, some of its sperm might thus be 
human, and if it were female, some of its eggs might be human eggs. If two such 
creatures were to mate, there would be a chance that a human embryo could be 
conceived and begin to grow in a mouse uterus – a sort of Stuart Little 
scenario, but in reverse and not so cute."75 
Brinvalou's plans had also met opposition in a 2002 forum of stem cell researchers, not 
only because of some scepticism concerning the transferability of results gathered in 
murine blastocysts to human environments, but also because of general concerns about the 
"ethical complexity" of such experiments. Some of Brinvalou's colleagues feared that the 
human-murine embryo would "provoke public disquiet, and could galvanize political 
opposition to all research involving human embryos."76 
Recent successes in the field of chimera research have fired the imagination of the public. 
The visions evoked by Gage's, Weissman's, Brivanlou's and others' experiments are hardly 
ever utopian. Considering the rapid and complex developments of science regarding 
interspecies mixtures, some believe that scientists will soon be able and willing to create 
truly "humanized" chimeras. Such creatures could, hypothetically, be produced with similar 
methods as the "geep", e.g. by fusing a human and a chimpanzee embryo – which could 
result in "humanzees" or "chumans", chimeric mixtures of human and chimpanzee. The 
perceived threat of the "humanized chimera" motivated government advisor and biotech 
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critic Jeremy Rifkin and Stuart Newman, a cell biologist, to file two patent applications for 
"chimeric embryos and animals containing human cells" in 1997.77 Rifkin and Newman 
wanted to keep scientists from creating any kind of mammal-human chimera by not giving 
out any licenses.78 Both patents, one covering chimeric mixtures with primates, such as the 
"humanzee", the other regarding mixtures of human material with other animals, such as 
the alleged "human-brained mice", were turned down in August 2004 – U.S. law forbids 
the patenting of anything human, and the proposed patents would have resulted in 
something "too human", in this sense.79 Though Rifkin hopes that, now that his 
applications have been turned down, the apparent lack of patentability will keep stem cell 
researchers from creating human-animal chimeras,80 current developments seem to prove 
him wrong. On the other hand, the degree of humanization Rifkin fears81 as a consequence 
of chimera research is nowhere near realistic today: there are no "mice who think like 
human beings", no mice who beget human beings, no "ideal laboratory research animals" 
in the form of "humanzees". Contrary to Rifkin's assertions, such scenarios still are Science 
Fiction today – albeit fiction that, some argue, has a chance of becoming reality in our 
lifetime unless we soon take care of installing rigorous regulation preventing such 
scenarios. 
5. Animal-to-human chimeras 
The novel creatures we have looked at so far were characterized by an animal recipient or 
host into whom human material was artificially introduced. Scientists have also done the 
reverse, namely introducing genetically nonhuman material, sometimes whole animal 
organs, into the human organism.  
The prospect of using animal organs for substitution of defective human organs is quite 
promising, since it could solve (or at least reduce) the problem of organ scarcity and 
thereby prevent many deaths. Unfortunately, researchers of organ xenotransplantation have 
encountered severe difficulties in the last century. To begin with, immune rejection, which 
is the central problem of all transplantation ventures, is much stronger when using organs 
of alien species. Rejection of interspecies transplants cannot be controlled by the 
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immunosuppressive means used in (human) allotransplants, but using stronger 
immunosuppression creates intolerable, fatal complications.82 Another problem is the 
differing anatomy, size and functionality of animal organs. Although pigs are somewhat 
anatomically similar to humans, it is not clear whether organs such as the lung could 
accommodate to the vertical positioning of their human host over long periods of time; 
also, porcine tissue may react differently to hormones and other substances within the 
human body in the long term.  
Apart from these problems of compatibility, introducing animal organs or tissues into 
humans increases the risk of zoonoses, i.e. infectious diseases that are transmitted from 
animals to humans. Some of the most dangerous diseases in humans result from infectious 
agents mutating and crossing over the species lines, under circumstances of close contact 
with infected animals – and introducing animal organs or tissue into immunosuppressed 
human organisms is probably the closest kind of "contact" imaginable. While most 
microorganisms can be eradicated from the source pigs, porcine endogenous retroviruses 
(PERVs) are apparently impossible to completely eliminate so far and could result in 
tumours and immune deficiency in the human host after transplantation.83 (The potential 
risks of xenotransplantation will be further discussed in chapter 2, section C.3 below). 
Despite the numerous problems it has to face until today, xenotransplantation has a long 
(and quite interesting) history – for more than a hundred years, the prospect of using 
animal material to help diseased humans has fascinated researchers.84 Solid organ 
xenotransplantation in modern clinical settings dates back to Princeteau, who transplanted 
parts of rabbit kidneys in a girl in 1905;85 and to Ernst Unger, who used a monkey kidney 
for implantation in 1909.86 Keith Reemtsma's projects of the 1960s,87 due to advances in 
immunosuppression techniques, were the starting point for more promising attempts at 
xenotransplantation. In 1963, he transplanted chimpanzee kidneys into humans – all but 
one of the fourteen recipients died within two months, one survived for 9 months. A 
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human recipient of a chimpanzee heart lived for two hours after transplantation in 1964. In 
1984, Bailey succeeded in transplanting a baboon's heart into a newborn ("Baby Fae" lived 
for three weeks).88 In 1992, Starzl and colleagues used baboon livers,89 but the experiments 
were not very successful, just as Makowka's transplantations of pig liver and heart.90 
Generally speaking, whole organ xenotransplantation, which has been tried over 100 times 
with diverse organs,91 has not been successful so far. Because of severe incompatibility 
problems, whole organ xenotransplantation will probably not catch on until organs can be 
sufficiently "humanized" via tissue engineering, transgenesis or chimerism. 
Transplantation of animal cells and cell clusters (i.e. non-vasculated tissues), on the other 
hand, has been more successful. Animal (especially frog) skin grafts have been used as 
temporary adhesive and flexible covering of burn wounds for hundreds of years.92 Since the 
1960s, porcine skin xenografts were a common skin substitute for burn victims.93 Pig and 
cow heart valves have been successfully used beginning with Binet's experiments in 1965,94 
resulting in what is today a standard procedure for replacing defective human valves. The 
animal valves are rendered biologically inert before implantation by a chemical tanning and 
fixation process and thus do not contain living cells. The same is true for porcine skin 
xenografts: they are basically dead tissue and are not vasculated during the healing 
process.95 Note that therefore, a human being with a bioprosthetic heart valve, just as a 
burn victim whose wounds are dressed with porcine xenografts, would not qualify as an 
animal-to-human chimera under definitions of "chimera" that require the use of live alien 
material.  
Other methods of xenotransfer did not stand the test of time. In the 1930s, it became 
therapeutic fashion to introduce live animal cells into the human body in order to generate 
effects of "revitalisation" – usually understood as pertaining to sexual function. Most 
famously among these early "endocrinotherapists" became Serge Voronoff, a Russian 
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working in Paris, who specialized in testicle grafts from chimpanzees and baboons to men, 
and of ape ovaries to women. He allegedly performed these procedures in 2000 patients.96 
Voronoff's work seems to have brought "relative success" in some patients – apparently 
the glands did not trigger massive immune reactions. Still, Voronoff lost all scientific and 
public reputation. The method of a certain Paul Niehans, who worked in Germany until 
well into the 1950s, was similarly unconventional: he injected crushed animal cells (usually 
from the thymus glands of lambs) to "rejuvenate" his patients. More than 30 of them died 
from severe immune reactions instead.97 "Revitalisation" therapies involving gland 
xenografts and injection of live animal cells were never scientifically recognized and 
systematically studied; it remains unclear whether they ever resulted in animal-to-human 
chimeras with live animal cells integrating into the human organism.  
A more modern, scientifically legitimate use of animal cells for therapeutic means is the 
external use of pig livers as temporary substitute for a failing human organ, i.e. 
"extracorporeal xenogeneic liver perfusion", which was first introduced in the 1960s. 
Today, scientists are testing transgenic porcine livers for perfusion applications, which 
apparently can work as a successful interim solution before allotransplantation.98 Again, this 
technique would commonly not be considered to result in "chimerism" because alien 
material is not introduced into the body itself. The same applies to the extracorporeal use 
of bioreactors containing pig cells which are connected to patients with liver failure as 
temporary substitutes ("bioartificial liver devices" or BAL).99 
There are some instances of successful transplants of animal tissue that actually lead to live 
animal-to-human chimerism in the patient. To give some examples from the 90s, scientists 
have used clusters of fetal porcine islet-like cells in diabetes therapy.100 Pig cells have 
survived and produced insulin in the human organism for astounding periods of time, in 
one documented case, for 9.5 years.101 Injections of fetal pig neural cells have been used to 
treat neurodegenerative diseases like Parkinson's and Huntington's – though the treatments 
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have not turned out to be very successful, alien neural cells survived in the host for 
prolonged periods of time.102  
As we can see, animal-to-human chimeras are created exclusively in the adult recipient 
variety – this is because under most legislation, human embryos and fetuses cannot be 
subject to chimerism-inducing procedures. Induction of animal-to-human chimerism in 
adults suffering from degenerative diseases is evidently less controversial. This is not only 
because the introduction of animal material is justified by medical indications (as opposed 
to mere "experimentation"), but also because integrated xenografts in adult human 
recipients only affect discrete functions, rather than spreading within the body, which could 
be the consequence of xenografting during early stages of human development.  
Xenotransplantation is currently at a crossroads. Its possibilities have fascinated researchers 
for almost one hundred years, yet it has never yielded mainstream applications. The use of 
animal tissues, maybe even whole solid organs, will probably increase and become more 
common once transgenesis and tissue engineering techniques are fully developed and 
animal materials can be manipulated in order to better adapt to transplantation purposes. 
As mentioned on page 16 above, researchers are already trying to grow biologically human 
organs in (chimeric) animals.103 This seems like a promising outlook for transplantation 
medicine – another possible route is genetic manipulation of animal organs. Specialists of 
the field estimate that 2010 will see the first promising trials of transplantation of 
transgenic pig hearts into humans in the U.S.104 "Humanization" of animal organs by means 
of genetic engineering is another branch of science where the line between human and 
nonhuman species is crossed by artificial means; I will look at transgenic "humanized" 
animals in the next section.  
6. Transgenesis 
Advances in genetic engineering have enabled scientists not only to interfere with the 
genetic information of a given species or individual (by "gene splicing") but also to transfer 
genetic information from one species to another (transgenesis).  
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One technique that is commonly used in order to test methods of gene transfer is to 
introduce certain easily recognizable genes ("reporter genes") into mammals' gene 
sequences. Gerald Schatten and his team, for example, created the rhesus monkey "ANDi"  
in 2001.105 ANDi (the acronym stands for "inserted DNA" read backwards) was 
manipulated in order to contain the fluorescent protein of a jellyfish (GFP), which results 
in a green glow of the animal under special lighting. Korean scientists created GFP 
transgenic pigs in 2006.106 By using reporter genes like the GFP gene, scientists can make 
sure the transgenic organism actually expresses the introduced alien information, in 
preparation for introducing genes that have a more relevant effect (i.e., genes that cause 
disease). Another possible use of the GFP method could be in stem cell research, because 
fluorescent stem cells could be much more easily observed and tracked. Transgenesis 
experimentation is not limited to medical research: in 2000, Chicago artist Eduardo Kac 
had French scientists manipulate an albino rabbit ("Alba") in order to contain GFP, 
pronouncing this successful experiment and the ensuing public interest in the animal a 
"transgenic art project".107  
a. Human-to-animal transgenesis 
Transgenesis is also used to create human-animal interspecifics. One example for such 
transgenic human-animal interspecifics are animals that "model" or emulate specific human 
diseases. A relatively advanced way of bringing animal organisms to mimic a human disease 
is that of introducing certain genetic information – e.g., the gene(s) which triggers a certain 
disease in humans, or the gene(s) which make an organism susceptible to a certain virus – 
into animals' organisms in order to study the disease more closely and to be able to test 
possible therapies. Today, thousands of mouse models of human diseases are available – 
mice which are or become, by genetic disposition, immunodeficient, cancer-infested, above 
or below average size, naked, obese, sclerotic, diabetic or have chronic hypertension, cystic 
fibrosis or deficiencies regarding the production of a certain enzyme or hormone.108 Often, 
these dispositions have been created by introducing human-typical genes into the mouse 
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organism. Usually this is done by using DNA microinjection or homologous 
recombination in embryonic stem cells.109 
b. Animal-to-human transgenesis 
The technology enabling scientists to create transgenic animals could be used to modify the 
genetic setup of human beings, as well. This is what scientists at Cornell University did in 
2007: Zev Rosenwaks and his colleagues introduced GFP marker genes into a human 
blastocyst in order to find out whether the gene would spread over all the developing cells. 
And, in fact, all the newly developed cells in the embryo glowed.110 The experiment was 
carried out on a non-viable embryo with a severe chromosomal deficiency, which was left 
to develop for only three days. Still, Rosenwaks' research stirred up controversy and was 
seen as an attempt to introduce "designer babies".111 The "species-crossing" quality of his 
manipulation was apparently not seen as the main problem. 
Apart from exceptions like Rosenwaks' experiments, transgenesis in human embryos is not 
a common field of research for scientists (and illegal in many countries). In an exploratory 
article, Oxford ethicist Julian Savulescu describes some scenarios in which introduction of 
animal genetic sequences into human genetic code, in his opinion, might not only be 
justified, but even advisable: 
"Imagine that scientists discover that some species are resistant to HIV 
infection and that resistance is genetically encoded. Imagine that it becomes 
possible to introduce these gene sequences into the human genome in order to 
confer resistance to HIV. While this is speculative, it is not absurd."112 
Savulescu describes similar scenarios not only aimed at defeating diseases, but also 
concerning "enhancement" of human properties: e.g. transferring animal genes that lead to 
a longer life span, improved night vision or even to the emergence of new sensory abilities, 
such as sonar, in human beings.113 It is unclear whether any of these scenarios will ever be 
within the bounds of scientific possibility; apart from this restriction, discussion of the 
moral advisability and implications of such plans would probably concentrate on the 
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question under which circumstances enhancement of human beings is morally advisable, 
and, above all, whether intrusion into the human germ line (which seems, at least under 
current conditions, to be an irreversible step) is such a good idea, in the first place. 
Confronted with these issues, the problem of the "species-crossing" quality of transgenic 
humans would probably take a back seat with bioethicists. 
c. Massive human-animal transgenesis 
Genetic manipulation across species can involve more than single genes – in the human-to-
animal direction, for example, mice have been created that contain almost a complete copy 
of the human chromosome 21.114 Critics of genetic manipulation fear that a massive 
introduction of human genes into animals or vice versa could lead to the scenario Sagoff 
describes in somewhat sensational tones: 
"(…) a mad geneticist could produce a transgenic embryo, implant it in a 
surrogate mother, and bring to term a Caliban that is neither clearly animal 
nor clearly human."115  
Though Sagoff vehemently dismisses this as "too incredible for any but the most lurid 
cinema",116 it is not an entirely invalid concern. Joshua Lederberg, geneticist and Nobel 
Prize laureate, noted as early as 1966 that "organisms whose karyotype is augmented by 
fragments of the human chromosome set", i.e. human-animal transgenic beings, might be 
more of an issue in future science than human cloning.117 Lederberg's prognosis of the 
likely creation of "subhuman", human-animal beings by scientists was never realized, but 
the problem of "massive humanization" is still recognized as one. A report of the Academy 
of Medical Sciences in the UK, issued in 2007, pointed out that  
"(…) it will be necessary to consider the appropriate conceptual and regulatory 
framework for transgenic and chimeric animals that contain significant 
amounts of human genetic material."118 
The image of a being that is a seamless fusion of human and animal, i.e. in which human 
and animal components fade into each other so much that one cannot say where one starts 
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and the other ends, is powerful and iconic; maybe even more potent than that of the 
characteristically motley chimera found in the art of almost all ages and cultures.  
Artist Patricia Piccinini has used such imagery in her work for the Australian pavilion at the 
Venice Biennale 2002 ("We are Family").119 Among other exhibits, one especially striking 
live-sized sculpture titled "The Young Family" depicts a mother-creature – an eerily 
hyperrealistic mixture of human and pig – which idyllically suckles three demonstrably cute, 
pinkish human-pig babies (see Picture 4).  
Piccinini's sculptures are evidently not realistic portrayals of what is done in today's genetics 
labs, but they tap deeply into the dream-like images terms like "transgenesis" conjure up in 
our minds. Current biotechnology has inspired Piccinini since the beginning of the 90s 
(when she worked on what she called "The Mutant Genome Project"); the catalogue essay 
accompanying the "human pig family" duly identifies Piccinini's creations as "transgenic".120 
The ethical implications of "humanizing" animals (or "animalizing" humans) will be 
discussed later. The degree up to which transgenesis could actually lead to animals 
exhibiting human properties (or vice versa) remains unknown. Although popular culture 
sees genetic engineering as a singularly powerful, near-magical device – re-shuffling species 
seemingly without difficulty, with the help of all-determining, easily transferred genes – the 
reality of transgenic beings, as exemplified by the scenarios I described above, is 
considerably less flashy.  
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Picture 4: Patricia Piccinini, "The Young Family", sculpture created for Venice Biennale 2003 
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The important point to take from this section is that not only chimerism but also 
transgenesis can cause creatures to stand between species lines. Transgenic animals like the 
ones described in this chapter are "interspecific" in the sense that their organisms express 
not only their own species-typical DNA, but also DNA that is typical for alien species. 
Mark Sagoff uses the term "chimera" in a somewhat confusing way when calling transgenic 
mice – such as the "Harvard OncoMouse", a mouse strain that contains a human-typical 
cancer-gene121 –"transgenic chimeras" and implying they are "just [mice] with a few human 
cells."122 Transgenic animals like the OncoMouse, "ANDi", or "Alba" are not chimeric, that 
is to say they do not contain "genetically human" cells, at all. Rather, they express one or 
several human-typical gene sequences in all or some of their cells. 
7. Human-animal hybrids 
We have, so far, looked at interspecifics that are a human-animal mixture on the cellular 
level (chimeras) and on the genetic level (transgenic organisms). But an interspecific 
mixture can also take place on a level that is, one could say, relatively "natural": on the level 
of egg and sperm (gametes).  
A mixture of this kind between humans and animals is conceivable – even without highly 
complex means of contemporary biotech – regarding closely related species, i.e. other 
primates like chimpanzees, gorillas or orang-utans. 
It is a little-known fact that the renowned Russian biologist and artificial insemination 
specialist Ilya Ivanov tried, with great effort and many supporters, to create human-ape-
hybrids in the 1920s.123 In a mission to Africa, supported by the Russian government, the 
Academy of Science and the Institut Pasteur in Paris, Ivanov went about this strange 
project by artificially fertilizing chimpanzee females with human sperm – without success, 
but this could just as well be due to the fact that the conditions under which the 
inseminations were carried out were quite adverse and that thus, in effect, no more than 
three attempts at artificial insemination were undertaken.124 Back in Russia, Ivanov even 
tried to realise long-held plans for inseminating woman volunteers with orang-utan sperm 
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– attempts to inseminate African women (without their knowledge and consent) had, 
fortunately, not worked out. Since Ivanov fell from grace with the Bolsheviks and ended up 
in a gulag, such experiments never took place.  
Ivanov's curiosity concerning human-ape hybrids was not an isolated case: several 
biologists of his time wanted to try human-animal hybridization, mainly because of a strong 
interest in discovering human and other primates' phylogeny. Rossiianov, in his 
meticulously researched article on Ivanov's crossbreeding experiment, mentions Hermann 
Moens and Oscar Hermann Rohleder in this context.125 Others locate the budding 
scientific interest in human-nonhuman primate hybridization in 19th century France, and 
cite, among others, Jean-Jacques Rousseau as advocating such experiments.126 As late as 
1971, Charles Remington, a Professor of Biology at Yale University, advocated and 
predicted human-primate hybridisation experiments, even working out a detailed plan on 
the raising of a human-chimpanzee hybrid in a primate laboratory,127 noting dryly that 
"[t]he experiment's human interest value is too obvious to deserve much justification."128  
Popular culture, from the 19th century on, seems to be obsessed with the topos of the 
human-ape hybrid: Gustave Flaubert  wrote about Djalioh, product of a slave girl and an 
orang-utan, in 1837.129 And fascination with human-ape hybrids remains vivid until today: 
Wikipedia contributors currently list more than a dozen examples of "human-ape hybrids" 
in contemporary culture,130 from "Planet of the Apes" (1968) to Michael Crichton's novel 
"Next" (2006) – featuring the uncanny human-chimpanzee-hybrid "Dave" who, clean-
shaven and well-behaved, certainly has come a long way from Flaubert's infanticidal, rapist 
Djalioh.  
Scientific and popular fascination notwithstanding, the existence of a real 
human/nonhuman-primate hybrid has never been verified. Although recently, scientists 
have brought forward the hypothesis that hybridisation between early human and 
                                                 
125 Moens and Bernelot (1908), Truth: Experimental Researches about the Descent of Man; Rohleder (1918), 
Künstliche Zeugung und Anthropogenie. 
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129 Flaubert (1980),"Quidquid volueris (1837)", in: Jugendwerke. Erste Erzählungen. Aus dem Französischen 
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chimpanzee individuals was an important part of the speciesation process of Homo 
sapiens,131 it remains unclear whether a hybridisation between modern homo-sapiens and 
other nonhuman primate could ever result in viable offspring.132 
What about hybridisation of humans with non-primate animals? It is indisputable that such 
a mixture could not be arrived at by "natural" reproduction or the relatively low-tech 
means of artificial insemination, i.e. by a simple mixing of human and nonhuman gametes. 
There is one example that is, so to speak, on the brink of human-non-primate 
hybridisation: the "Hamster Test", a screening tool in reproductive medicine. In a "Sperm 
Penetration Assay", (SPA) human sperm fertility is tested on hamster ova.133 The sperm 
quality is assumed to be sufficient if the sperm succeeds in permeating the hamster egg. If 
this does not work, this indicates that the sperm donor might be infertile. The resulting 
human-hamster hybrid embryo does not proceed beyond the two cell stage,134 some state 
that "fertilization" does not even take place.135  
Generally speaking, the less closely two species are related, the less likely it is that 
hybridisation between their gametes works. This definitely rules out that "simple" hybrids 
between humans and non-primates could develop into viable organisms. Additionally, there 
are no scientific reasons (excluding simple curiosity) that would make generating an 
(embryonic) hybrid between human and nonhuman appear sensible. This might change, 
though – as the 2007 report by the UK Academy of Medical Sciences points out, "given 
the speed of this field of research, the emergence of scientifically valid reasons in the future 
cannot be ruled out" and further, "the reasons for banning the creation of hybrid embryos 
for in vitro experimental use (…) are not clear to us (…)."136 Abstract and tentative interest 
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in human-animal hybrid embryos notwithstanding, the creation of fully grown 
"humanzees" certainly seems not to be what is at issue at the moment. 
8. Human-animal cybrids 
a. Technicalities and motives 
Modern biotechnology offers new possibilities, and new motives, for creating human-
animal mixtures. Since there is a growing demand for human embryonic stem cells, 
scientists are trying to find ways of easily obtaining such cells, or cell types with similar 
properties. An ideal stem cell source would be one that does not rely on human embryos or 
gametes which are hard to get hold of, and whose use can cause ethical concern. One 
alternative could be that of "reverting" human cells to embryonic cells by transferring a 
human cell nucleus to the enucleated egg of an animal. This technique – somatic nuclear 
transfer – is better known as "cloning": the creators of Dolly the sheep transferred the 
nucleus of an adult sheep cell into an enucleated sheep ovum which was reimplanted and 
brought to term. The clone has exactly the same genetic setup as the donor from whom the 
nucleus has been obtained. The enucleated cell only keeps some of its DNA in its 
mitochondriae (i.e. organelles that serve as "cellular power plant"). When this method is 
used on egg and nucleus of differing species, the resulting entity is called "nucleo-
cytoplasmic hybrid" or "cybrid", for short. 
Even among experts, there are differing views on how "cybrids" should be classified. 
Although they do not stem from different zygotes, some experts classify them as chimeras 
because they exhibit a "genetic mix" of differing mitochondrial and nuclear DNA.137 
Journalists often refer to them simply as "hybrid embryos". At the opening conference of 
CHIMBRIDS (an EU project on chimeras and other interspecifics), one expert declared 
cybrids "hybrids" while another classified them as "chimeras".138 Cybrids are certainly not 
"true" hybrids, since their production does not involve the fusion of gametes of different 
species – hybrids are usually understood as products of sexual procreation.139 As a matter 
of accuracy, cybrids created of human nuclei and animal eggs should be regarded as 
interspecifics sui generis. 
                                                 
137 Jens Reich: "Auch das sind Chimären, und zwar, genetisch gesehen, mindestens wegen des 
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The history of cybrid creation began in 1996, when Jose Cibelli and colleagues tried to 
apply the somatic nuclear transfer technique to cow eggs and human nuclei. The team 
claimed to have created cybrids, but the success of this experiment is doubted.140 Some 
years later, a team of Chinese scientists led by Hui Zhen Sheng successfully employed the 
same approach to fuse human somatic nuclei with enucleated rabbit eggs.141 As expected, 
the resulting embryos' DNA is predominantly human; with the exception of DNA which 
stems from the rabbit egg's mitochondriae. Resulting incompatibilities notably diminish the 
potential of this cybrid to grow into a viable organism – it remains unclear whether human-
animal hybrids could, in theory, ever develop into an adult creature.142 For the experiments 
at issue, this question is irrelevant, since the created cells are not expected to survive after 
the blastocyst stage. At that point, the inner cell mass of the embryo is removed to harvest 
the resulting nuclear transfer embryonic stem cells, or rather "stem-like" cells which are 
hoped to have the same (pluripotent) properties as stem cells created without the 
involvement of somatic cells. The Sheng group showed that the harvested "stem-like" cells 
are indeed capable of differentiation and self-renewal.143  
b. Cybrids in the UK 
From the perspective of bioethics, the question of human-animal cybrids was (alongside 
with Weissman's proposals) one of the most important condensation seeds of debate. The 
renewed bioethical interest in cybrids and interspecifics in general was triggered by the 
plans of several UK researchers to create human-animal cybrids. Lyle Armstrong of 
Newcastle University wanted to use cow eggs to develop stem cells for the treatment of 
diabetes and spinal paralysis; Stephen Minger, of King's College London, had plans to use 
human-cow cybrids to study degenerative neurological diseases, i.e. Parkinson's and 
Alzheimer's.144 Chris Shaw of the Institute of Psychiatry, London, said he would need 
human-animal cybrids to study motor neuron disease. All three applied to the British 
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institution responsible for issuing licenses for research involving human embryos, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in November 2006.  
A month later, a government white paper proposal was revealed which stood in clear 
opposition to the researchers' plans. This draft would have outlawed all kinds of 
interspecific beings in the UK.145 Many scientists and patient organisations united in protest 
against these plans.146  
The HFEA decided that before granting any licenses, a general licensing policy on creation 
of human-animal interspecifics should be agreed upon – a three-month process of public 
consultation followed. It was found that although initially most people were opposed to all 
interspecific beings, after some information and debate, a considerable majority of 
participants were in favour of creating cybrids. A quarter of the participants remained 
opposed to this type of research (scepticism remained much higher regarding chimeric 
embryos and true hybrids).147  
A report of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee opposed general 
legislative prohibition of cybrids and demanded "a greater role for the regulator within a 
broad permissive framework set out by the parliament" (Phil Willis, MP). The committee 
was also in favour of a free vote on the issue of interspecific research regulation.148  
In a complete reversal from their previous position, the UK government issued a new, 
permissive draft bill in May 2007. This would allow for transgenesis, the creation of 
chimeras and cybrids involving human material, as long as the entities created would be 
destroyed after 14 days, and as long as no true human-animal hybrids were created.149 
Several ministers were opposed to this new bill – they were particularly critical of cybrid 
creation.150 In September 2007, the HFEA announced that their consultation had not 
found fundamental arguments against cybrid experiments, and that specific committees 
would now look at the three license applications. Public reaction was immediate, 
worldwide, and mostly negative: e.g. several German church officials and politicians 
denounced the UK cybrid plans.151  
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In January 2008, Lyle Armstrong of Newcastle University and Stephen Minger from King's 
College were granted HFEA licenses for the creation of cybrids, even before the House of 
Commons had decided on the government's proposal. 152 The Newcastle team announced 
the successful creation of human-cow cybrids in April 2008.153  
In May 2008, a strong majority of the House of Commons, in a free vote, decided in favour 
of the new permissive embryo bill, against criticism from several ministers and the Catholic 
Church.154  
At the time of writing (July 2008), the HFEA has granted another one year license to 
scientists at Warwick Medical School who plan to create human-pig cybrid embryos in 
order to obtain stem cells which are then supposed to be differentiated into heart cells if 
the experiment works out as planned. To improve the cybrid procedure, the researchers 
around Justin St. John are planning to destroy all remaining (mitrochondrial) pig DNA in 
the cybrids: the resulting cells are supposed to be "the world's first human stem cells from 
embryos that are part human and part animal."155 Removal of the mitochondrial pig DNA 
is supposed to improve the functions of the resulting cells. The ultimate goal is to create a 
human stem cell line with which to study cardiomyopathy (heart muscle disease). 
What is particularly remarkable about the cybrid debate is that these entities seem 
extremely hard to grasp for laymen and even scientists. As we have seen, cytoplasmic 
hybrids defy old-fashioned modes of classification as "chimera" or "hybrid", but also 
unambiguous categorization as "human" or "nonhuman". They are also hard to grasp in a 
simpler sense: the entities involved are not accessible and well-known objects like human 
or animal bodies, but rather elusive, tiny microscopic cells. As John Burn, the head of the 
human genetics institute at Newcastle University put it, "We're talking about something 
that looks like sago under the microscope."156 Maybe this elusiveness made the debate 
around cybrids so fervent and fruitful: as objects that are not easily imaginable, cybrids are 
the perfect blank screen on which intuitions about "human-animal mixing" in general can 
be projected. And so, one side comes up with comparisons like "sago" – implying that the 
mere idea of restricting such research could only have roots in silly, unjustified 
superstitions and myths – while the other side imagines something rather like Patricia 
Piccinini's human-animal abominations, or Frankensteinian procedures carried out on 
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babies, and is understandably up in arms. The intuitions of both sides clash violently and 
lead to the impression that compromise is impossible. After some consideration it seems 
that neither of these projections does justice to what is actually happening when cybrids are 
created. What we can learn from the debate around cybrids in the UK is that stepping back 
from knee-jerk reactions and analysing what, exactly, it is that makes us oppose (or 
welcome) the creation of interspecific beings is a necessary step when trying to find 
consensus on future policies regarding their creation: regarding interspecific beings, things 
are often not what they seem at first glance. 
To come back to the original intent of this chapter, let us once more look at the precise 
definition of "chimeras" and other interspecific beings, which is the first stepping stone for 
any serious debate. 
C. Definitions 
As we have seen, the concept of "chimera" in biology is a plurivalent and complex one. 
There is no one authoritative definition of what "chimera" means in biology or bioethics. 
Let us, therefore, have a look at several approaches at defining chimeras before deciding on 
how to proceed. 
Aiming at an all-encompassing taxonomy of chimeras, Henry Greely offers an extremely 
wide definition of chimeras. Under his definition, a chimera is "a single biological entity 
that is composed of a mixing of materials from two or more different organisms."157 This is 
a suitable formulation for Greely's purpose (namely, giving a very wide taxonomy of 
interspecifics), but for a fixation of the meaning of "chimera" in bioethics, it seems too 
wide: after all, any animal (or human) that is a product of sexual reproduction would have 
to count as a chimera in that sense.  
Jens Reich, in an introductory presentation on the subject of chimeras to the "Nationaler 
Ethikrat", gives a more restricted definition of chimeras as organisms that consist of 
genetically differing parts.158 This would rule out organisms which consist of genetically 
identical parts (i.e. of cells which carry the same genetic fingerprint), and thereby not count 
usual outcomes of sexual reproduction. Reich's classical definition highlights the puzzle-like 
                                                 
157 Greely (2003), "Defining Chimeras…and Chimeric Concerns", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3). 
158 Nationaler Ethikrat (2005), "Wortprotokoll - Niederschrift über den öffentlichen Teil der Sitzung am 25. 
August 2005", p. 3. In German, this passage reads: "Die biologische Definition von Chimäre besagt, dass es 
sich dabei um einen Organismus handelt, der aus unterschiedlichen Zellen oder Geweben oder Organen 
zusammengesetzt ist, unterschiedlich vor allen Dingen in ihrer genetischen Zusammensetzung." 
Chapter 1: Biological Basics 
 37
quality of chimeric organisms on cell-level. Reich adds that chimeric organisms somehow 
stem from two source organisms, specifically, that chimeric organisms are "tetragametic": 
their DNA stems from four gametes, i.e. from two zygotes (fertilized eggs). Thus, a 
standard, general definition of chimera can be given as: "Animal that has two or more 
different populations of genetically distinct cells that originated in different zygotes."159 
Some further qualifications or refinements seem advisable when defining "chimera". 
Firstly, as we have seen above, the hosts used for chimera research are not necessarily 
complete organisms. It seems advisable to describe the objects involved as "organisms and 
biological entities", since chimera production starts at the point of fused zygotes or other 
pre-organismal entities (e.g. cybrids). 
Secondly, it might be advisable to restrict the definition of "chimera" to organisms which 
consist of genetically differing material which is alive. Greely mentions the example of the 
"man with the wooden leg".160 When human beings with heart-valve implants of bovine or 
porcine origin are described as "chimeras", this is misleading: heart-valve implants are 
biologically dead, and their hosts are not animal-to-human chimeras, just as a man with a 
wooden prosthesis is not an oak-to-human chimera. 
In a similar vein, it is questionable whether the use of extracorporeal bioreactors filled with 
porcine cells or extracorporeal xenoperfusion with animal organs (see p. 24) constitute 
instances of animal-to-human chimerism. A key factor of chimerism seems to be the 
mutual contact and influence of differing sets of cells. Extracorporeal bioprosthetics' 
mutual contact with the human organism and resulting feedback effects are very limited. In 
order not to blur the concept of chimera, it seems suitable to exclude extracorporeal and 
dead material that is brought in contact with the host from constituting chimerism.  
Another problematic point that I already mentioned above is that of "transgenic 
chimerism". I would not find it advisable to subsume transgenic organisms under the 
concept of "chimera", even if they express DNA that is usually found in other species: such 
organisms do not exhibit the puzzle-like quality that is typical for chimeras, but are 
homogenous. The term "chimeric DNA", on the other hand, may be useful for describing 
genetic material that consists of sequences taken from different organisms.161  
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For the same reason, I think it would not be prudent to describe nucleo-cytoplasmic 
hybrids ("cybrids", see p. 32) as "chimeras" – if they would develop further, the resulting 
organisms would not consist of genetically differing sets of cells, but rather of homogenous 
cells whose origin from differing organisms and even species would only be evident on the 
inner-cell level. 
Many contributors to the bioethical debate tend to restrict their discussion of ethical issues 
concerning chimeras to human-to-animal embryonic chimeras.162 It is probably true that 
these particular creations raise more, and probably also more complex, ethical questions 
than, e.g., animal-to-animal adult chimeras. However, I will not employ this restricted use 
of "chimera", because I believe that it implies that chimeras, as such, are ethically 
problematic. Equalising "chimera" with "organism whose creation is ethically problematic 
and whose existence poses ethical problems or confusion" is not advisable because it might 
lead to ethically problematical non-chimeras being overlooked while ethically 
unproblematic creatures or experiments are scrutinized just because they involve 
chimerism. While it is unproblematic to limit discussion within a publication to human-to-
animal embryonic chimeras and to call them "chimeras" for brevity's sake, it seems not 
advisable to extend this limited use of the term "chimera" to general discourse. "Chimera", 
therefore, should not be equated with "ethically problematic artificial being". 
Concerning the definition of "chimera", another approach might be not to settle on one 
authoritative formula, but rather to point out that several definitions are in use. These 
definitions may differ, depending on the circumstances they are used in. A single, absolute 
definition seems not advisable to some: firstly, new types of organisms are created over the 
years. When sticking to traditional definitions of "chimera", one will have a hard time 
accommodating new types of beings like cybrids, fused embryos or transgenic beings. 
Secondly, different fields of expertise have differing requirements regarding the concept of 
"chimera". Karpowicz, Cohen and van der Kooy, commenting on the meaning of 
"chimera" and "hybrid" in the context of experimental biology, note that 
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"For molecular biologists, chimeric DNA refers to sequences derived from two 
sources and combined into one; for cell biologists, there are nucleocytoplasmic 
hybrids involving somatic cell nuclear transfers (cloning) within or between 
species; for embryonologists, chimeras are prenatal combinations of cells derived 
from different zygotes, either intraspecies or interspecies; for geneticists, there are 
interspecies genetic hybrids such as the mule; and finally, there are interspecies 
xenografts of tissue into postnatal hosts."163 
We can see that the terms "chimera", "chimeric" and "hybrid" are sometimes used to 
denote not only creatures that are literal "chimeras", corresponding to the textbook 
definition given above, but to all kinds of biological entities that are a "mix" in the widest 
sense. When I use the term chimera, this will be in the – quite restrictive and biologically 
exact – meaning: 
Chimera (Def.): Biological entity composed of genetically distinct living 
cellular material stemming from two or more different zygotes. 
This definition does not imply the artificiality of chimeras – it includes not only man-made 
novel creatures, but also natural occurrences like microchimerism. The definition also 
includes non-organisms (such as fused zygotes). It excludes some artificial interspecifics, 
such as cybrids and natural non-chimeric mixtures, such as hybrids, as well as creatures 
with transgenic ("chimeric") DNA. 
Even if we have not yet discussed the specific ethical concerns regarding (some) chimeras 
and other novel creatures, it already seems quite clear that being a chimera as such does not 
make any ethical difference whatsoever. As Henry Greely puts it:  
"As an ethical concern, chimerism per se might itself be 'an unfounded 
conception.' The fact that something is or isn't a chimera does not in itself raise 
ethical concerns. A new type of organism might raise concerns (…) whether or 
not it meets anyone's definition of chimera."164 
As I have mentioned above, many types of chimeras are plainly uninteresting for ethicists – 
take the odd bovine twin chimera or human microchimerism. On the other hand, and this 
is what Greely hints at, many non-chimeric interspecifics seem to be highly controversial – 
out of the same or very similar reasons that make some chimeras controversial.  
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My further discussion will, therefore, usually not focus on "chimeras" or other tightly 
defined types of interspecies mixtures such as cybrids or transgenic beings, but rather refer 
to "interspecifics", defined as follows: 
Interspecific (Def.): any organism or living biological entity which is the 
product of mixing of species, including but not limited to products of inter-
species chimerism (as a result of embryonic injection, mixing, xenografting or 
xenotransplantation), products of inter-species transgenesis, products of inter-
species hybridisation (sexual procreation between animals of different species), 
and inter-species nucleo-cytoplasmic hybrids ("cybrids"). 
Usually, the interspecifics at issue in the bioethical context will be between human and 
nonhuman species (i.e. human-animal interspecifics). Similarly inclusive concepts are used, 
e.g., by David Castle, who also employs the term "human-nonhuman interspecifics 
(HNHIs)"165 and by Jason Scott Robert, who refers to "part-human entities".166  
In chapter 2 below I will spell out what types of ethical concerns are or could be caused by 
the creation or existence of chimeras and other interspecifics. At this point, it should 
become much clearer what kinds of interspecifics could be ethically problematic, in what 
sense, and why. Before this discussion of ethical implications, let me give a very short 
overview of the legal situation of chimera and other interspecific research involving human 
material. 
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D. Excursus: Legal situation of human-animal interspecific research 
A short overview of the regulatory situation regarding research with human-animal 
chimeras and other mixtures seems to be advisable for two reasons: firstly, the regulatory 
conditions surrounding this research influence what happens in research labs, determine 
where interspecific research will flourish or deteriorate, and what conditions researchers 
face concerning funding, licensing procedures and legal risks, and thereby helps us to gain 
deeper understanding of the situation of chimeric/interspecific research around the world 
which I presented in the previous sections. Secondly, an overview of the regulatory 
background and political positions on the subject indicates commonly held public or 
political attitudes towards interspecific research, which will be interesting in respect to 
chapter 2 below. 
The legal and regulatory situation of human-animal interspecific research is closely tied to 
that of research with human stem cells, particularly human embryonic stem cells (hESC), 
since most chimeric/hybrid/cybrid research today involves the use of such materials – 
many instances of modern human-animal chimera research can be regarded as special cases 
of stem cell research. The status of hESC research is unclear in most countries: an 
international legislation database of the International Society for Stem Cell Research 
(ISSCR) lists policies, legislation and pending legislation regarding hESC research around 
the world, and shows that most countries do not have any explicit legislation of such 
research (much less on chimeras or cybrids produced involving hESC or other stem cells), 
be it restrictive or liberal.167 There are also frequent changes in stem cell policies at the 
moment. The regulations that are in place on the national level regarding hESC research 
and chimeras vary wildly. 
This underregulation, frequent change, and underlying discord about stem cell policies 
explains why there is no international legislation on this topic and much less on that of 
chimeras: international treaties claim a general "right to life" (e.g. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3), but it remains unclear from what point on human 
embryos are granted this right. Direct or uncontroversial conclusions in regard to 
interspecific human-nonhuman experimentation do not follow from a "right to life". 
Disagreement about the ethical permissibility of hESC (and chimera/cybrid) research is 
also common within the European Union and its member states. For example, the 
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European Parliament planned legislation on "Advanced Therapies" in 2007 which was 
meant to regulate and simplify the central licensing of medication and new therapies, 
among them hESC and chimera/cybrid-based methods. In the end, controversy 
concerning questions of authority and discord about ethical considerations led to an 
exclusion of all embryo related research (i.e. chimera and cybrid research, as well) from this 
EU regulation.168 The European Union decided in 2006 to offer funding for stem cell 
research169 (contrary to a German initiative for an EU-wide ban on stem cell research). Yet, 
definitive European legislation on permissibility of hESC research or chimera research 
seems unlikely to come to pass in the near future, because opinions are divided 
internationally and even within political camps. 
Regarding regulations below the legislative level, there are international guidelines 
concerning hESC research, issued by the ISSCR (International Society for Stem Cell 
Research) in 2006.170 These largely procedural guidelines recommend that "review, approval 
and ongoing monitoring by a special oversight mechanism" (SCRO – Stem Cell Research 
Oversight) should be maintained whenever "human totipotent or pluripotent cells" are 
incorporated into animal chimeras (8.1), and that in this process, "ethical permissibility and 
justification" should be factored in. At least some adult chimerism experiments would be 
exempt from this full-scale process (category 1 of the ISSCR guidelines entails "routine and 
standard research practice" such as assays of human tumour formation in SCID mice, 
10.1), while embryonic chimeras would fall under full SCRO procedure (amount, point of 
introduction of cells, species, and affected organ would have to be considered here). 
Research that "should not be pursued" under ISSCR guidelines includes the cultivation of 
manipulated human embryos, or part-human structures with "human organismal potential" 
past 14 days or until formation of the primitive streak;171 implantation of animal-human 
chimeras into an uterus; and breeding of human germline chimeras. The ISSCR guidelines 
are supposed to be incorporated by journal editors, who should prevent the publication of 
research that does not meet ISSCR standards. The ISSCR committee forum has also issued 
a report on "Ethical Standards for Human-to-Animal Chimera Experiments in Stem Cell 
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research" which proposes more detailed standards for SCRO committees.172 It is unclear to 
what extent scientists do actually follow these non-binding international guidelines or the 
ethical standards proposed. 
Regarding regulation on the national level, in the U.S.A., the potential problematicity of 
human-animal interspecific research was already addressed by President Bill Clinton, who 
referred the "troubling" matter of "mingling of human and nonhuman species" to the 
National Bioethics Advisory Council in 1984.173 No legislative action was undertaken back 
then. The U.S. National Academies of Sciences (NAS) issued guidelines for conducting 
human embryonic stem cell research in 2005,174 which also include guidance for 
interspecific research: an additional SCRO review process is required for research involving 
introduction of hESC into animals. Also, patterns of integration into the animal organism 
should be closely watched – special attention should be paid to neural chimeras. NAS 
Guidelines prohibit the introduction of hESC into nonhuman primate blastocysts,175 the 
introduction of human and nonhuman hESC into human blastocysts, breeding with 
human-to-animal chimeras and, finally, the cultivation of human-animal products of hESC 
research past 14 days/formation of the primitive streak. Although stem cell researchers 
claim to abide to the NAS guidelines, evidence for this claim is hard to come by.176 State 
regulations in the U.S. concerning hESC and chimeric/cybrid research vary. California, for 
example, has adopted the NAS guidelines as state law. On the federal level, there is hardly 
any legislation regarding hESC research, although federal funding by the National Institutes 
of Health is limited to certain types of hESC research – expressly excluding at least some 
kinds of interspecific research.177 A federal legislative initiative by four conservative U.S. 
senators, led by Sam Brownback, was started in 2005 to ban "human chimeras" altogether 
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("Human Chimera Prohibition Act").178 The (unsuccessful) initiative was supported by 
President Bush, who openly criticized the creation of "animal-human hybrids" in his 2006 
State of The Union Address as one of the "most egregious abuses of medical research."179 
A new, similar bill to "prohibit human-animal hybrids" was introduced in November 2007 
by Brownback and 13 supporters, among them Republican presidential candidate John 
McCain.180 The misleadingly named bill would apparently not only outlaw the creation of 
human-animal hybrids, but also the creation of cybrids and at least some human-animal 
chimeras: germline chimeras, nonhumans "with human brains" and, somewhat vaguely, 
"human embryo[s] into which a non-human cell or cells (or the component parts thereof) 
have been introduced to render the embryo's membership in the species Homo sapiens 
uncertain."181 
In other leading research countries, the status of chimera research is under similar public 
and political scrutiny – in Great Britain, the possible ethical import of human-animal 
hybridisation was first mentioned in a 1984 report of the committee of Enquiry into 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology ("Warnock Report"), in the context of the "hamster 
egg test" mentioned in section B.7 above.182 HESC research, in general, is allowed in the 
United Kingdom under quite liberal conditions (i.e. even creation of hESC for research 
purposes is allowed). As noted above, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
which is concerned with issuing the necessary licenses for such research, held a public 
consultation on human-animal chimeras and cybrids in 2007. The consultation's report 
came to the conclusion that cybrid experimentation could in principle be licensed in cases 
approved by the HFEA.183 Three projects involving cybrids by UK researchers have been 
approved in November 2007, January 2008, and July 2008 respectively.184 The legislation 
introduced in May 2008 is quite permissive, allowing for the creation of chimeras, cybrids, 
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and transgenesis using human embryos.185 What the new UK embryo bill prohibits are true 
human-animal hybrids and, similarly to NAS guidelines, implantation of manipulated 
embryos as well as cultivation for longer than a fortnight. All in all, Great Britain seems to 
remain on a relatively liberal course regarding interspecific research. 
This is in contrast to the situation in Germany, where hESC research in general is handled 
rather restrictively. The Stammzellengesetz of 2002 used the cut-off date of January 1st, 
2002 to determine which imported stem cell lines may be used; this legislation was 
reviewed in 2008, and the cut-off date was moved to May 1st, 2007. The parliamentary 
debates revealed deeply divided opinions on hESC research, ranging from demands to lift 
import restrictions to requests that hESC research should be stopped altogether. 
Accordingly, the future situation regarding chimeric research involving hESC remains quite 
unclear. The German licensing authority (Zentrale Ethikkommission für 
Stammzellenforschung, ZES) has, in fact, granted chimera experimentation with non-
embryonic human stem cells in the past.186 German law, while it may be hard on hESC 
researchers, does not prohibit the creation of embryonic chimeras – as long as the research 
does not involve the use of a human embryo, or totipotent parts of it, but disparate 
pluripotent embryonic cells.187 German law does also, in principle, allow the creation of 
human-animal cybrids, experts on medical law confirm.188 The legislative situation in 
Germany regarding interspecific research can currently be described as open-ended; hESC 
research as such is the problem dominating public and political discourse. Germany shows 
remarkably restrictive tendencies in this context compared, e.g., to the U.S. or UK. This 
indicates that extensive legislative restriction of chimera/cybrid research might be an issue 
in the future. 
Apart from the U.S., the UK and Germany (which I have picked out as examples, since 
they are especially important research nations), the legislative/regulatory stances countries 
take regarding hESC and chimera research vary wildly. Some nations have decided to take a 
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restrictive position regarding the creation of human-animal interspecifics. For example, 
Australia, which is permissive regarding hESC research, adopted the "Prohibition of 
Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research 
Amendment Act" in 2006, which prohibits creating human-nonhuman chimeric and cybrid 
and hybrid embryos (except for human fertility testing, which can be carried out with a 
license under strict regulations).189 The creation of cybrids and chimeric embryos involving 
human material is also forbidden in Canada, through the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act of 2004 and regulations for state funding (which cover all research facilities since there 
are no private laboratories involved in chimera research in Canada).190  
Other countries are particularly permissive of stem cell (and interspecific) research: at the 
forefront of this is China, which allows all kinds of chimera creation and even the 
introduction of human genetic material into nonhuman embryos.191 Likewise, South Korea, 
Japan, and Singapore are relatively supportive of chimera/cybrid creation.192 
Xenotransplantation, as we have seen, is another possible source of human-animal 
chimeras. The technique is closely regulated in many countries; the rare clinical trials that 
take place will usually have to be approved by oversight committees. Since the main 
problems associated with xenotransplantation are nowadays in the area of medical risk, i.e. 
tumorigenicity and virus transfer (rather than in the ethical problematicity of "species-
crossing"), and also because xenotransplantation is currently not in the focus of research, I 
will not discuss these regulations in detail here.193 
Summing up the legal and regulatory situation of chimera and other interspecific research, 
it has become clear that regulations vary wildly, and that the legal situation is unclear 
and/or currently changing in many regions. Additionally, as I pointed out, the legal and 
regulatory situation of some chimeric and interspecific research is complicated by their 
dependence on human embryonic stem cells, whose use in research is subject of public 
controversy around the world. Irrespective of these varying views on interspecific research 
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and the overlapping controversies of chimeras/cybrids and hESC use, we can conclude 
from our look at the legal situation that some kinds of interspecific research are more likely 
to be forbidden than others.  
Research that is most likely to raise controversy, and therefore to be regarded or declared 
as illegal in many countries, includes:  
 Creation of human-animal hybrids (through fertilisation of human eggs with animal 
sperm, or animal eggs with human sperm). Human-animal hybridisation is a punishable 
offense in many legal systems and discouraged by both NAS and ISSCR research 
guidelines. Objections regarding the creation of "true hybrids" sometimes, but not 
always, extend to human-animal cybrids. 
 Use of whole human embryos as hosts for chimera-creation is penalised by several laws, e.g. 
German Embryonenschutzgesetz, and restrictive U.S. draft bills. Using disparate 
hESCs in chimera creation is usually regarded as less problematic, 
 Use of hESC for transfer into animals (while use of adult or somatic stem cells, or non-
stem cells, is usually not regarded as extremely problematic) 
 Early transfer, and  
 Transfer into especially relevant systems, such as the neural system or gonads, is met with 
suspicion (cf. NAS guidelines). 
 Transfer into nonhuman primates is regarded with more scepticism than transfer into not 
closely related animals, e.g. in the NAS guidelines. 
 Cultivation past two weeks of cybrids, hybrids or chimerically manipulated human-animal 
embryos is often prohibited. 
 Implantation into an animal or human uterus or otherwise bringing to term of human-
animal interspecifics is regarded as problematic, and forbidden under many 
legislations/guidelines. 
 Breeding with human-to-animal interspecific organisms is perceived as problematic. 
These gradations in the legal/regulatory judgement of interspecific research should become 
much clearer once we look at the underlying ethical considerations concerning interspecific 
research. In the next part, we will therefore analyse the moral reasons and justifications 
brought forward for prohibition or strong(er) regulation of chimera/cybrid research. As 
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reflected by legal and other restrictions, many people think that creation of human-animal 
interspecifics is wrong – but why, exactly? 
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Chapter 2: Arguments Against Creating 
Interspecifics 
So far, I have presented the natural occurrence and the artificial creation of chimeras and 
other interspecifics in a largely descriptive manner, and given a short overview of the legal 
situation of human-animal interspecific research. In the following sections, I will address 
the moral arguments that have been brought up regarding the creation of interspecifics, 
particularly human-animal interspecifics.  
I will first give an introduction to the participants of the current debate around chimeras 
and other interspecifics, i.e. my main sources, in section A below. In the following sections, 
B, C, and D, I will present several types of arguments that experiments involving or 
resulting in chimeras and other interspecifics have given or could reasonably give rise to. 
This part will offer detailed descriptions of arguments against the creation of interspecifics, 
and a systematic classification of such arguments into different types. This taxonomy will 
be useful in making the terrain of argumentation against interspecific creation accessible for 
further analysis. That will be the task of chapter 4, where I will address the question central 
to this dissertation: Is there an argument that persuasively supports the general position 
that creating interspecifics (specifically: human-animal-interspecifics) is wrong and should 
be prohibited? 
Before this concluding analysis, chapter 3 will offer an excursus to a closely related area, 
introducing the concept of "moral status" and discussing the question of the moral 
relevance of species membership ("Speciesism"); questions which will be relevant for the 
final analysis and conclusion in chapter 4. 
A. An introduction to the debate: Sources 
Who has contributed to the discussion of the ethical problems of creating chimeras, 
particularly human-animal chimeras or interspecifics, so far?  
Many aspects and arguments discussed in chapter 2 of my dissertation are originally based 
on the American Journal of Bioethics' 2003 Target Article Collection "Crossing Species 
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Boundaries".194 Numerous philosophers, bioethicists and scientists responded to Jason 
Scott Robert's and Francoise Baylis' assessment of the moral quandaries connected with 
the creation of human-to-animal interspecifics (specifically, human-to-animal embryonic 
chimeras). "Never", AJOB editor-in-chief Glenn McGee recalls, "has a Target Article 
collection published in The American Journal of Bioethics occasioned as much interest as 
'Crossing Species Boundaries.' (…) Dozens more than we were able to publish wrote to 
suggest articles."195 This might be because the AJOB chimera issue is one of the first 
instances of assessing the problem of human-nonhuman interspecifics – subjects that have 
gone more or less untouched, so far, invite discussion.196 Secondly, this might be because 
the subject is deeply interesting and highlights aspects that are crucial for other ethical 
problems as well. Another selection of articles, this time on a specific form of animal-
human chimeras (Weissman's "human neuron mouse" scenario) appeared in 2007, also in 
the AJOB.197  
German and other Continental European philosophers have not extensively contributed to 
the chimera debate so far. There are some exceptions to this rule: Christoph Vallant's 
"Hybride, Klone und Chimären" (2008) is based on actual new developments regarding the 
creation of interspecific and other artificial beings, but does not strive for precision 
regarding biological terminology. Vallant aims for a sweeping analysis of big idea-historical 
connections rather than the analytical applied ethics approach I follow here. Irrgang, and 
Orland et al., in their 2005 discussion of posthuman perspectives, focus on and cyborgs or 
"enhanced" humans and mention the related, in some respects overlapping, field of 
interspecific beings or "chimeras" only in passing.198 Eminent moral philosophers Robert 
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Spaemann and Julian Nida-Rümelin commented on the UK cybrid decision of 2008. Both 
apparently think that something is seriously wrong with creating human-animal 
interspecifics – Nida-Rümelin finds cybrids tolerable when they are just used as substitutes 
for human eggs, while he declares that the "'production' of human-animal-chimeras" would 
be a "crime against humanity" [transl. CH].199 Spaemann speaks of "horrific visions of half-
human chimeras" and notes that their creation is "one of the biggest crimes humans can 
commit, an opting out of Tao which denotes the immemorial frame of humanity" [transl. 
CH].200 Apart from these passing remarks, Spaemann's and Nida-Rümelin's discussion of 
cybrids focuses on the general issue of using human embryos in stem cell research rather 
than on the specific aspect of mixing of human and nonhuman material. 
An Ravelingien's thesis "Pig Tales, Human Chimeras and Man-Made Public Health 
Hazards" (2006) offers one of the few extensive philosophical academic discussions of the 
topic of mixing human and nonhuman.201 While Ravelingien concentrates on the topic of 
xenotransplantation, some parts of her analysis overlap with the topic of this dissertation – 
particularly her chapter on human dignity argumentation.202  
Journalists in the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany have extensively commented and 
reported on the subject of "interspecifics" in science – another important source for my 
typology of arguments. Irving Weissman's research plans spurned a first wave of debate 
around 2005, and the UK cybrid debate triggered an avalanche of journalistic commentary 
in 2007-2008. 
Institutions responsible for bioethical counselling and research are discovering the subject 
all over the world: Germany's "Nationaler Ethikrat" was given a talk by its member, 
bioethicist and politician Jens Reich on "the question of cultivation of chimeras" in 2005.203 
Its institutional successor, the "Deutscher Ethikrat", discussed human-animal interspecifics 
in February 2008.204 From 2005-2007, the EU funded an international project on 
"Chimeras and Hybrids in Comparative European and International Research" 
(CHIMBRIDS) at the Institute for Medical Law in Mannheim. As an interdisciplinary 
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project, one of the aims of CHIMBRIDS was to "enable a close, lasting and sustainable 
interrelation between the rapid progress in scientific research and basic ethical, 
philosophical and legal principles."205 The final report had not been published at the time 
of writing (October 2008).206 
The UK entered the debate about questions of interspecific research much earlier with the 
Warnock Report of 1984; more recently, the Embryology Authority HFEA carried out a 
public consultation on chimeras/cybrids and connected ethical questions,207 which was 
extensively covered by the UK press. The topic of chimeras has probably received most 
attention in the U.S., culminating in the 2005 NAS guidelines and current legislative 
initiatives to regulate human chimera/interspecific research, which are backed by 
presidents and presidential candidates.  
Human-animal interspecifics have become a mainstream subject of bioethics debate and 
public policy both in the U.S. and in Europe. The cultivation of human-animal embryonic 
chimeras and cybrids has triggered this discussion, but the arguments brought forward, as 
we will see, are rarely limited to these two particular kinds of interspecifics. Apart from 
some, very rare, exceptions,208 commentators argue against chimera creation rather than 
defending it. Below, I have divided up possible objections into three types:209 firstly, in 
section B, that of the intrinsic, "bioconservative" type; in section C, we will assess 
objections based on a fear of possible consequences of chimera production, and thirdly, in 
section D, indirect consequence-based objections based on the threat of "confusion" which 
is allegedly the consequence of creating interspecifics. 
B. Intrinsic objections 
Intrinsic arguments against creating chimeras are characterized by the implicit or explicit 
assumption that creating chimeras is wrong as such. Arguments of this type will not be 
brought forward by a consequentialist (i.e. someone who thinks that what makes an action 
wrong or right is its consequences), but rather by someone who believes in ethical 
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principles as guiding fundamental assumptions for his actions. The adherence or 
disobedience to the principle determines whether a certain action is morally right or wrong. 
For understanding and evaluating this kind of argument, we must find out what principles 
are brought forward against the creation of chimeras and whether they hold up under 
scrutiny (i.e. whether they are or will be violated by the creation of chimeras, and whether 
they are consistent). 
Intrinsic arguments are, one might think in the first place, absolute arguments: once you 
have accepted such an objection, you are not going to change your mind just because 
(empirical) conditions in the world change. To take the example of chimera research: even 
if it turned out that, by means of painless experimentation on human-animal chimeras, 
scientists had found a way to cure cancer, a person who has intrinsic arguments against 
creating chimeras would still be opposed to such experimentation. Likewise, if it turned out 
that following his principle led to very adverse effects, this could not – in theory – lead to 
the intrinsic objector changing his mind on the matter. His objection against creating 
chimeras is not based on expected adverse consequences and he is therefore not fazed by a 
change in expectation (or actual outcome) regarding the action at hand.  
This absolute view of intrinsic objections is doubted by Gregory Kaebnick: an intrinsic 
claim, he says, is not absolute and unchallengeable by changed expectations or outcomes. 
Rather than answering ethical questions once and for all from a standpoint that is 
independent of the world as it is, intrinsic arguments, specifically in bioethics, invoke a kind 
of "precautionary principle" and move us to adopt a "preservationist attitude".210 Intrinsic 
and consequentialist arguments are not as intransigent or unconnected as it seems in the 
first place. Mary Midgley points out that the two are linked at a crucial point: 
 "Acts that are wrong in themselves can be expected to have bad effects of a 
particular kind that is not just accidental. Their badness follows from what is 
wrong in the act itself, so that there is a rational, conceptual link between them 
and their results."211 
Additionally, it can be noted that outlooks are imaginable where both intrinsic and 
consequentialistic aspects are considered and, only when taken together and balanced 
against each other, result in a position on a certain subject.  
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I see a meaningful difference between intrinsic and consequentialistic argumentation mainly 
in their proponents' different argumentative focus or emphasis. Intrinsic arguments are 
open appeals to basic values or principles of the opponent or combatant. The empirical 
questions at hand are, in this type of argumentation, often taken for granted or not too 
closely considered. Consequentialistic arguments, on the other hand, give more attention to 
empirical questions (i.e.: "What will the consequences of the action really be?"). Yet, they 
also rely on basic principles – often in the form of a utilitarian approach – which are usually 
not discussed. Intrinsic and consequentialist argumentation overlap and, ultimately, can 
complement each other. 
I do not want to give a general assessment of different types of ethical arguments or 
metaethical positions in this thesis. A question that should interest us more is: how 
convincing are the intrinsic arguments that are used to prove the wrongness of creating 
interspecifics? I have identified four approaches to why creating interspecifics could be 
intrinsically wrong. Some apply only to the mixing of human and animal, be it in the form 
of chimerism or hybridisation; others might, in theory, be applied to all kinds of artificial 
chimeras (even in plants). Firstly, let us have a look at arguments from "repugnance" or, 
more general, arguments from an intuitively negative emotional reaction to interspecifics. 
1. Repugnance, the "Yuk Factor", and arguments from emotion 
a. Leon Kass' "Wisdom of Repugnance" 
The first kind of intrinsic argument that has attracted the interest of bioethicists is the so-
called "Wisdom of Repugnance" argument. Leon Kass, a former chairman on President 
G.W. Bush's Council of Bioethics, developed this point in 1997,212 noting that, though 
disgust is not an argument, as such, "in crucial cases (…) repugnance is the emotional 
expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it." This alleged 
wisdom is there to "protect the central core of humanity". In his praise of "repugnance", 
Kass states:  
"Indeed, in this age in which everything is held to be permissible so long as it is 
freely done, in which our given human nature no longer commands respect, in 
which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of our autonomous rational 
wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to defend the central 
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core of our humanity. Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to 
shudder."213 
In 1997, this statement was meant as a response to the cloning of Dolly the sheep and the 
prospect of human cloning, but "repugnance" has since been used or at least alluded to in 
many areas of bioethics.  
Some bioethicists answer Kass' argument with outright refusal or even ridicule. It is noted 
that intuitions or "knee-jerk reactions" have, in the past, been used to argue against morally 
neutral actions (e.g. interracial marriage, homosexuality), without any justification.214 There 
are, arguably, some reactions based on repugnance that should have no moral 
consequences and which ought to be ignored or suppressed. Feelings of violent 
repugnance towards a very sick or disfigured person, a burn victim or a person suffering 
from a skin condition are common. How are we to tell that this repugnance caused by 
disease or unusual genetic variation in another person is not a "sign of wisdom" and that 
we should shun, avoid or punish all that are affected by such atypicalities? What is it that 
repugnance is telling us, if it tells us anything at all? David Castle notes that the type of 
argument Kass praises "is a viciously poor guide for channelling one's uneasy responses to 
people with severe disabilities or injuries."215 Another problem that arises when trying to 
use the "repugnance" objection to the creation of chimeras is that, clearly, not all chimeras 
or even human-animal interspecifics look "yucky". Thus, the argument could probably not 
be used against not obviously suspicious cases like mice with a few human cells or genes, or 
against cybrids in early stages, or against human beings with (not directly visible) animal 
transplants. These are all quite pragmatic objections to or restrictions of the repugnance 
argument. Others attack Kass' type of argument from repugnance on much deeper 
grounds, stating that it lacks philosophical content, altogether. Science journalist Chris 
Mooney, in a critical assessment of Kass' career in US bioethics, ridicules his source of 
inspiration, Hans Jonas (whom he deems a "rather obscure German philosopher") and his 
"heuristics of fear"216 as demagoguery, then accuses Kass of fear-mongering, and both of 
an utter lack of convincing ethical argument.217 Glenn McGee (editor of the American 
Journal of Bioethics), in a similarly acidic tone, notes that the "rules for avoiding 'yuk'" are 
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completely arbitrary and that reference to "shared feelings of yuk" are just political tactics 
and part of a "flimsy new kind of neoconservative natural law theory."218 Here, most of the 
objections to Kass are based on criticism of his role in (conservative) politics, rather than 
the philosophical content of his argument.  
The most substantial objection to Kass-style arguments is that any moral intuition or 
emotion must be justified and defended as valid – intuition must be "legitimate". David 
Castle thinks that the Kass-style arguments mentioned by Robert and Baylis are  
"so weak they can be toppled with pea shooters. Kass' 'wisdom of repugnance,' 
perhaps the most pernicious of the lot, puts typological reasoning to poor ends 
by backstopping claims about the legitimacy of moral intuitions."219  
It seems quite clear at this point that Kass' argument does not have many followers – 
particularly few, it seems, in contemporary U.S. bioethics – and does certainly not succeed 
in persuading adversaries.  
b. Sub-argumentative references to emotion and intuition 
Still, "repugnance" has been used by many objectors to creating chimeras – not necessarily 
as a free-standing argument, but in the description of typical "knee-jerk"-reactions to 
(human-animal) chimeras or other interspecifics. Most authors would not go as far as 
declaring their or the "typical" intuition regarding chimeras a fact that is directly morally 
relevant or decisive. Still, no author would go to great lengths at describing his or others' 
intuitive reaction to a phenomenon if he or she thought these reactions were entirely 
irrelevant.  
Let us look at some examples of philosophers referring to or even elaborating on 
emotional reactions regarding chimeras or other interspecifics. Jeffrey Stout uses the 
example of a (hoax) cat/rabbit interspecific ("Cabbit"), shown on TV, for comments on 
the attribute "abominable". 220 He notes: "I have no objection in principle to cabbits. Yet 
the sight of a living cabbit did affect me. I found it revolting."221 Seyfer, elsewhere raising 
religious concerns against creating chimeras (see section B.2 below), notes in the last 
sentence of his article that mixing humans and animals, (among other points) "(…) evokes 
a certain repugnance. Perhaps this repugnance is a sign of wisdom" – a direct reference to 
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Kass' Argument.222 Mary Midgley defends a soft argument from revulsion concerning the 
advances of biotechnology: she thinks that there is a widespread feeling of revulsion 
regarding (trans-species) genetically manipulated plants and animals which should not be 
ridiculed but "spelled out" in the form of an argument.223 Midgley's approach could just as 
well be applied to the question of artificial production of human-animal interspecifics – we 
will assess it more closely below. Physician, biologist and bioethicist William Hurlbut, 
interviewed by the New York Times' Jamie Shreeve, notes that "When we start to blend 
the edges of things, we're uneasy.(…) That's why chimeric creatures are monsters in 
mythology in the first place." He even offers an evolutionary explanation for this feeling of 
uneasiness, giving it the "justification" of being natural and useful: "Our minds have 
evolved to be hypersensitive to the borders between species, just as we see a rainbow as 
composed of six or seven distinct colors when it is really a continuum of wavelengths of 
light."224 Morriss (who ultimately does not subscribe to an argument from revulsion) 
describes the typical reaction to human-animal hybrids like this: "We react with fright, with 
horror. This is not just the horror of ordinary physical fear, it is an existential horror – a 
metaphysical one. This sort of existential angst is a very powerful feeling (…)."225 In the 
political sphere, U.S. President Clinton, according to a 1998 request regarding the 
bioethical assessment of the production of human-bovine cybrids to the National Bioethics 
Advisory Council, noted that he felt "(…) deeply troubled by this news of experiments 
involving the mingling of human and nonhuman species (…)."226 In general, newspaper or 
magazine articles about interspecific research appeal to emotions of fear or horror in their 
titles with astonishing regularity.227 
There are also more indirect forms of evocation of disagreeable feelings regarding 
interspecifics. The connection of interspecifics with the category of "monsters" is rooted in 
their name's ambiguity. As mentioned earlier, "Chimera" also denotes a monster of Ancient 
Greek mythology that is a composite of several animals (see picture 1, p. 4). This mythical 
connotation survives until today: Bruce Lehman, the U.S. commissioner of patents, calls 
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human-animal chimeras "monsters", outright.228 So do others (not necessarily intrinsic 
objectors to creating chimeras): Bernard Rollin entitles one category of possible 
(consequentialist) objections "rampaging monsters",229 Mark Sagoff mentions a "Caliban" 
(i.e. a villain) as one possible type of interspecifics one could create. Depiction of chimeras 
and other interspecifics, especially of the human-animal kind, as "monsters" is quite 
common, and undoubtedly this denotation provokes fear and disgust towards and 
exclusion of the creature referred to – it also to a certain degree predetermines the 
evaluative stance one will have towards creating such a being.  
c. Can there be an "Argument from Emotion"? 
We have seen that emotions of disgust, revulsion and repugnance play a role, be it a direct 
or an indirect one, in the debate around interspecifics. This type of objection – depending 
perhaps on the sensitivity of the person who uses it – can be directed against the creation 
of different kinds of interspecifics. Some apparently already feel revulsion when thinking 
about transgenic plants or animals, others deem an animal-to-animal chimera like the 
"geep" disgusting, less sensitive subjects feel revulsion only when considering "funny 
looking" chimeras, and for others, the line is crossed only if human material is involved.  
There have not been many polls or similar inquiries into whether human-animal chimeras 
(and which kinds of them) do really stir the negative affective reactions cited by the 
bioethicists who make use of arguments from revulsion, although the HFEA report of 
2007, which concluded a three-month public consultation process in the UK, notes:  
"Certainly at the outset of the deliberative work, many of the participants 
expressed an initial repugnance in reaction to the suggestion of mixing human 
and animal material. Associations were drawn with incidents such as the 
Northwick Park drug trials, myths and legends, and the elephant man. 
However, when further factual information was provided and further discussion 
took place, the majority of participants became more at ease with the idea, 
although as one participant observed, 'The gut reaction is hard to 
overcome.'"230 
This gut reaction might not be as fixed and hard-wired as it seems, though. Morris points 
out that societies can be very different regarding their view of the inherent value of human-
nonhuman boundaries, and that the portion of people who react with disaffection could be 
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"narrower than the human race".231 It is very well imaginable, for example, that other 
cultures produce less horrendous, or even positive emotional reactions to mixed beings – 
analogously, intersexual persons evoke vastly different reactions in different cultures, 
ranging from disgust in (traditional, but also modern) western societies to spiritual worship: 
many non-western religions know intersexual – and interspecific – deities. The 
connotations of chimeric beings also seem to have changed within Europe's own cultural 
development. Ancient Greece, apart from frightening monsters like the Chimera and the 
Minotaur, also knew neutral or even "good" hybrid or chimeric creatures, such as the 
Centaurs (human-horse mixtures), Satyrs (often described as donkey- or goat-men), and 
Pegasus (a winged horse which helped slay the monstrous Chimera). 
Apart from the varying prevalence of negative feelings raised by (human-animal) 
interspecifics, and apart from the question whether there are such feelings in all or the 
majority of the population: can direct or indirect reference to "emotions" be used as an 
argument in ethics, at all? Many have noted that emotion or intuition by themselves are not 
arguments: "If claims about repugnance are to have any moral force, the intuitions 
captured by the 'yuk' response must be clarified", Robert and Baylis state.232 Much of the 
criticism Kass' and Kass-like arguments are met with is based on this point, and many 
philosophers forbid the use of "yuk factor" arguments because they are nothing more than 
thoughtstoppers.  
But let us not prematurely discard this type of argument: what defences are there for the 
moral relevance of "repugnance"? 
d. Defences of the "Yuk Factor" 
Not all ethicists concerned with arguments of this kind immediately reject them as useless. 
Let us take an exemplary look at two defences of the "Yuk Factor", especially its use as an 
argument against biotechnological advances: Mary Midgley's (who is concerned with the 
progress of bio-engineering in general) and Robert Streiffer's (who specifically addresses 
the problem of human-animal chimeras). 
In an article tellingly entitled "Biotechnology and Monstrosity – Why We Should Pay 
Attention to the 'Yuk Factor'",233 Midgley discusses arguments involving the "yuk factor" in 
a broader context, namely that of bioengineering in general. Aside from 
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xenotransplantation and cross-species transgenesis, she mentions human enhancement and 
GM crops, and, generally, biotechnology that takes species not as fixed entities but as 
objects of our technical improvement or engineering. Undoubtedly, her reasoning could 
and would also be applied to the production of all kinds of artificial interspecifics. Midgley 
wants to make two points: she argues that we should take emotional objections seriously 
and try to understand or spell out what is behind them, because then we will see that they 
are not as "irrational and negative" as we took them to be. Secondly, we should recognize 
that pro-bioengineering positions are not as rational as they purport to be, but really the 
upshot of "algenic manifestos" and a general new "agenda" of biotechnology their 
supporters (unconsciously or consciously) subscribe to. I will not elaborate further on the 
second point here for it is a political or polemic one which does not really help us with the 
question whether emotional reactions can make (or at least support) valid arguments, in 
general. Let us focus on Midgley's first point instead: we should, in a nutshell, pay attention 
to the "yuk factor" because there might be a rationale behind the simple utterance of an 
adverse emotional impulse. Midgley goes further: in her opinion, in regard to 
bioengineering, there is such a rationale behind the "yuk". It is our responsibility to spell 
out and understand properly what an objector to bioengineering is actually saying behind 
his façade of seemingly "inarticulate disgust". And he or she is, in Midgleys words, really 
"objecting to the attacks on the concept of species". In Midgley's view, "there is good 
reason for that objection."234 At this point, she goes on to spell out the rationale behind 
arguments that deem "unnatural" actions morally wrong. Is this a defence of the "yuk 
factor" or of an argument from repugnance? I think not, although Midgley tries hard to 
construct it as one. If an objector to bioengineering states that the mere thought of GM 
crops or animals fills him with disgust and revulsion, and that therefore one should forbid 
such advances of bioengineering, even with the most charitable interpretation, his or her 
statement cannot be understood as an argument drawing from the value of integrity of the 
species concept. It is true that "yuk factor" approaches can be beefed up and made 
persuasive by explaining what concepts or values are behind the emotional reaction 
reported, and that, in this context, the report and assessment of intuitions and knee-jerk 
reactions is helpful; but it remains true that the pure reference to the "yuk factor" is 
argumentatively void. It turns out that despite her express intentions, Midgley's argument is 
not one from the "yuk factor" but one from a quasi-religious view of species boundaries as 
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morally relevant. I will therefore assess Midgley's argument under the heading of "Religious 
and quasi-religious objections", below.  
Robert Streiffer defends the view that the "yuk factor" could be used as a valid argument 
for objecting to the creation of human-animal chimeras. While he admits that such an 
action is not necessarily morally wrong just because it is "unnatural", and that the notion of 
moral wrongness qua "unnaturalness" is problematic, he notes that "proponents of the 
unnaturalness objection can insist that (…) they still know that crossing species boundaries 
is wrong."235 (Karpowicz et al. (2005) do not defend, yet reconstruct a similar argument, 
referring to incest and cannibalism as abominations that might be comparable. They call 
this the "moral taboo argument".)236 To support this, Streiffer identifies analogous cases in 
which moral wrongness cannot be further explained, but where we "know by just looking" 
that they are wrong: "Bestiality and pedophilia are wrong even when they cause no physical 
or psychological harm" and therefore: "Robert and Baylis' epistemological claim that 
intuitions must be justified if they are to 'have any moral force' is mistaken."237 Thus, the 
"yuk factor" could, after all, be an argument against creating chimeras – though Streiffer 
does not decide on whether it is valid, he wants to hold on to the possibility of using 
arguments of this type. One could argue against Streiffer by doubting that his examples are 
convincing: for one, one could state that there is no "pedophilia" without harm done to the 
child (or rather, that mere "pedophilia" is not the problem – pedosexuality is, even if the 
two are often confused). One could also make the point that "bestiality" is not morally 
wrong in itself (as Peter Singer did, quite persuasively, in his review of Midas Dekker's 
book "Dearest Pet").238 Some argue against the use of the "yuk factor" by pointing out that 
arguments of this kind have been used to support anti-miscegenation policies or other 
systems and structures now considered morally wrong. For the field of bioethics, note that 
blood transfusions and organ transplantation were, not too long ago, considered 
"abhorrent", and arguments were made against these new techniques based on these 
emotional or "taboo" responses.239 Streiffer counters this somewhat weak objection by 
noting that, as with other types of arguments, it may be wrong for some, but right for other 
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cases (his example are paternalistic arguments, which are today considered a mistaken 
approach when used concerning women, but appropriate when used concerning children). 
Yet finally, Streiffers' concluding remark regarding the repugnance argument shows the 
crucial problem of this kind of reasoning:  
"Should the repugnance some feel at the crossing of species boundaries be 
dismissed (as the reaction of a racist should be), or does it constitute yet another 
intuition in a long line of intuitions where our difficulties in providing 
satisfactory theoretical explanations merely indicate theoretical inadequacy? 
Given the poor state of the arguments on both sides of the debate, it is too early 
to tell."240  
What Streiffer says is: we will know whether our argument from repugnance was right once 
we have worked out whether there are actual reasons that support it. The "argument", after 
all, is based on emotion and, as such, it is hugely influenced by our socialisation and 
cultural surroundings, and – most importantly – it cannot be used to convince other people 
who have different emotive responses. Therefore, it is useless in any ethical debate where 
there are conflicting emotive responses. Basically, Kass and Streiffer use emotions in a 
supporting role – as stand-ins for when they have run out of arguments. This does, in my 
opinion, not make their position more convincing. Karpowicz et al. (2005) offer a similar 
interpretation of what they call "taboo arguments":  
"What makes such outrage justifiable, however, is not the emotion in itself, but 
the reasons why one responds with this emotion. We would be reluctant to 
accept ethical judgments based solely on emotions (…) for these can occur by 
chance and may be misplaced."241  
The authors extend this critique to arguments from "intuition" (as distinct from emotion) – 
though intuitions, in their view, "establish a prima facie case", they can still be conflicting 
and fallible, and "need to have the support of some form of reasoning that is 
intersubjectively available and can be followed by others."242  
To sum up, the feelings or intuitions people have when confronted with novel beings such 
as chimeras are a valid object of research regarding their roots and the concepts behind 
them. They are useless as an argument and – at least this is true for emotions –, in my 
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opinion, they should not even count as a vague indicator that "something is wrong". 
Karpowicz et al. arrive at a similar conclusion, finding that "taboo arguments" do "not 
provide an adequate basis for rejecting studies using human-nonhuman chimeras (…)." 243 
After this examination of the "yuk factor" or arguments from repugnance, let us look at 
other, more promising types of argument. As I mentioned above, it proves to be hard to 
draw lines between different types of intrinsic arguments, and also between intrinsic and 
consequentialist arguments; keeping a crude typology, however, seems advisable for the 
sake of a clear synopsis. The following two types of intrinsic argument are often 
constructed as explanations for (or reasons behind) the "yuk factor". Creating chimeras is 
deemed offensive and repugnant because it means "challenging God's existence".244 
Another type of argument highlights "boundaries" between species that are considered 
sacred or, as Robert and Baylis write, "inappropriate objects of human transgression". 
Transgression of such a boundary leads to the violation of a taboo which causes 
"instinctive and intense revulsion".245 Are these objections to creating chimeras more 
convincing than the repugnance argument, or do they substantially improve its 
persuasiveness? 
2. Religious and quasi-religious objections 
It is not uncommon to explain revulsion or similar aversion to interspecifics by religious 
reasons. I will not dwell on this kind of argument for too long, but still mention some 
typical concerns. I will also have a look at what I call "quasi-religious" concerns: objections 
on the grounds of beliefs that are not necessarily religious in the traditional sense, but 
based on the belief in a higher order of some kind (e.g. the teleological belief that there is a 
sense or direction in nature which we should obey, or a sanctity that does not derive from 
specifically religious beliefs). These "quasi-religious" concerns are probably even more 
influential nowadays than religious concerns proper. 
a. Christian attitudes towards the creation of interspecifics 
Objections against the creation of chimeras, especially human-animal chimeras, can 
apparently be derived in a relatively direct fashion from the scripture: "bestiality", i.e. sexual 
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intercourse between human and nonhuman beings, is expressly forbidden.246 Some infer 
from this that technically assisted "mixing" of humans and animals – especially in the quasi-
sexual way of merging human and animal embryos or embryonic cells – would be highly 
problematic.247 
A somewhat more abstract argument states that mixing one species with another species 
can be seen as meddling with the types of beings God has given us. Morriss reconstructs 
(but does not share) a view that sees the world as "complete" and any creation of novel 
creatures therefore necessarily as an insult to God.248 In the same vein, a 1987 synod of the 
Evangelische Kirche Deutschland concerning genetic engineering and reproductive 
medicine referred to the "predetermined shape of creation", which would be "violated" by 
creation of chimeras and hybrids [transl. CH].249 Mixing human with nonhuman beings 
would be regarded as an even graver offense, since humans are seen as a kind of being that 
has a special and unique connection with God. Human beings, according to Christian 
doctrine, belong to an altogether different category than nonhuman animals; God has 
created them in his image and correspondingly they carry an inherent value. Seyfer notes 
that, from the Christian viewpoint,  
"Jesus Christ did not come as an animal, but specifically as a human being, in 
a human body. This bespeaks the dignity which God accords human beings 
and their bodies and how specially He views the human race. It thus seems to 
lead towards the blasphemous to purposefully combine the genetic or bodily 
material of a human being and an animal in a way that changes either of their 
identities. To mix the imago Dei with non-imago-Dei seems a violation, and 
evokes a certain repugnance. Perhaps this repugnance is a sign of wisdom."250 
Aside from this reference to Kass' argument from repugnance, the main part of the 
argument rests on the religiously grounded dignity of human beings and thereby the 
offensiveness of mixing human with nonhuman (for further discussion of "human dignity" 
in this context, see section B.4 below).  
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The overriding principle of Catholic Christian opinions regarding the creation of human-
animal interspecifics is the priority of the doctrine of sanctity of human life from 
conception on. This results in staunch opposition to any research that involves the use of 
human embryos – including many types of interspecific research. The priority of the 
sanctity of life principle can lead to results that seem counterintuitive at first glance. Roman 
catholic bishops suggested in 2008 that, should human-animal embryonic chimeras be 
created (which they consider to be morally wrong), then there should be no legislation 
preventing the embryo from being implanted in the womb of the woman who donated the 
egg: 
 "Such a woman is the genetic mother, or partial mother, of the embryo; should 
she have a change of heart and wish to carry her child to term, she should not 
be prevented from doing so"251 
Sanctity of life considerations, in this point of view, clearly overrule other arguments that 
would make the bringing to term of such a hybrid being morally wrong. 
Although the standard Christian reaction to hybridisation, chimerisation and transgenesis is 
negative, some argue that Christian viewpoints do not necessarily result in a firm 
opposition to the creation of interspecifics (even human-nonhuman mixtures). Theologian 
Daniel McGee points out that human life, though it has a supreme position in the hierarchy 
of Christian values, is not granted "absolute value or sacred status" in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Regarding chimeras, McGee reminds of Karl Rahner, who, in the 1960s, warned 
fellow Catholics not to absolutely dismiss new technologies for human manipulation: "He 
noted that Christians must recognise that such self-manipulation will contain the potential 
for both good and evil", McGee resumes, and that (even for faithful Christians) there is no 
one answer to the new complexities brought about by new developments of biotechnology 
such as chimera creation.252 Robert and Baylis point out that  
"Some would argue further that not only is it not wrong to play God, but 
rather this is exactly what God enjoins us to do. Proponents of this view 
maintain that God 'left the world in a state of imperfection so that we become 
His partners' – his co-creators."253 
                                                 
251 Gledhill (2007), "Human-animal hybrid embryos should be legal says Catholic Church ", Times Online, 
2007/05/27. 
252 McGee (2003a), "Moral Ambiguity? Yes. Moral Confusion? No", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3). 
253 Robert and Baylis (2003), "Crossing Species Boundaries", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3). Citing 
Breitowitz (2002), "What's so bad about human cloning?" Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 12. 
Chapter 2: Arguments Against Creating Interspecifics 
 66
Let me close this incomplete and very tentative look at Christian views of chimera creation 
with the somewhat surprising result that the ethical classification of human-animal 
chimerism research is not a univocal one even within the bounds of Christian 
interpretation, at least not on the level of intrinsic objections. 
b. A quasi-religious objection: Hubris 
In the bulk of adverse reactions to biotechnology, there is one very common type of 
objection or concern which I would not call "religious" although it sometimes uses 
religious terminology. It is expressed in the formula that biotechnology, and particularly 
chimera creation, constitutes "Playing God" or "Meddling with Nature" and is, therefore, 
morally reprehensible or at least suspect.  
In a 2005 interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Jason Scott Robert stated that "he's 
been struck by how 'even secular people, people who aren't of faith, nonetheless see the 
wisdom of the ›playing God‹ objection' to creating chimeras."254 Robert Streiffer cites the 
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment's report on public perceptions of biotechnology as 
stating that concerns "about playing God and tampering with Nature" are quite prevalent 
in the (American) public.255 Chakrabarty reports that "crossing the so-called evolutionary 
barrier through scientific interventions does not resonate well with most people; it is 
considered an overreach for scientists to play God."256 Jeremy Rifkin, in an assessment of 
human-mouse xenograft experiments, states that such research will "stretch the limits of 
human tinkering with nature to the realm of the pathological" and he fears a "journey into 
a brave new world in which all of nature can be ruthlessly manipulated."257 
I understand both the (non-religious) "Playing God" and the "Meddling With Nature" 
concerns to have one common root: the accusation of hubris. Stemming from Ancient 
Greek culture, this today denotes a combination of ignorance, arrogance and exaggerated 
pride of an agent which is typically followed by punishment by fate or higher powers. A 
typical kind of modern hubris view assumes that there are actions, or types of action, that 
are reserved for higher beings (God or Nature), and areas of life and nature which are 
inappropriate for human beings to interfere with. Robert Spaemann's reference to "opting 
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out of Tao" seems to fit this pattern;258 others directly refer to the dangers of hubris 
concerning interspecific research.259 Concerns of this type are not limited to the creation of 
human-animal interspecifics, they can be directed against the artificial creation of life, in 
general (e.g. in vitro fertilization), against the creation of manipulated life (manipulation of 
the genome, cloning, hybridisation), against the ending of life by man (suicide, assisted 
suicide, death penalty), against the undue prolonging of life by medical means, or even 
against contraception. Since it is assumed that a supernatural being (or "Nature") is in 
charge of creating categories of creatures, of giving life, creating life and taking it away as it 
sees fit, human interference with these responsibilities is seen as insolent and morally 
wrong.  
Mary Midgley, whose "Biotechnology and Monstrosity" I introduced above as trying to 
defend "yuk factor" arguments, is one of the few to spell out this type of intrinsic 
objection. While her article addresses all kinds of manipulative biotechnologies, the 
paragraph entitled "How solid are Species?" focuses on beings that stand "between species" 
(she speaks of hybrids and, in her examples, of "novelties and monsters, chimeras and 
winged horses and three-headed dogs").260 Can an argument be made from the statement 
that such beings are "unnatural" to the moral view that we shouldn't make them? Putting 
aside the assumption that everything that straddles species lines is somehow dangerous, 
Midgley admits that modern biology has uncovered that "species are not timeless essences 
– that they can be formed and can change and decay – and also that a few species hybridize 
and mingle at their borders."261 Still, she indicates that, in modern (evolutionary) biology, 
the "evolutionary niche" has taken the place of the "species essence" – it is today what is 
believed to give "sharp edges" to the kinds of beings that can exist: "(…) actually very few 
evolutionary niches are available at any given time, and (…) these are normally far apart, 
accommodating only the rather widely varied creatures that now occupy them." Between 
the niches, nature is "inhabitable", Midgley states, and utterly inhospitable to beings like 
"mice with ears on their backs" or lion-tiger hybrids – "they could not survive in the wild." 
Midgley concludes: "Evolution (…) knows what it is about when it puts together the 
repertoire of characteristics that marks a species." I understand Midgley, from this analysis 
of the current state of nature, to conclude that "Nature Knows Best", and that creating 
beings that have no place in it is therefore demonstrably morally wrong. Species, then, 
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must be "taken seriously", because there is a principle telling us that (at least some) species 
characteristics "should not be moved". 
Contrary to Midgley, I do not think that making use of modern evolutionary biology is of 
much help when defending the point that "Nature Knows Best". Firstly, I am troubled by 
Midgley's definition of "evolutionary niche". An evolutionary niche does not have to be in 
the wild. The niche concept can, more plausibly, be understood as meaning that all beings 
which are alive have, by virtue of being alive, and retaining the possibility of procreation, 
found their "evolutionary niche". This includes wild animals, but also pets which – from 
Chihuahua to Koi fish – could not survive in the wild (it also most likely includes a lot of 
human beings, e.g. short-sighted and/or weakish persons, like the majority of professional 
philosophers). This means that chimeras and other interspecifics, contrary to Midgley's 
assessment, do have an "evolutionary niche", even though they are not running wild in the 
woods like other participants in the competition of evolution: their niche is in labs and 
cages and in the willingness of humans to create and feed them. We can grant Midgley the 
point that interspecific chimeras do not live in the wild and do not occur without human 
intervention, yet the step from this assertion to the moral problematicity of their creation is 
hard to make. They are "unnatural" – probably yes, depending on your definition of 
"natural". But why this is an argument against their creation is not made clear by Midgley's 
argumentation. How can we make sense of her statements? 
Midgley uses a telling metaphor when saying that "Evolution, in fact, knows what it is 
about (…)." In modern evolutionary biology, which Midgley stresses as her starting point 
in this paragraph, there is no way of saying that evolution "knows", "does", or "has in 
mind" anything at all. Behind this manner of speaking, there seems to be a view of Nature 
not as a random process, but as an almost personal being or "incorporated principle" that 
has aims and – most importantly – whose aims or intentions are morally relevant, right for 
us. I call this a "quasi-religious" view because Nature, crudely speaking, seems to take the 
place God occupies in other worldviews. It is this teleological view of nature which is the 
foundation for arguing against the creation of "unnatural" beings (i.e. beings that are 
openly at odds with the principle). Karpowicz et al. offer a similar interpretation of quasi-
religious arguments (in their terminology: "The 'unnaturalness' argument"): 
"This argument maintains that the operations of nature are to be understood 
and valued in terms of their purposes. It is indebted to Aristotelian thought, 
which asserts that every living thing has an inner tendency to reach its 
appropriate end or goal (telos) by exercising certain characteristic biological 
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functions. According to traditional natural law theorists, the very fact that a 
living entity pursues a particular kind of life through certain biological processes 
is its own justification." 262 
Once we assume such a teleological view of nature, it is possible that a promising intrinsic 
argument against the creation of chimeras could be made. In this sense, the 
"unnaturalness" argument need not immediately fail – natural features could then be 
regarded as having direct moral importance. Karpowicz et al. point out that the teleological 
kind of argument is far from helpful, though, mainly because we have no criterion for 
finding out when intervention is allowed and when it is against nature's aims, or which 
natural features or "aims" are morally relevant and which are not. Modern human life is 
basically identical with "intervening with nature"– it cannot be true, and it is probably not 
the claim proponents of this argument have in mind, that all interventions are wrong in 
themselves. The teleological route does not equip us with tools with which to find out 
which of them are. In any case, the road Midgley takes (i.e. via a teleological analysis of 
evolutionary biology) does not seem viable. 
Another possibility for intrinsic objections to chimera creation, as we will see in the next 
section, is in a certain understanding of species boundaries.  
3. The boundary between humans and nonhumans 
The concept of a boundary between humans and nonhumans – and of the problematicity 
of crossing it by creating human-animal chimeras – is widespread in the discussion of 
interspecifics. Further analysis of this argument-type reveals that it would have to jump 
three hurdles by demonstrating that:  
(I) There is a boundary between humans and nonhumans 
(II) The boundary is morally relevant, i.e. there is a fundamental/categorical moral division 
between human and nonhuman beings 
(III) Creating human-animal chimeras (or other interspecifics) constitutes a "crossing" or 
"violation" of the boundary 
From these premises it would follow that creating human-animal chimeras or other 
interspecifics is morally wrong. 
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What is intrinsic about this type of argument is the assumption of a morally relevant 
boundary between humans and nonhumans – crossing the line, according to this approach, 
is wrong because of the innate sacredness of this boundary, not because of detrimental 
consequences its crossing might have. One can ask several central questions in this context:  
Ad (I) What constitutes the "boundary" between humans and nonhumans? Is it genetic, or 
metaphysical (e.g. in the sense of humans and nonhumans belonging to different natural 
kinds)?  
Ad (II) What confers moral relevance to the "boundary"? Why should there be a 
fundamental moral difference between humans and nonhumans? 
Ad (III) In what way, at what point, is the boundary violated when someone creates an 
interspecific entity? 
The first concept that comes to mind when thinking about what could constitute a proper 
"boundary" is that of (biological) species. Human beings, in contrast to other living beings, 
belong to the species Homo sapiens. To give a short glimpse of considerations to come: we 
will see below that the concept of species is today understood in a way that makes it 
difficult to accept it as the fundament of given, natural boundaries between kinds of beings 
(see chapter 3, section B.3.a below). But even if we did not have these problems with 
species concepts (which, for the sake of analysing this type of argument, I will assume for 
the duration of this chapter), we would need a good argument to explain why this 
biological categorisation should be deemed morally relevant for the question of chimera 
production, at all.  
In their analysis of boundary arguments, Robert and Baylis refer to the notion of "fixed 
species boundaries" which are "inappropriate objects of human transgression".263 They 
note that, far from concerning each and every biological species, only one particular species 
boundary is affected by this notion, namely that between human and nonhuman beings. 
Besides, the crossing of species lines cannot be immoral, as such, since it happens in nature 
(e.g. hybridisation of horse and donkey).264 Robert and Baylis diligently consider the 
question of what could possibly fuel the moral power of this special boundary – and 
conclude that, in their opinion, there is no actual "human essence" or "species essence" 
that could be considered the root of a fixed boundary. Species boundaries are a "moral 
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construct",265 and they reveal that worry about species boundaries is, in fact, a concern 
about something else. The human-animal boundary is a typical "taboo", they say – a social 
and moral shield held up against ambiguous things, because uncategorizable objects pose a 
danger to moral decision-making. Ultimately, Robert and Baylis find it unhelpful and 
mistaken to use the concept of "fixed boundaries" to argue against the creation of human-
animal chimeras. The concern with human-animal chimeras, they say, is not really about a 
fixed boundary (because such a thing cannot be identified), but rather about "moral 
confusion" – i.e. an alleged consequence of chimera creation that will be discussed in detail 
in section D.3 below. Regarding my three-step analysis of boundary arguments, one could 
say that Robert and Baylis abandon this approach already at step (I): they believe that 
realism concerning the boundary is mistaken (because they think that boundary realism 
relies on species essentialism which they declare obsolete) – they also argue that, 
concerning step (III), it cannot be inherently wrong to "cross species boundaries" by, e.g., 
moving genes from one species to another, since such things also happen in nature. As we 
will see in more detail in chapter 2, section D below, Robert and Baylis are not prima facie 
disinclined to arguments belonging in the realm of step (II) (i.e. speciesism). Robert's and 
Baylis' influential discussion of the boundary argument was, as we have seen, not 
favourable.  
On the other hand, there are several defenders of the view that there is a boundary 
between species (especially that between humans and animals) which is also a morally 
relevant border line. Mary Midgley, e.g., supports a kind of species realism which sees as 
the defining and determining element of species not a "hard essence", but rather the 
adaptedness of species to an evolutionary niche (Step I). Midgley does not explicitly state 
why violating the boundary would be morally problematic, but can be understood as using 
a teleological view of Nature (or "Evolution") to do so (Step II). I have made clear above 
that Midgley's route is not promising: because Midgley's account of evolutionary niches is 
mistaken, it fails to explain why chimeras violate the alleged boundaries between species 
(Step III), at all.  
Robert Streiffer, to give another example, defends the moral relevance of species 
boundaries as at least possible. Regarding the question whether there is such a thing as 
"species boundaries", he states that just because there's disagreement about the boundary 
(i.e. the species concept), the concept isn't necessarily superfluous. He also doubts Robert's 
and Baylis' assumption that "crossing species boundaries" cannot be immoral as such since 
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it happens naturally: "(…) it can be natural for bacteria to move genes across species 
boundaries without it being natural for human beings to do so."266 Streiffer does give some 
support to the concept of "species boundaries" – it might be useful and not necessarily 
superfluous for ethical debate. Still, his considerations do not, in my opinion, offer the 
"Defense of the Moral Relevance of Species Boundaries" the title promises, mainly because 
Streiffer's defence is grounded in a repugnance argument I do not find convincing (see 
chapter 2, section B.1.d above).  
Louis Charland defends the species concept as such – claiming species can be understood 
as natural kinds – but he acknowledges that this doesn't do anything for explaining or 
erecting a morally relevant boundary (i.e., Step II): "None of this settles the question 
whether and how moral categories crosscut natural ones", he admits.267 Charland does not 
address the questions subsumed under (II) or (III).  
Cynthia Cohen268 states that a species concept is necessary for keeping up the assertions 
Robert and Baylis make – we must first "understand which properties, features, 
characteristics and functions are distinctively and importantly human." – then we can 
decide in how far the created chimeras "have become human", i.e. "where the conceptual 
boundary between human beings and animals lies and when it has been crossed." In the 
following, she implies (or assumes) that "turning animals into human beings" is morally 
wrong, but gives no reason why it should be. Therefore, regarding step (III), Cohen's 
approach would supposedly be that creating chimeras is a transgression of the boundary if 
and in as far as it "turns animals into human beings." Similarly to Streiffer and Charland, 
Cohen defends the species concept in answering question (I), but shies away from giving 
answers to question (II) (i.e. the reasons for moral relevance of such a concept).  
Like the commentators before him, Leo Zwanziger269 defends the idea behind the species 
concept, stating that there is "significant and real, if not immutable, stability in Homo 
sapiens." Again, there is no mentioning of the question of moral relevance identified here 
as question (II). 
At this point, we are confronted with commentators generally defending the usefulness of a 
concept of species boundaries or a firm boundary between human and nonhuman as such 
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but shying away from the question whether and why it should be morally relevant, let alone 
the third step of formulating why and in what cases, exactly, creating human-animal 
mixtures constitutes a violation of the boundary defined. What could a successful boundary 
argument against the creation of human-animal interspecifics, specifically chimeras, look 
like?  
Let me, again, resort to the crude outline of possible arguments described on p. 69-70. On 
the level of (I) – regarding the existence of a boundary – there are two roads one can take. 
One is an antirealist approach: "species", and, more specifically, the species boundary 
between humans and nonhumans, is understood as a mere "social construct" that has a 
value in as far as it prevents the occurrence of bad consequences. This is the road Robert 
and Baylis take in their article and which I will follow in section D. Such an approach 
would, however, leave the realm of intrinsic arguments that are the subject matter of this 
section. The other possible approach regarding question (I) is that of realism concerning 
species (at least in the sense of sticking to a classification into "human" or "nonhuman"). 
This is, basically, what defenders of the species concept like Charland and Zwanziger do. 
(We will see in chapter 3 that the problematicity of constructing an appropriate species 
concept, and more specifically, essentialism, are not only relevant for a discussion of 
human-animal chimeras, but also situated at the very centre of the speciesism debate). 
Only at this point are we beginning to touch upon questions of morality, i.e. on questions 
of step (II). Why should species membership or, as it were, membership in a "natural kind", 
have moral relevance? One possibility here would be to assume that being a member of the 
natural kind "human being" confers the property of personhood or, more generally 
speaking, high moral status. The natural kind of "beings belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens" would be assumed to be coextensive with the natural kind of "beings deserving 
special moral consideration". This assumption is made by some who defend the moral 
privileges of members of our species as an ethical principle (i.e. by proponents of 
"Speciesism", see chapter 3, section B below). This should certainly be included in a 
typology of intrinsic arguments regarding chimeras, since it seems, at least prima facie, to 
do a satisfying job of connecting the realm of facts (existence of species) with that of 
morals (moral relevance of being a member of a species).  
But does taking this route really help someone who intrinsically objects to the creation of 
(human-animal) chimeras? Let us recapitulate the course of the argument so far: the 
objector has stated that boundaries between species (especially between humans and 
nonhumans) do exist in reality/nature. Further, he has stated that these natural kinds are 
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relevant in a moral sense: beings which belong to the natural kind of "Homo sapiens" do also 
belong to the natural kind of "person". But there is a third hurdle to take. The objector 
must argue for the proposition that making a (human-animal) chimera constitutes a 
"violation" of the boundary he has identified.  
Here, at step (III), my reconstruction encounters two problems: firstly, I cannot fathom 
how an objector to creating human-animal chimeras can take offense with mixing humans 
and animals, at all. A mixture in the sense of tainting the human essence with nonhuman 
parts (or vice versa) seems unimaginable in the conceptual framework presented. The 
natural kinds of "human/person" and "nonhuman/nonperson" must be mutually exclusive 
– otherwise, there would not be a clear boundary between them in the first place. 
Interspecifics in the sense we are discussing here – i.e. beings that are neither of the kind 
human/person nor of the kind nonhuman/nonperson (or part of both)270 – seem 
conceptually impossible in such a view. Is that an argument against creating them – or 
rather, one against taking the route of declaring humans a natural kind? 
Is there another rationale for declaring chimera creation a violation of boundaries? Putting 
aside the problematicity of natural kinds, one could, from the speciesist argument above, 
argue that crossing the human-animal boundary by "making an animal out of a human" 
(e.g. by injecting a huge amount of nonhuman stem cells in a human embryo) must be seen 
as morally wrong, since it destroys a person. This would not constitute a valid intrinsic 
argument against the creation of (human-animal) chimeras, though. For one, it would do 
nothing to explain why the opposite – namely, turning animals into human beings – should 
be deemed morally wrong (as is implied by, e.g., Cohen).271 Considering that experiments 
done today are usually human-to-animal and not vice versa, this to me seems to be the 
bigger threat that is posed by chimerism experiments. With the suggested approach, such 
experiments might even be considered morally favourable – what, after all, could be wrong 
with creating a being that has the highest moral status (even if it is created from an animal)? 
This "uplift" scenario will be discussed further in section C.2.2 below.  
Ultimately, it remains unclear what ethical principle an intrinsic boundary argument would 
be based on. What exactly is it that would make introducing living animal parts into human 
bodies (as in the case of chimeras), or alien genes (as in the case of transgenics) intrinsically 
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wrong, while living together with nonhuman animals as pets, touching them, or even eating 
them, would not constitute such an intrinsically wrong "boundary crossing"?  
4. Human dignity arguments 
Several bioethicists analyse the creation of human-animal chimeras in relation to the notion 
of human dignity. Human dignity concerns are intrinsic concerns – they do not refer to 
specific interests of humans or animals or animal-human mixtures which are supposedly 
violated as a consequence of creating interspecifics, but to the general and abstract concept 
of "dignity" which makes, some argue, creation of interspecifics wrong in principle. 
The most extensive discussions of dignity approaches are given by Johnston and Eliot 
(2003), Karpowicz, Cohen and Van der Kooy (2005), and Ravelingien, Braeckman, et al. 
(2006).272 Others argue that "human dignity" is a nebulous and vague term, that there is no 
agreement on how it should be understood exactly, and that it adds nothing to the host of 
concerns for the wellbeing of humans which are brought forward without referring to the 
notion of "dignity", at all. Robert and Baylis,273 for example, and with them the majority of 
authors in both the AJOB 2003 and 2007 issues concerned with chimeras, leave "human 
dignity" out of their analysis of chimera creation altogether; likewise, the CHIMBRIDS 
project opening discussion was highly sceptical of "human dignity" approaches.274  
Nevertheless I think that the human dignity concept adds a perspective to the discussion 
that differs considerably from just stating that human beings might be treated inadequately. 
"Simple" concerns for the wellbeing of humans, as described in section C.2.b below, are 
based on the assumption that chimera creation might violate the interests or the rights of 
humans (or part-humans). Claiming that human dignity is being violated is a much 
stronger, and structurally different, claim – in particular because a genuine violation of 
human dignity is not justifiable by means of a cost-benefit analysis, which means that an 
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argument from this approach would be much stronger than the consequence-based 
arguments discussed below. The statement that human dignity is "inviolable", in this sense, 
is a prescriptive one which means that violations of dignity cannot be justified or balanced 
out with other values (e.g. wellbeing). 
Apart from concerns about outright violation of dignity, there are also concerns that 
chimera creation might lead to constrictions or limitations of human dignity. Such 
constrictions or limitations – "threats to human dignity" – might be somewhat more easily 
justifiable – they fuel consequence-based rather than intrinsic concerns. As Resnik puts it, 
"it is not reasonable to prevent all possible threats to human dignity, because this strategy 
would require societies to forego important opportunities or violate basic rights."275 But 
still, such threats could be the basis for viable arguments against human-animal chimera 
creation: especially in the form of slippery slope arguments, they are influential in many 
bioethical debates. A variant of such concerns for a (indirect) threat to human dignity will 
be discussed in section D.3 below. 
In the typical phrasing of "human dignity" approaches, human beings' special characteristics 
demand that they be treated as means, not only as ends. These characteristic(s) are defined 
in varying ways – as the ability to act in order to fulfil purposes (cf. Alan Gewirth),276 as 
being created in the image of God (imago dei) (cf. Christian approaches), as a bundle or 
family of valuable capacities (cf. Karpowicz, Cohen, Van der Kooy),277 or they can be 
found in the role of humans as moral subjects (cf. Kant).278 Ravelingien's adaptionist 
approach to human dignity tries to identify uniquely human characteristics that are 
responsible for "human dignity" as "those adaptations that arose in response to the 
particular adaptive problems not shared by the ancestors of other species."279 
Different interpretations of the "special characteristic" notwithstanding – what should be 
central to our analysis of human dignity concerns is the question of what, exactly, the 
violation, constriction or endangerment of human dignity consists in in the case of creation 
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of human-animal chimeras or other interspecifics. Since not all types of interspecific-
creation raise these issues (xenotransplantation of insulin-producing porcine cells, for 
example, is rarely mentioned in respect to dignity violations), there must be something 
about specific types of interspecific-creation which makes them problematic in this regard.  
According to Karpowicz et al. (2005), there are different ways of violating human dignity: 
(a) Human dignity is violated when individuals with valuable capacities are kept from 
exercising them. Examples for this are slavery or any kind of forcible coercion, which 
keeps humans from acting freely and deciding for themselves, which in turn makes their 
role as moral agents dubitable.  
(b) Human dignity is even more severely violated when human beings which are in 
possession of valuable capacities are wilfully robbed of them. Murdering a human being is 
the worst possible case of this type, since it means denying a human all capacities; 
mutilation, in as far as it leads to a permanent diminishment of valuable capacities, is also 
regarded as an especially reprehensible violation of human dignity in this sense.  
What, then, does the dignity violation consist of in the case of creation of human-animal 
interspecifics? The identification of a violation would presuppose that special 
characteristics/valuable capacities are affected – it is not conceivable, e.g., how the transfer 
of human muscle or renal cells into an animal could count as a violation of human dignity 
in these senses. Accordingly, Karpowicz et al. assume a transfer of those physical 
components that are necessary for "valuable capacities" from a human being to an animal 
host.  
Let us look first for dignity violations of type (a), i.e. cases where beings are kept from 
exercising valuable capacities. One would find them in the (hypothetical) case of chimeras 
which do have valuable capacities, but which are prevented from exercising them because 
of the lab setting they are kept in. This is not a direct argument against the creation of 
human-animal-chimeras, but rather, parallel to inadequate treatment arguments (section 
C.2.c below), an indirect one. Assuming that the physical components transferred to the 
animal do not induce the development of valuable capacities, the chimera is not kept from 
exercising the latter and human dignity is not violated (at least not in the sense of type (a)).  
For the sake of argument, Karpowicz et al. discuss the case of a whole-brain transfer from 
human to animal host and state: 
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"The development of such a chimera arbitrarily would limit the ways in which 
certain human characteristics and capacities associated with human dignity 
could be exercised in a nonhuman setting and therefore would contravene 
human dignity."280  
The situation of a whole-brain transfer into an animal seems, in this respect, to be similar 
to cases in which a human individual's body is mutilated or otherwise constricted (i.e. by 
drugging) in order not to exercise "valuable capacities". Accordingly, this would be a quite 
straightforward dignity violation of type (a). Such a procedure is wholly hypothetical, 
though, and certainly not what is currently understood by human-animal chimera creation.  
As for dignity violations of type (b), it is doubtful here who is robbed of valuable capacities 
when physical components which are necessary for the former are removed and transferred 
to an animal host. The animal host organism cannot be the subject at issue, since it does 
not have valuable capacities before the transfer. If we, to follow Karpowicz et al., assume 
the transfer of big, undissociated portions of neuronal cells taken from an aborted fetus, we 
could prima facie understand this as "robbing" the fetus of something. But this approach 
raises several questions. Firstly, how could the fetus be robbed of valuable capacities it does 
not have (such as reason, being a moral agent, consciousness, etc.)? This could maybe be 
remedied with an argument from potential (although I am sceptical of such approaches). 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is to be assumed that if a human dignity violation takes 
place in the course of chimera creation with material taken from aborted fetuses, at all, it 
should be interpreted to take place in the act of abortion (or, in other scenarios, killing of 
the embryo which is created specifically for experimentation). This is the point at which the 
fetus can sensibly be regarded as being "robbed" of something. How its tissues are used 
afterwards, and, particularly, whether they are implanted into alien bodies, seems 
completely irrelevant regarding the primary violation that has already taken place. Finally, 
whether human tissue is transferred into a nonhuman body in this process, i.e. the 
"chimera creation" itself, does not play any role in whether we regard this as "dignity 
violation" regarding the embryo. Accordingly, I find it hard to identify a "dignity violation" 
in human-to-animal embryonic chimera creation itself – be it in sense (a) or in sense (b). If 
at all, this construction seems to work against all embryo-destructive research (and 
abortions), but is not conducive to arguing against chimera creation, in particular. Baylis, in 
her analysis of the prohibition of human-nonhuman primate blastocyst grafts, has similar 
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difficulties finding the point of violation of human dignity in such scenarios.281 This critique 
does not rule out that a point of "dignity violation" could be identified in certain scenarios 
of human-animal interspecific creation in the future, but this point seems to require more 
clarification. Our difficulties in finding what the specific conditions of a dignity violation 
would be are similar to problems in the context of "boundary" arguments, where a specific, 
consistent principle stating what makes some kinds of species-crossing morally 
reprehensible while other types are neutral could not be given (see section B.3 above). 
Additionally, the question may crop up whether human dignity talk is helpful, at all, when 
discussing human-animal chimera creation. What is so special about "human dignity"? The 
concept brings with it three characteristics that, I believe, are indispensable if one wants to 
take it seriously, at all: 
(1) Firstly, human dignity is understood as something a subject either partakes in or does 
not partake in, i.e. an absolute value that is not doled out in degrees. Partakers in human 
dignity are not only different, but of a wholly different category than other beings.  
(2) Secondly, a basic idea behind human dignity is the view that it does not depend on 
certain characteristics of the individual. The human individual does not have to jump any 
hurdles in order to gain this status – he or she has it, uncontestedly, in virtue of being 
human. Höffe, in his discussion of the concept, calls this aspect "Mitgiftwürde" (human 
dignity as an unmerited "dowry"), and observes that the contrasting aspect of 
"Leistungswürde" (human dignity as accomplishment) is, rather than being a precondition, 
just an appendix to this central characteristic.282  
(3) Thirdly, human dignity approaches assume or imply speciesism, i.e. the position that 
human beings are fundamentally morally superior to nonhuman beings. 
In addition to the assumed "inviolability" of human dignity mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, these three characteristics – being absolute, being unconditional, and only applying to 
human beings – are what distinguishes human dignity from other values, and therefore what 
distinguishes human dignity arguments from more straightforward or simple arguments 
that claim a plain violation of interests of living beings (i.e. arguments of the type spelled 
out in section C.2 below). I deem these characteristics to be indispensable, essential parts of 
the concept of human dignity. Yet, these very characteristics are also what could make 
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human dignity arguments problematic in the context of assessing the moral relevance of 
creating human-animal chimeras. 
This is, firstly, because under some circumstances it might be hard to determine whether a 
being is human or nonhuman (think, e.g. about the humanness of the hypothetical case of a 
human-chimpanzee hybrid, or about the humanness of rabbit-human cybrids). Using 
species-membership as the determining factor for moral status, under these circumstances, 
might not be advisable. The assumption that every being falls clearly either into the 
"human" or the "nonhuman" category, and that this classification is central for the question 
of whether a being is accorded human dignity, is problematic. The part of "special 
characteristics" as preconditions for dignity, at this point, seems to be reduced to a mere 
appendix of the human dignity concept: If a being is human, it is accorded human dignity 
no questions asked, i.e. even if it does not exhibit any of the "special characteristics", or 
only exhibits them to a small degree. The most striking problem of using human dignity 
argumentation in the discussion of human-animal chimeras, then, is its inherent speciesism: 
Human dignity approaches assume fundamental human superiority. In the context of the 
animal rights debate, the assumption of "human dignity" (as opposed to any other kind of 
ethical value beings can have) is begging the question. The very term "human dignity" 
assumes and implies speciesism, i.e. a fundamental difference between humans and 
nonhumans. Baylis and Fenton identify the tension resulting from this connection in 
Karpowicz, Cohen et al. 2005, who work with the concept of "human dignity" and, 
according to their critics, 
"want to both (a) value certain human functions and capacities for their own 
sake and not because they are human and (b) value certain human functions 
and capacities because they are human and not for their own sake. At the 
same time, both of these points in tension rely on an implicit appeal to a 
principle conferring intrinsic moral value on x if x belongs to a class A that 
contains members who manifest certain cognitive or emotional capacities, even if 
x herself does not. X is thus valued, or possesses moral significance, because x 
is a member of class A. In this case, the class is all humans."283 
That this connection between "human dignity" and "speciesism" is a necessary one is 
disputed by, e.g., Otfried Höffe, who states: 
"Should there be beings with a similar capacity for reason on other planets of 
the universe, though, then these beings would deserve the same dignity. Arguing 
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against Peter Singer, therefore, this is not a case of morally disputable kind-
egotism ('speciesism')." [transl. CH]284 
This saving of human dignity approaches from the accusation of Speciesism does not 
work, in my opinion, because Höffe does not address Singer's (and other Anti-Speciesists') 
undoubtedly strongest argument, i.e. the Argument from Marginal Cases. A central 
characteristic of human dignity, for Höffe, is that it is accorded to all human beings, 
independently of merits or achievements. Human dignity is unconditional, innate, an 
unmerited "dowry" (Mitgiftwürde), and its sphere includes beings which cannot "answer 
for their own dignity" [transl. CH], such as babies, the mentally ill and slaves.285 Nonhuman 
beings, on the other hand, are excluded from this sphere of beings that are accorded dignity 
although they also cannot "answer for their own dignity". This is because they do not 
belong to the biological species "human" which, according to Höffe, is not necessary but 
(in the case of beings who "cannot answer for their own dignity") sufficient for belonging to 
the sphere of carriers of dignity. Accordingly, human and nonhuman beings are measured 
by fundamentally different standards – if you are human, you are accorded dignity no 
matter what, if you are nonhuman, you must jump hurdles. So human dignity approaches 
do bring about speciesism. Whether that position is in fact "morally questionable", though, 
is a distinct issue that shall be discussed in chapter 3, section B below. Note that the 
success of dignity approaches, at this point, seems to crucially depend on whether 
Speciesism is defensible.  
Let me conclude this discussion with a roundup: it appears that, if at all, only the creation 
of those human-animal interspecifics that are "humanized" (in the sense of having 
"valuable capacities" that yield superior moral importance) could be countered by human 
dignity arguments. However, even in these cases I found it difficult to pin down what 
exactly the violation of human dignity would consist in, a point that would need more 
elaboration by supporters of "human dignity" arguments. One argument one could make 
would be that any use of embryos for research (and abortion) is unjustifiable under all 
circumstances, since human embryos have valuable capacities (or at least potential valuable 
capacities), and destroying them robs them of the latter and thereby constitutes a violation 
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of human dignity. Additionally, the success of human dignity arguments depends on 
whether the Speciesist assumption they presuppose is defensible in some way. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, some arguments from human dignity do not 
assume a direct violation of dignity by creation of human-animal chimeras, rather, they 
suspect that allowing the creation of human-animal chimeras could ignite a process which 
would, in final consequence, lead to dangers for human dignity. Via a slippery slope from 
seemingly marginal encroachment on human dignity, the collective worth of humanity 
could be seriously endangered (leading, in turn, to dangers for individual humans, and 
inadequate treatment). Arguments of the slippery slope type, which state that interspecific 
creation could have indirect disadvantages for human dignity, will be discussed in chapter 
2, section D below, as they are consequence-based rather than intrinsic arguments. 
5. Intrinsic arguments: Conclusion 
I hope that I have made sufficiently clear in this section that intrinsic arguments might not 
be the best route to take when trying to argue against experiments that involve the creation 
of human-animal interspecifics. Arguments of the "repugnance" type and "quasi-religious" 
arguments are powerful and popular in the chimera debate, but they are not accessible to 
anyone who is not repugned by the idea of such creatures or who is not religious or 
believes in nature as a quasi-god, posing a teleological principle that should govern our 
actions. Arguments of the boundary type appear to be more promising and more accessible 
to debate. Still, my analysis reveals that there are several hurdles to take. Firstly, a 
convincing argument for (human) species realism must be made; secondly, the view that 
this boundary is morally relevant must be defended; and thirdly, it must be explained in 
how far the creation of human-animal interspecifics does violate the boundary while other 
kinds of mixing with nonhuman animals do not. This leaves open the questions of "species 
realism" or essentialism, which touches in turn on the defensibleness of some kinds of 
speciesism (I will come back to further discussion of this point in chapter 3 below). Thus, 
even boundary arguments – a type of intrinsic argument that is commonly brought forward 
and intuitively appealing even to non-religious people – have proven to be hard, if not 
impossible, to spell out in a coherent way. Dignity arguments fail for a very similar reason: 
it remains hard to phrase a consistent ethical principle which spells out why, and in what 
way exactly, the creation of human-animal interspecifics constitutes a violation of human 
dignity, while other kinds of "mixing" of human with animal are supposedly unproblematic. 
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Additionally, the concept of human dignity presupposes speciesist assumptions which, as 
we will see in chapter 3, section 3 below, are highly problematic. 
C. Direct consequence-based objections  
Not all objectors to interspecific experimentation rely on intrinsic arguments, and indeed, 
powerful resistance to such research is possible without resorting to such types of 
objection. Let us have a look at the more tangible type of argument which refers to the 
possibility of disadvantageous consequences (costs) of such research. Looking at the debate 
around interspecific experiments from this angle, we are presented with a wide array of 
objections, ranging from very direct concerns (e.g. for animal welfare) to quite indirect or 
abstract ones. First, let us have a (relatively short) look at possible benefits of interspecific 
research. 
1. The benefit side 
Discussing chimerism research in a consequentialist framework would not make much 
sense if one would take the side of possible benefits of this research out of the equation. I 
will not extensively comment on the benefit side of this analysis, though, but rather give 
some introductory remarks in this regard.  
The potential or actual benefit of experiments involving interspecific entities varies greatly 
– which is true for any basic, not yet directly therapeutically applicable research. Looking at 
Irving Weissman's (proposed) work, for example, I find it to be quite plausible that the 
development of disease models like the "human neuron mouse" could offer many 
advantages regarding the improvement of our knowledge of how brain stem cells work to 
advances as tangible as screening of psychiatric drugs in a environment similar to a human 
brain. Greely's working group comes to a similar result when assessing potential benefits of 
Weissman's experiments.286 
On the other hand, there are chimerism experiments that seem to have no benefit apart 
from satisfying the curiosity of the researcher. Andrzej Tarkowski, a Polish embryologist 
and pioneer of mouse chimera research,287 notes in his recollections regarding interspecific 
(animal to animal) chimera experiments: 
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"For those who love experimenting in general, and in whom the childish 
curiosity and fantasy have not been yet completely ousted by logic and coolness 
of a respectful adult scientist, this is a wonderful experiment to do, but…(see 
below). (…) Although creation of interspecific mammalian chimaeras is indeed 
a spectacular experiment, in the author's opinion its contribution to embryology 
and genetics of mammals has been rather limited and disappointing."288 
The creation of interspecific (nonhuman) chimeras has turned out to be of almost no use 
for the embryologist, apparently. I say "turned out" since, as in all areas of research that are 
still in their infancy, it is impossible to predict what kinds of benefits one might one day 
reap from them. An area of research that seems highly promising today might turn out to 
be a dead end in the future, as cross-species chimerism research apparently has for 
embryology. Also, it is imaginable that research results that might today seem only 
accessible via chimerism research might, at some point in the future, turn out to be 
researchable by other means – chimerism experimentation might turn out to be a detour in 
retrospect. 
A prognosis of the future successes of basic research notoriously carries pronounced 
uncertainties. It seems extremely hard to make any useful statement on whether 
interspecifics research as such, or certain areas of it, e.g. human-animal chimera or cybrid 
research, will reap benefits. Even regarding specific experiments, it might prove to be 
impossible to sensibly predict whether they will, in retrospect, turn out to have promoted 
scientific success in a meaningful way. This uncertainty runs deep in the character of basic 
research. 
I will assume here that the odds are somewhat skewed towards the point of view that the 
bulk of research done, in the long run, is reasonable or justified in some way. The reasons 
for this assumption pertain not to special moral qualities or benign intentions of scientists, 
but to pure mechanics of the research industry. Scientists, who are confronted with a 
situation of scarcity – funding for basic research is hard to access – are generally not 
interested in wasting money and time on unjustified or unreasonable experimentation, 
because this would hardly further their own long-term financial and status-related interests. 
These advantageous mechanics, evidently, can get skewed over short periods of time or in 
some areas of research. For example, the crude and dangerous "revitalisation" therapies of 
the 1930s (see p. 23) probably do not jump the hurdle of reason; neither does Ivanov's 
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work regarding the hybridisation of human and ape (p. 30).289 The benefits of these 
(ultimately botched) ventures were not immediately tangible even at the time they were 
tried. I deem these cases to be rare exceptions from the rule that researchers usually, on 
average, have good reasons to believe that what they do will probably result in concrete 
scientific or medical benefits (this does not imply that I believe they necessarily will result in 
such benefits in all cases). 
My assumption of overall reasonableness may sound trivial, yet I believe that stating it 
openly is important. Some popular objections to the creation of interspecifics (including 
the "hubris" concerns of section B.2.b above) work with or even crucially rely on the topos 
of the "mad scientist" who is completely cut off from common sense and allegedly does 
everything he does "simply because it can be done".  
My analysis of consequentialist concerns will, from now on, concentrate on the cost side of 
the calculation, as this is what the debate focuses on. What bad consequences does (or 
could) interspecifics research lead to?  
2. Bad consequences for the entities created 
Many objectors to interspecific experimentation have concerns for the beings that are used 
in, or result from, inter-species experiments. There are arguments that work independently 
of the question of whether the beings qualify as "humans", but also arguments that only 
apply once the interspecific is identified as human or "part-human". I will begin with 
arguments of the former type, concerned with the protection of living beings in general 
(see section a below), and proceed to arguments of the latter type, concerned with the 
protection of human beings, or human materials/structures that qualify for special 
protection (see section b below). I will then discuss objections that focus on the 
undetermined, undeterminable or at least preliminarily unclear moral status of interspecific 
novel beings, which some think puts them in an especially dangerous position for 
exploitation and abuse (see section c below). The final part of this section will be 
concerned with the moral relevance of intentionally "shifting" the moral status of living 
beings (see section d below). 
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a. Animal welfare concerns 
Opponents to experimentation on animals in general will also come to doubt whether 
experimentation of the type we see in interspecific research is justified or justifiable. All 
types of objection given in this section presuppose a (minimum) concern for animal 
interests, i.e. they would not be supported by someone who thinks that animals do not feel 
pain, do not have "interests" in the widest sense, or that their pain or distress is not morally 
relevant at all.290 Such concern usually is more pronounced concerning higher-developed 
animals – most prominently primates,291 but also other mammals like rats, mice, etc. – while 
few would see pronounced ethical problems concerning experimentation in jellyfish or 
molluscs (aside from holists who, in extreme cases, assume that even natural phenomena, 
like rivers or forests, have "interests"). This kind of (pathocentric) argument is not limited 
to human-animal interspecifics, but to basically all kinds of chimeric, hybrid or transgenic 
novel beings. 
In regard to concerns about animal welfare, the killing of research animals – which is 
regularly and systematically carried out in succession to completed experimental series – 
can be seen as a moral problem, even when it is done painlessly. This concern is, in many 
regards, distinct from the question whether harming animals or cruelty towards them is 
morally problematic. It is conceivable for someone to consistently allow for the painless 
killing of animals while objecting to causing animals pain in almost all circumstances (e.g. 
by stating that animals are not "harmed" by death because they have no continuing self-
awareness), just as it is a consistent moral position to object to killing animals, in principle, 
while assuming that the causation of pain can be justified quite easily (e.g. because pain is 
reversible while death is permanent).292  
Putting aside the question of whether painless killing of animals is problematic, the classic 
objection to animal experimentation, and therefore also to chimera research, is that many 
experiments cause notable or even extreme amounts of distress or pain in animals, and that 
this is not, or cannot be justified by benefits for human beings. Argumentation of this type 
                                                 
290 Alternatively, indirect objections to cruelty to animals could be offered, e.g. a Kantian formulation that 
believes that cruelty should be avoided since it is detrimental to human character. 
291 For example, an asssessment of human-nonhuman primate neural grafting of the Working Group on the 
Criteria for Cell-Based Therapies at John Hopkins University states that "Some group members have serious 
ethical concerns over any use of nonhuman primates in invasive research. However, we set aside broader 
controversies to focus on ethical challenges specific to human-to-nonhuman primate (…) neural grafting." 
Greene, Schill, et al. (2005), "The Working Group on the Criteria for Cell-Based Therapies, John Hopkins 
University: Moral Issues of Human-Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting", Science, 309. 
292 On the general question of animal killing, see: Singer (1979), "Killing Humans and Killing Animals", 
Inquiry, 22(Summer 1979); Jamieson (1983),"Killing Persons and Other Beings", in: Miller and Williams (eds.) 
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will focus on the amount of pain or distress inflicted upon the experimentation subjects, 
thereby declaring such experimentation morally unjustifiable. Arguments mentioning the 
aspects of chimera and other interspecific research that are detrimental to animal welfare 
are brought forward by Rollin293 and (more indirectly) by Urie, Stanley and Friedman.294 
The latter call for a standard in scientific and medical experimentation that requires "full 
disclosure and informed consent (…) regardless of species", which would most probably 
rule out any use of animals in science, not only in the field of chimera or interspecific 
research.  
The general discussion of animal use in science aside, let us have a look at one animal 
welfare aspect that is specific for research involving the creation of chimeras: interspecific 
chimeric animals (be it human-to-nonhuman or animal-to-animal) are especially prone to 
developing severe and debilitating or fatal medical problems. Interspecies chimerism 
experiments produce adult animals in only a small minority of cases: the bigger the "genetic 
gap" between the species involved, the bigger the risk of severe malformation – most 
interspecific chimeras, therefore, die off before birth. Bernard Rollin hints at a similar 
problem with regard to transgenic beings when asking: "[M]ight hybrids be harmed or 
diseased in some way simply because they are transgenic?"295  
Rollin also mentions other fears concerning what he calls the "plight of the creature" – he 
speaks of "harming animals for human benefit, as in genetically engineering suffering 
animals as models for human disease", and asks: 
"Would we enslave them (as when rumors were rife about genetically 
engineering human traits into chimps so that they could perform tasks that 
human beings abhor)? Would we create them as cannon fodder?"296 
This is not a direct argument against chimera creation; we could treat the newly created 
beings appropriately, after all. In contrast to concerns I will address in section c below, 
Rollin is not up in arms against such enterprises because he thinks animals infused with 
human genetic material deserve, as such, special protection that would not be granted in 
animal testing labs: using "normal" animals as "cannon fodder" would, in principle, be just 
as problematic for Rollin, who embraces a non-speciesist, pathocentric perspective.  
                                                 
293 Rollin (2003), "Ethics and Species Integrity", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3). 
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b. Concerns for human embryos, gametes, and genes 
In chapter 1, section B.4 above,, we saw that, in many cases, research resulting in human-
animal interspecifics of diverse kinds uses human embryonic cellular material. Human-to-
animal chimeras are typically made by introducing human embryonic stem cells, or cells 
derived from hESC lines, into animal organisms. Ebryonic stem cells are obtained from 
embryos in an early stage of development, and are especially useful for research because of 
their pluripotency.  
It is argued that any research that destroys human embryos warrants very careful ethical 
consideration and justification, or even that such research is not justifiable, at all; because 
human embryos have a special moral status – be it because they belong to the species Homo 
sapiens (argument from species membership), because of the moral continuum from 
conception to birth (argument from continuity), because they are identical with the "fully 
human" being they will be later on (argument from identity), or because they have the 
potential to become such a "full" human being (potentiality argument).297 The protection of 
the human embryo can be limited, or it can be seen as growing continually along a 
developmental scale, but it can also amount to the view that the human embryo deserves 
the same full amount of protection any adult human warrants from conception on. Some 
have argued that every type of experimentation with human embryos should be completely 
banned;298 this demand would certainly also extend to all kinds of human-animal chimeric 
experimentation which involves the use of human embryos. Many, if not most, of these 
arguments for the special protection of human embryos are grounded in Speciesist 
assumptions (see chapter 3, section B below). 
Human fetal tissue used in interspecific research is usually obtained from intentionally 
aborted fetuses because this source has numerous advantages to using spontaneously 
aborted or stillbirthed fetuses (i.e. cells are fresher and in better condition, usually not 
tainted with pathogens or carriers of genetic disorders). Especially in the U.S., where 
abortion remains a controversial topic, there has been an ongoing debate since the 1980s 
about the propriety of using human fetal tissue from fetuses that have been intentionally 
aborted.299 "Pro-life" positions aside, even many "pro-choice" advocates would probably 
not support research that relies on fetuses that would otherwise not have been aborted. 
                                                 
297 For a comprehensive overview, see Damschen and Schönecker, Eds. (2003), Der moralische Status 
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Intentional abortion – or even abortion forced on unwilling or persuaded and pressured 
women – in order to obtain fetal material is a scenario that makes a vivid argument against 
the use of fetal tissues. Use of fetal tissue from intentionally aborted fetuses does not 
necessarily lead to a rise in abortion numbers or to pressuring women into abortion, 
though (although the possibility that individual womens' choices are skewed towards 
abortion as soon as they know that "it might do some good" probably cannot be 
completely ruled out). The topic of abortion and the closely connected fetal tissue research 
debate cannot be discussed here in detail. Many or even most of the experiments discussed 
in chapter 1 would be exposed to arguments against research using human embryonic stem 
cells and fetal tissues, as mentioned in my excursus on the legal situation of chimera 
research (chapter 2, section D above). Chimera creation which makes use of adult stem cells 
or precursor cells would avoid the discussion around embryonic stem cell use, on the other 
hand. 
It is controversial whether the creation of nucleo-cytoplasmic hybrids (cybrids, see p. 32) 
can be said to constitute a "use of human embryos" – after all, what would purportedly be 
used is only a human cell nucleus implanted into an enucleated animal egg. Views which 
assign full moral status to human beings after the fusion of egg and sperm do not, prima 
facie, understand cybrids as human embryos, since no egg and sperm are involved and 
fusion in the traditional sense does not take place. It would also be quite difficult to 
construe identity, potentiality, species membership or continuity arguments for cybrids: 
they will not and, it is said, cannot possibly develop into adult beings, so they are not 
identical with humans, there are no potential humans, nor do cybrids slide on a "normal 
process"-continuum towards humanness. As is plausibly argued, the cybridic being could 
be considered a "human embryo" in a wider sense (being used as source of human 
embryonic stem cell lines and having just a very small part of nonhuman DNA in its 
mitrochondiae). The ethical characterisation of the cybrid should take these factors into 
account. In this sense, at least an argument from species membership could probably be 
construed in the favour of outstanding moral status in human-animal cybrids and therefore, 
indirectly, against cybrid experimentation which ends in destruction of the cybrid. Again, 
such an argument would depend on the defensibility of Speciesist assumptions which will 
be discussed in chapter 3, section B below.. 
Some see the human gamete (egg or sperm) as precursor of human life that requires special 
protection. The circumstances of the harvestation of these materials are regulated in most 
countries, and so is their use (some legislations, e.g., forbid the sale of human eggs and/or 
Chapter 2: Arguments Against Creating Interspecifics 
 90
sperm). It is therefore easy to infer that creation of human-animal hybrids by fusion of 
gametes would cause many ethical concerns just in regards to the protection of human 
gametes (apart from the numerous other ethical concerns such an undertaking would give 
rise to).  
Due to considerations similar to those concerning gametes, human-typical genetic 
sequences ("human genes") are, by some, regarded as deserving special safeguarding against 
commodification and utilisation – this concern would affect the creation of transgenic 
beings which are manipulated to contain sequences of human genome. 
Finally, Hank Greely's 2007 working group résumé points out that human tissue also 
warrants respectful, especially careful handling (derived from special treatment that is 
usually reserved for human bodies). Different cultures might have very different views on 
what kind of behaviour is appropriate concerning human tissue – some organs might have 
special symbolic value, e.g. the heart and especially the brain which is today, by many, seen 
as the "seat of consciousness". Human-animal interspecific chimera bodies which contain 
human tissue should, according to these considerations, be treated as medical waste that is 
properly disposed of; the consumption of human-animal chimeras by other animals should 
be avoided.300 
While the human embryo is, by many, seen as having a "value in itself", concerns for the 
proper handling of gametes, genetic material and tissue do not rely on such an inherent 
value, but rather see the careful handling and non-commodification of these as indirectly 
conducive to other goods, e.g. "human dignity". 
Let me recapitulate the main types of concern regarding human precursors or, more 
generally, human biological materials human-animal interspecific experimentation can lead 
to:  
 The concern of unjustified or unjustifiable use of human embryos (via hESC use, applies 
to many human-animal chimeras and maybe also to cybrids) 
 The concern of unjustified or unjustifiable use of human gametes (applies to all human-
animal hybrids) 
 The concern of unjustified or unjustifiable use of human-typical genetic material (be it from 
transplanting a whole nucleus – applies to cybrids – or genome sequences – applies to 
human-animal transgenesis)  
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 The concern of inadequate use or treatment of dead or live human tissue (applies to all 
kinds of human-animal interspecifics). 
These types of concern have not yet been extensively addressed in bioethical discussions of 
chimera experimentation (apart from Greely, Cho, et al.).301 This is because they are seen as 
belonging to or stemming from different kinds of bioethical debates (i.e. the stem cell 
debate, the abortion debate, the debate around patentability of human genes, the debate 
around the proper handling of human gametes e.g. regarding contraception, and the 
questions surrounding proper treatment of medical waste, which are discussed in medical 
ethics). Still, these aspects are important to mention as potential costs of chimera, hybrid or 
cybrid experimentation involving human material. 
c. Concerns for novel interspecific beings: Inadequate treatment 
Both the concern for animal welfare and the concern for human embryos and proper 
treatment of human material have their source in the idea that nonhuman beings – or 
human embryos – could, as a result of chimera or other interspecific experimentation, be 
treated in a way that is not in accordance with their moral status. Going further, some claim 
that what is at issue is the proper treatment not of nonhuman beings (cf. animal welfare) or 
all-human beings (cf. embryo protection), but the treatment of "part-human" beings. In 
contrast to Rollin, they say that creation of human-animal chimeras is despicable precisely 
and particularly because it puts part-human beings in a bad situation.  
Chakrabarty, for example, fears that in a not-so-distant future human-animal hybrids could 
be created for "organ harvesting, for use as subhuman species to perform hard manual 
labors, or simply for curiosity's sake."302 He points out that this would be legally 
problematic since it is conceivable that such a hybrid could fall under the protection of the 
Thirteenth Amendment (which forbids slavery and ownership of human beings). The real 
question behind this is a moral, not just a legal one: shouldn't a "part-human" at some 
point be granted human rights? If yes, this could mean that the exploitation of such beings 
should be tightly controlled and in parts restricted – because we are morally bound not to 
treat part-humans the way we treat "normal" lab animals, livestock, or pets. 
One common concern for the "part-human" novel being is that it is wronged because the 
circumstances it is born into allow it – it is to be used as a subject of experimentation. As I 
noted in my discussion of Rollin's objections, this is not a direct argument against the 
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creation of chimeras – after all, one could create them and then treat them royally – 
however, it seems to be a valid objection, since hardly anybody would have an interest in 
creating disease-models or research subjects that are then not to be touched. Streiffer 
(2005) points out: 
"So long as experiments that involve the xenotransplantation of human stem 
cells into animals are overseen by animal research oversight committees (…), 
the wrong, or an incomplete, set of moral protections is likely to be afforded to 
status enhanced chimeric research subjects."303 
Streiffer adds that researchers could guarantee "adequate protections" for humanized 
research subjects, but that then, the main objective of chimera creation would be void: 
most research could not be performed on subjects who are granted the same protections as 
human beings, and even if they could, why then not simply do them on human beings, 
which would be even better models? The danger of inadequate treatment seems to 
constitute a catch-22 of human-animal interspecific research. As we have seen, this type of 
research is based on the assumption that human-animal chimeras have the "advantage" that 
they can be treated like animals – should their moral status be elevated to that of human 
beings, their creation would become useless. At the same time, the scientific justification 
for creating chimeras usually depends on the claim that they are demonstrably humanized 
(i.e. exhibit human-typical properties that are relevant for research).304 
When the Working Group on the Criteria for Cell-Based Therapies at John Hopkins 
University considered the scenario of human-to-nonhuman primate neural transfer, it 
identified several issues as potentially morally problematic – most prominently, the 
development of "humanlike cognitive capacities relevant to moral status" in the altered 
primate.305 Humanization of the primate, in this relevant sense, cannot be ruled out 
according to Greene, Schill et al., and it can be seen as a "risk to avoid", since it could lead 
to beings that are not treated according to their moral status, and to "greater capacity for 
suffering that would add to existing concerns about the harms caused by inadequate 
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conditions for [nonhuman primates] in research."306 In their 2007 résumé on Weissman's 
human neuron mouse scenario, the Greely Working Group comes to the similar 
conclusion that "human consciousness trapped in a mouse's body would truly be cruel 
treatment" although it "seems extremely unlikely."307 
Johnston and Eliot's critical assessment of the consequences of chimerism experiments 
between humans and animals states that: 
"Intentionally creating compromised human beings or part-human beings is 
cruel to the creature created (it is, for example, a laboratory subject created for 
the purposes of experimentation, able to exercise only compromised human 
facilities, likely to be kept in a cage, and perhaps not able to fend for itself.)"308 
Clearly, the concern for inadequate treatment of human-animal chimeras is closely 
connected with concerns that the moral status of the latter is hard to determine or even 
altogether indeterminable. This point – which I call "moral confusion" – will be dealt with 
in chapter 2, section D below. 
d. Concerns for novel interspecifics: Shifting moral status 
Another possible concern could be based on the view that shifting the moral status of a 
being as such could be morally problematic – that is, independently of the danger of 
inadequate treatment described above. Some of the concerns cited above seem to point in 
this direction, namely the notion of the "compromised human being" employed by 
Johnston and Eliot,309 – which evokes the picture of a human being that has been violated 
in some way – and the fears that human consciousness could be "trapped" in a mouse's 
body used by Greely et al.310 Apart from jeopardizing human-animal chimeras by putting 
them in environments that are not in accord with their demands and thereby violate their 
moral status, could it simply be wrong to transfer an individual from one level of moral 
status to a considerably higher or lower level? Could it be wrong to "shift" the moral status 
of a being? Could the subject of such a "shift" be violated by it? 
We might approach this question by first asking who would possibly be the subject of the 
moral status shift. Assume, for simplicity's sake, that there is a status-unambiguous or at 
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least relatively status-fixed being to begin with. In this context, it is useful to distinguish 
between two different types of scenarios: "Downshift" and "Uplift". 
Let us first have a look at an example of "downshift". In a scenario, for example, where a 
human embryo is subject to neural xenografts with animal neurons which render its brain 
cognitively inferior to typical human brains or which let its brain develop into an organ that 
is below the functional standard it would have reached without intervention, we can 
sensibly understand this subject as being "compromised" or violated. A being that would 
otherwise have developed into something with exceptional cognitive capacities would have 
been harmed by chimerizing it; for some, its moral status would (at least prima facie) "shift 
down" since it could not fulfil criteria like self-awareness or consciousness anymore. 
Similarly, it would seem abhorrent to subject a human being to a xenografting procedure 
that would make it look like a nonhuman animal – for many, human appearance signals or 
even constitutes a criterion for high moral status, which in turn, a human with a nonhuman 
face, furry skin or an animal body would be denied. Chimerisation of humans would be 
comparable to other cases where human beings are intentionally violated or deprived of 
necessities and thereby lose important cognitive capacities (or other morally relevant 
properties), e.g. by mutilation, drugging, or other medical intervention that renders the 
victim incapable of higher "typically human" capacities. It seems indisputable that such 
actions would be morally wrong. 
Fortunately, chimeric and other interspecific manipulation is usually not done on human 
embryos – among other reasons, certainly because it is widely recognized that shifting 
down the moral status of a human embryo or adult by massive chimeric/transgenic 
introductions would be morally reprehensive and constitute a massive violation.311 
Xenografts into adult humans (e.g. in Parkinson's stem cell therapy trials) are not 
substantial enough to influence the brain's functioning or lead to "downshift", though they 
apparently can infer damage on the brain by leading to tumours. Other xenografts, such as 
small graft transplants of skin and tissues, have even less influence on the human organism 
(and on morally relevant properties). Downshifting the moral status of human beings by 
chimerizing them, then, is not what is at issue when pointing out that "shifting" moral 
status could be problematic.  
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What, on the other hand, about the second possibility mentioned above - "uplift" 
scenarios? How should we regard the possibility that the moral status of animals could – 
hypothetically – be shifted upwards by the introduction of human material? Could this be 
understood as constituting a "compromising" of animals, or how else should it be 
interpreted? 
The improvement or "humanization" of (usually: mental) capacities of animals by technical 
means has been a subject of fiction since at least 1896, when H.G. Wells published "The 
Island of Dr. Moreau".312 Wells was deeply influenced by the public debate of vivisection in 
his time. In Wells' haunting novel, a misguided physiologist tries to transform animals into 
humans by means of painful surgical procedures. These procedures give the animals 
involved an appearance bordering on humanness, but also apparently greatly improves 
their mental capacities – they begin to master language and even show interest in moral 
rules. Dr. Moreau, who has no justification for his experiments but pure curiosity, is 
ultimately killed by one of his wayward creations, a "humanized" puma. The scenario of 
"biological uplift" of animals has inspired dozens of books and movies since Wells' time. 
What makes these stories special is the wide chasm between two possible points of view. 
Uplift-negative approaches, such as Wells', assume that using technology to alter animals in 
order to make them more human is evidently wrong. Moreau's creatures, for example, are 
portrayed as deeply conflicted and ultimately unable to retain control over their horrifying, 
ugly and violent "animal side" (here, Wells may be telling us more about the Victorian idea 
of man than about the dangers of vivisection). The narrator's attitude is not one of 
compassion or pity towards the botched "Beast Folk", but rather one of intrinsic, intuitive 
rejection of and disgust at the mixed beings living on Moreau's island. Uplift is portrayed as 
wrong because it is predetermined to result in preternaturally evil or at least dangerous 
creatures. Contemporary works of fiction have a very different attitude towards "uplift", 
describing it as ambiguous, neutral or even positive.313 
Since the recent progress of interspecific research, the idea of an – intentional or 
unintentional – "uplift" of nonhuman creatures, i.e. their endowment with properties or 
capacities that are seen as essentially human (and relevant for human moral status), is not 
limited to Science Fiction anymore. Bioethicists' considerations usually focus on the 
improvement or change of mental capacities, such as intelligence and self-awareness. To 
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give but two examples of reputable institutions analysing the ethical import of such 
scenarios, as mentioned above, the 2005 John Hopkins Working Group concerned with 
the introduction of human neural cells into primate brains considered the possible 
"humanization" of the nonhuman-primate.314 Similarly, the 2007 guidelines of the ISSCR 
committee forum for chimera research involving human material explicitly consider 
"research with the known, intended, or wellgrounded significant potential to create 
humanized cognition, awareness, or other mental attributes."315  
Just as in the fictional examples we looked at, bioethicists' reactions to "uplift" scenarios 
are deeply divided: some regard this possible consequence of interspecies mingling as 
evidently morally wrong, while others have a prima facie neutral or even positive approach.  
Commentators that are prima facie uplift-negative include Ramaswamy, who states that 
"If a human-animal chimera (such as a monkey with a human-like brain) 
comes to possess any of these qualities [i.e. the capacities for language, 
consciousness, or rationality], then it would be morally objectionable to create 
that organism. (…) In cases where there is a reasonable possibility of 
transferring quintessentially human capacities to a chimera, scientists must stop 
short of actually creating it."316 
Similarly critical of uplift scenarios is Cynthia Cohen, who is afraid that chimerism 
experiments could "turn animals into humans" (which, she implies, would be a very bad 
thing and should definitely be avoided).317 Note that these objections centre on the mere 
fact of "uplift", rather than on the danger of inadequate treatment that could be the 
consequence of uplift. 
Uplift-negative views are seldom argued for and more often simply taken as granted. 
Criticizing this tendency, Baylis and Fenton remark that the view that "enhancing the 
psychological and cognitive capacities of nonhumans is a priori a bad thing" is in urgent 
need of "critical examination".318 Baylis and Fenton are not the only ones to have 
recognized this need: the John Hopkins Working Group on Human-nonhuman primate 
neural grafting mentions as an aside that a "humanization" of the nonhuman primate could 
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also be seen as a "potential benefit to the engrafted animal, insofar as the changes are 
viewed as enhancements of the sort we value for ourselves."319 Robert Streiffer, too, points 
out that moral status enhancement – apart from problems of inadequate treatment – is 
"prima facie good" for the research subject.320  
Apparently, an argument from moral status shift is not viable against, but maybe can be 
used in favour of the creation of certain types of human-animal chimeras. It seems highly 
unlikely that this position will ever be used in a serious manner to justify human-animal 
chimerism experimentation – the interests of research into interspecifics are tightly bound 
to possible human benefits, not to "making humans out of animals". 
But still, I find the question of how to react to the slightest evidence of the development of 
human-like cognitive capacities in chimeric research subjects hard to answer exactly 
because of this puzzling aspect of "humanization". The termination of experiments struck 
by such developments seems unavoidable (and is advocated, e.g., by the John Hopkins 
Working Group and Robert Streiffer), but how does one justify the killing of an 
experimental subject on the grounds that it "became too human"? After all, beings that are 
in the delicate process of developing into a creature that has the full array of human-typical 
features are seen as morally valuable and worthy of protection in many ethical approaches 
exactly because they are just undergoing this process. This is known as the "argument from 
continuum" in the discussion of the moral status of the human embryo – wouldn't 
supporters of such arguments have to fend for the not-yet-wholly-human chimera or 
cybrid, too? If the creation of a human life, or life that displays typically human capacities, 
is seen as a prima facie positive thing, would that not also include the creation of human 
life via "making animals human"? I haven't spotted arguments of this orientation in secular 
bioethics, but one point of view that points in this direction is maybe found in Roman 
Catholic Bishops' view that the carrying to term of chimeric or hybrid human-animal 
embryos, once they exist, should be allowed (although the Catholic Church is distinctly 
against the creation of such chimeric embryos).321 
Apart from these – highly speculative – remarks, let us note that we have found status shift, 
as such, not to be a problem in current or likely future chimera research. Experimentation 
would, if at all, lead to upshift of animal xenograft hosts rather that downshift of human 
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subjects. Downshift seems to be clearly morally wrong, just like other kinds of mutilation 
or detrimental manipulation of human beings.  
The question of whether the "enhancement" of nonhuman beings in order to outfit them 
with characteristics we find desirable in humans is advisable or even obligatory will not be 
discussed here. Although the enhancement question is highly interesting,322 I believe it does 
not play a big role in what human-animal interspecific research is currently concerned with. 
All this does not affect our result from c above, i.e. that inadequate treatment of human-
animal (and other) chimeras because of undetermined or even indeterminable moral status 
could present us with a considerable problem. 
3. Bad consequences for human populations: Health risks 
Objections to chimera experimentation are not only based on consideration for chimeras 
or other interspecifics, i.e. the novel beings created. There are also direct concerns for the 
security and health of already existing beings – especially human beings. The most concrete 
concern of this type is the thought that experiments that involve cross-species grafts could 
lead to or heighten the risk of diseases. 
In this respect, xenotransplantation/xenografting is associated with two types of health 
risk: risks that only concern the host individual, and risks that also concern others. 
Several types of risk are considered that are limited to the recipient of nonhuman material: 
Immunoresponse, i.e. the risk that the recipient has an immediate adverse reaction to animal 
material; Tumorigenicity, the risk that the recipient has long-term adverse reactions to the 
animal material, and Zoonosis, the risk of contracting a disease via transferred animal 
material. A connected third-party risk that would also affect non-recipients is seen in the 
scenario of an epidemic or even pandemic spread of zoogenic pathogens. 
My introduction to xenotransplantation (chapter 1, section B.5 above) already explained 
that immunoresponse was, and still is, a serious problem for transplantation from animal to 
human recipient, especially when whole organ transplants are considered. Immunoresponse 
in xenotransplantation is much stronger than in allotransplantation. Additionally, with the 
porcine material that is commonly used, this risk is even more pronounced than it would 
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be with material from more closely related species (i.e. nonhuman primates). 
Immunoresponse is usually the most massive problem preventing or complicating 
xenotransplantation.  
Tumorigenicity, on the other hand – i.e. the disposition of certain material to lead to the 
formation of tumours in the recipient – is a problem for embryonic stem-cell-based 
therapies. Stem cells have the advantage of being able to "morph" into several types of 
cells, but also the disadvantage of sometimes morphing into a teratoma, a certain type of 
tumour. This risk is also present in interspecific grafts,323 and thus must be considered in 
cases where animal embryonic stem cells are xenografted into human hosts. 
Immunoresponse and tumorigenicity are risks that are not specific to xenograft/-
transplantation but also known from allotransplantation. 
Things are even more complicated concerning the risk of pathogen transfer. A disease that 
is subject to trans-species transmission from animal to human is commonly called 
zoonosis. The danger of zoonoses has been discussed and recognized as a severe problem 
in the context of xenotransplantation. Here, apart from the danger of an infection of the 
individual recipient, there is a much bigger danger: that of a xenogenic epidemic or even 
pandemic which could potentially kill thousands or even millions of people. 
For understanding this risk, it is important to realize that the precursors of many or even 
most of the most dangerous and ravaging diseases throughout human history – bubonic 
plague, typhus, measles, smallpox, influenza, HIV, and many others – were originally 
transmitted from animals to humans. The "jump" of a pathogen from one species to 
another, i.e. a shift of the disease host, brings the risk of a pandemic – this is what 
happened when the SARS virus "jumped" from civet cats to humans, and this is what 
scientists fear is about to happen in the case of porcine influenza (swine flu) and/or avian 
influenza (bird flu). The transmission of such viruses to humans and the associated 
pandemic risk is a constant matter of concern for epidemiologists. 
In the case of xenotransplantation, there is a quite specific zoonosis concern: it is feared 
that a cross-species jump of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) could produce a 
virus that recombines with human DNA and results in a highly pathogenic, fatal virus 
aimed at human hosts (such as the HI virus, which probably originates from a retrovirus in 
chimpanzees, SIV). If there is a danger of "species jump" and pandemic, transplanting 
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living body parts of one species into another seems to be a surefire way of increasing this 
risk, since live xenografts make it hard to eliminate eventual pathogens. Additionally, 
xenografting eliminates virtually every barrier viruses usually face when crossing from one 
species to another – keeping in mind that strict immunosuppression is necessary in the 
host. Previous zoonoses have emerged because of close contact with animals or their 
excrements, or because of consumption of animal products – in comparison, the 
introduction of live material into the (immunosuppressed) host organism itself seems to be 
an even closer kind of contact between species, and to open the door to species jumps. 
Normal pathogens, in this context, do not constitute such a big danger of xenozoonosis, 
since they can be eliminated before introduction of animal material into the human 
organism, by keeping the animals under "specific pathogen free" (i.e. partly sterile) 
conditions, vaccination, and by breeding selection for uncontaminated animals. 
Endogenous retroviruses are characteristically wired into the DNA of animals, though – 
they are integrated into the genome of their host organism, not acquired by infection, and 
cannot be removed from the tissue nor can one selectively breed uncontaminated animals. 
All vertebrates have such endogenous retroviruses that do not figure as pathogens in the 
original species, but which have pathogen potential when transferred to other species, 
leading to immunosuppression or tumours in the host, and possibly to a disease that can 
also be transmitted to other humans (or other species). The question of whether being 
subject to porcine (or other) xenotransplantation leads to a high risk of PERV (or other, 
especially primate, ERV) zoonosis is a highly complex one which cannot be discussed in 
depth here – it seems that studies have come to the conclusion that, though PERVs can 
transfer to human material in test-tube settings,324 transmission in subjects of pig-human 
xenograft of living material is not easily established.325 An EU study done in 2003 comes to 
the conclusion that nonhuman primate material should not be used for xenotransplantation 
because of xenozoonosis risk of easily transmittable primate endogenous retroviruses, 
while pig material can be used as long as certain safety measures are in place.326 The 
moratorium on clinical xenotransplantation that was demanded in the 1990s327 and which 
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was, de facto, in place in many countries at the end of the century has today in most 
nations been replaced by more stringent control and regulation.328 
What about the risk of zoonosis in other types of interspecifics? The Scottish Council on 
Human Bioethics regards zoonoses as a risk to be considered when thinking about 
"human-animal mixtures" (of chimeric and transgenic origin – i.e. not only products of 
"classic" whole organ xenotransplantation). The council concludes that 
"This infectious danger is therefore sufficiently serious to induce physicians and 
biologists to publicly raise the question of whether it is ethical to allow 
humankind to run the risk of devastating and uncontrollable pandemics since 
animal-human mixtures will never concern more than a limited group of 
procedures."329 
In the case of transgenesis and (micro)-chimerism, the risk of epidemics is crucially lower 
than in the case of xenotransplantation. This is simply because the (animal) host does not 
or at least need not necessarily come into contact with humans which would allow 
contamination with potentially dangerous new pathogens. Unlike in organ 
xenotransplantation, the danger of zoonosis can be limited to the animal host which can 
easily be subject to stringent control (as compared to free-roaming human transplant 
recipients). 
The scenario of a zoonotic infection and resulting epidemic is even more unlikely in the 
case of cybrids – the UK Academy of Medical Sciences report of 2007 judged this risk to 
be "not greater than" in normal (non-interspecific) cell cultures.330 
4. Risk, uncertainty, and precaution 
In regard to assessing the risk potential of new technologies, especially biotechnology, 
some argue that the standard approach of Risk-Cost-Benefit-Analysis (RCBA), which tries 
to take into account all kinds of foreseeable health risks, is not sufficient and even 
inapplicable and misleading. 
For example, Hans Jonas, in his influential 1979 book "Prinzip Verantwortung" ("The 
Imperative of Responsibility") argued that, as modern technologies' consequences are 
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becoming harder and harder to predict, and, more importantly, as we are presented with 
technology risks which could wipe out humanity, one should apply a "heuristics of fear", a 
pessimistic outlook that assumes that negative scenarios will indeed take place (even 
though they may seem extremely unlikely).331 Normal Risk-Cost-Benefit-Analysis, Jonas 
argued, is prone to neglect highly unlikely scenarios, even if they have full catastrophic 
scale, and is therefore not the appropriate means of devising how to handle powerful tools 
like nuclear power or advanced biotechnology. In a similar approach, Gregory E. Kaebnick 
mentions a "precautionary principle" that can be distilled from intrinsic arguments and 
argues that we should adopt a "preservationist attitude" in regard to biotechnology.332  
Can we make sense of a precautionary principle outside of intrinsic concerns discussed in 
section B above? Could such an argument for precaution be used against the creation of 
human-animal interspecifics? 
The problems of standard RCBA are comprehensively outlined by Timothy Lewens:333 
comparing the consequences of different scenarios poses one evident problem, another is 
the fact that RCBA which makes use of economic methods does not offer an objective 
assessment of values, but rather tells us how average persons would allocate resources. 
RCBA also does not deal with distributional issues: who is at risk and who, on the other 
hand, reaps the benefits of the risk taken is by many considered to be relevant for moral 
consideration, but this aspect is not captured in RCBA. These points make it clear that 
RCBA approaches are not about replacing ethical analysis with juggling numbers, but that 
RCBA must necessarily be preceded or complemented by decisions about ethical values. 
Precautionary principles are at the basis of many regulatory policies regarding risk 
management – they "dominate most European regulatory policy",334 and are e.g. expressed 
in the 15th principle of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,335 
feature in professional medical ethics codes like the Hippocratic oath and the related 
primum non nocere, and are also captured in proverbs like "better safe than sorry". The de 
facto moratorium on xenotransplantation that was in place in many countries at the end of 
the last century was based on such precautionary principles.336  
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The adoption of a "precautionary" approach is typically advised when we are confronted 
with ignorance regarding the potential consequences of an action – RCBA can only usefully 
be applied to situations in which we have a basis of past experience or data points to draw 
on and extrapolate from. In cases where probability distributions of consequences are 
unknown or potential consequences are unclear because we have no previous similar cases 
to compare the new scenario with, it is argued that following a precautionary principle 
would be advisable.  
Is the creation of interspecific (particularly human-nonhuman) beings a case where a 
principle of precaution should be applied? And if yes, what would such a principle tell us? 
As mentioned above, precautionary principles typically come into play when we are 
confronted with ignorance concerning the potential outcomes of an action. This would be 
the case in regard to genuinely novel types of actions, which have not been done before, or 
which are sufficiently different from types of actions done before that extrapolation is 
impossible. Is the creation of interspecific beings or entities novel in this sense? Do we 
have any data to draw on when thinking about the risks of mixing interspecies animal or 
even human and nonhuman material?  
Prima facie, mixing species, particularly human and nonhuman species, seems to be a 
drastic, absolutely novel thing to do. Yet, we have seen, there are interspecific hybrids 
between closely related species in nature. Also, there are intraspecific cases of chimerism in 
nature and also in humans (e.g. microchimerism in twins). Regarding human-animal 
mixtures, it could be argued that very close, even symbiotic connections between human 
and nonhuman animals have existed for millions of years. We coexist with wild animals, 
livestock, pets and vermin. Parasites live on and enter into most human bodies and, more 
enjoyably, most of us voluntarily introduce animal materials into our own bodies by the 
very common habit of consuming animal products. From all these data points, it seems 
that we actually do have vast experience concerning the mixing of different species, and 
even "mixing" animal and human material. Some of these past experiences have led us to 
believe that certain types of mixing might be dangerous: we know that, for example, 
xenotransplantation could result in dangerous new pathogens. We certainly do not operate 
in an area of total ignorance when assessing the risks of creating interspecifics.  
Still, there are areas which are not easily covered or mapped by such extrapolation from 
our experiences with "mixing". One of these scenarios would be that of chimeric, hybridic, 
or transgenic beings released (accidentally or on purpose) in populations of non-
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interspecific animals. How would populations, or whole ecosystems, react to such 
intrusions? Could recombination of genes from different species lead to the emergence of 
dangerous properties in the transgenic being? These scenarios may sound familiar from the 
area of genetically manipulated plants. Other areas in which it seems very hard to give 
useful prognoses include the aspect of Robert's and Baylis' Argument from Moral 
Confusion, which I will discuss in section D.3 below, and, in general, the aspect of 
emerging consciousness or other valuable mental properties in interspecifically manipulated 
animals (see sections 2.c and 2.d(ii) above). 
Concerning these areas of the unknown or unforeseeable, would precaution be a sensible 
argument? Should we avoid creating interspecifics even in cases where specific problems 
cannot (yet) be pointed out, or seem very vague, but should still be considered in our 
analysis? 
It seems advisable here to step back and ask what a principle of precaution can sensibly 
mean. In a very weak sense, precaution could mean that we should not assume something 
has no risk just because there is no scientific proof for that risk – we should not argue from 
ignorance, or as Sunstein puts it, "a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a 
ground for refusing to regulate."337 Another interpretation states that precaution means 
shifting of the burden of proof: the party which plans an action would have to prove that it 
is not dangerous, rather than burdening the party affected with possible consequences with 
proving that they could be harmed – this would introduce distributional issues into the 
analysis. These interpretations of a precautionary principle, however, seem merely 
complementary to standard RCBA. They add ethical and other considerations to the 
assessment rather than overriding this method's general outcome or applicability. 
Precaution, in these senses, constitutes procedural minimum requirements that should be 
fulfilled in our RCBA process, and/or ethical/distributional considerations that should 
complement RCBA.  
But could a principle of precaution be understood in a way that tells us to avoid an action 
even if a RCBA carried out fulfilling all these minimum requirements tells us that we are 
justified to carry out the action? Are there cases where RCBA is the wrong approach, as 
such? 
As mentioned above, RCBA is appropriate for cases where the probability distribution of 
outcomes is known or can be extrapolated, but not for cases which are actually not about 
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risk but rather about deep uncertainty. The distinction between risk and uncertainty, as 
described by Knight,338 is a crucial analytic step at this point: "risk" proper is described as 
"measurable uncertainty" (i.e. we do not know whether scenario x will take place, but we 
think it will take place with a probability of y), while "uncertainty" describes cases where we 
have no access to probability distributions of the scenario at issue. The potential 
detrimental consequences of the creation of novel interspecific beings, in some aspects, fall 
into the realm of risk (example: risk of transfer of known types of pathogens to 
xenotransplant recipients). In other aspects, potential detrimental consequences fall 
squarely into the field of uncertainty (example: unforeseeable detrimental consequences in 
case of release of transgenic beings to ecosystems). 
What if we accept that RCBA does not cover all possible risks and potentially understates 
catastrophic scenarios? Does precaution offer a sensible alternative? In a very general 
sense, the precautionary principle could be understood as stating that we should be 
especially or extremely risk-averse, simply because RCBA does not "give us the whole 
picture".  
As Sunstein339 points out, this is not a sensible alternative: being risk-averse is not a 
principle that can tell us what to do (or not to do). In the case of interspecific creation, it 
might be advisable not to create interspecific beings in the light of precaution in order to 
avoid detrimental consequences like rampaging interspecific monsters destroying the world. 
On the other hand, it could be seen as the risk-averse path of action to invest in research 
(and interspecific-creation) in order to have the best chance to find out about therapies for 
all kinds of diseases. Thus, we could avoid the detrimental consequence of us or future 
generations dying of diabetes, Parkinson's, stroke, or even diseases that do not exist yet but 
may threaten humanity in the future. Precaution, unfortunately, does nothing to tell us 
which detrimental consequence to avoid. It does not even tell us not to act, at all (in the 
literary sense of a "paralyzing principle"): difficulties of distinguishing actions from non-
actions aside, acting is often as or even more precautionary as not acting. 
Also, it remains unclear which areas of action precaution should apply to: in fact, every 
action in the real world has potential unforeseeable consequences which are not covered or 
would not be taken into account by a standard RCBA (rare examples are something like 
throwing dice or roulette, where the probability distribution is known beforehand). 
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Following a precautionary principle in all situations where uncertainty is at play would 
make us incapable of decision. 
Precaution, then, must be understood as complementing or stating minimum requirements 
to standard risk analysis, not as an alternative to this approach. It is true that risk analysis 
does no good job of covering scenarios of uncertainties – but unfortunately, precautionary 
principles do an even worse job of helping us deal with these unquantifiable risks by 
creating the impression that they can be avoided by simply abstaining from action or risk-
taking. 
D. Confusion: Indirect consequence-based objections 
The consequence-based arguments presented so far rely on relatively direct consequences 
of the creation of interspecifics, like possible problems for animal welfare, the destruction 
of human embryos, and health concerns. Other concerns are more indirect and subtle: it is 
claimed that the creation of interspecifics, particularly of human-animal interspecifics, leads 
to confusion, which is understood as a detrimental consequence. This confusion can be 
understood in different ways. Three types of confusion which could be the consequence of 
the creation of interspecifics will be presented in this chapter. 
When confronted with human-animal interspecifics, there are two primary ways of 
understanding "confusion": one is stating that the moral status of chimeric subjects (and 
thereby our obligations towards them) is hard to determine due to the conditions of 
interspecific creation – this will be discussed in section 1 below. The second way of 
understanding "confusion" in the context of human-animal chimeras is more absolute: the 
moral status of human-nonhuman interspecifics could become altogether indeterminable (see 
section 2 below). A third type of "confusion" argument is based on the concern that the 
uncertain moral status of some human-animal interspecifics could, in turn, lead to society 
questioning its' criteria of moral status assignment and, in the process, give up the 
assumption of human beings' superior moral status (see section 3 below). 
1. Confusion as complicated determinability 
Let us look at the first aspect of the confusion problem, which I will call the problem of 
complicated determinability. Note, in the first place, that determining the moral status of a 
being is rarely easy or undisputed. As we will see in our excursus on moral status, there are 
many problems lurking in the question of which capacities or properties of creatures are 
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morally relevant, i.e. which qualities have an influence on the moral status of the being. 
Candidates for such properties or characteristics include language capacity, rationality, free 
agency, species membership, natural kind membership, and many others. Defining such 
concepts and justifying their moral relevance is fraught with problems. In addition, we face 
epistemological hurdles when trying to pin down criteria for when a being (be it human, 
animal, or chimera of both) does exhibit these properties – how, to give but one example, 
are we to find out whether a monkey does or doesn't have consciousness or self-
awareness?340  
The problem of determinability is even graver in the case of artificial interspecifics 
discussed in chapter 1, section B above, simply because they are novel beings. When 
assessing the various capabilities and properties of a common rat, we have a huge body of 
empirical data to fall back on, namely all kinds of research that have been done with other 
typical rats. For determining the moral status of the individual "new" rat, we can make use 
of general knowledge about rats: the rat (assuming it is not a wildly atypical mutation) will 
not be able to use language, no matter how hard we try to teach it, it will be able to solve 
mazes up to a certain degree of difficulty, it will feel pain, etc. Regarding novel 
interspecifics like embryonic chimeras or transgenic beings, there is, at least from a certain 
point of humanization on, no such extensive empirical data to extrapolate from. This 
would similarly be true for other novel beings (which have been altered in morally relevant 
characteristics), e.g. (if this were possible) animals that are outfitted with enhanced 
cognitive capacities via genetic manipulation, but also Artificial Intelligence and 
extraterrestrial beings. In all these cases, we would have the epistemological problem of 
finding out what properties these entities have without having access to comparable 
precedents. 
This problem does not make moral status indeterminable as such. In moral systems that 
discriminate between different moral status levels there are certain criteria for determining 
whether a property (like having the capacity for language, being rational, etc.) is present in a 
being. If moral status classification is the aim, stating morally relevant properties must 
mean stating the criteria for determining whether they are present. The being's moral status 
will be derived accordingly (for a further explanation of moral status assignment, see 
chapter 3, section A below). Such a process will take place for all kinds of beings: humans, 
nonhumans and human-nonhuman chimeras alike. This analogy in process between moral 
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status classification of chimeras and "normal" cases is also pointed out by Andrew Siegel, 
who comes to the conclusion that classifying chimeras is not especially problematic in 
many moral systems ("For both [Kantianism and utilitarianism] there is no conceptual 
obstacle to understanding the moral status of chimeras.").341 There will – as I pointed out – 
be cases where categorisation will be especially difficult. We need not resort to Science 
Fiction in order to come up with examples for this: all kinds of atypical beings will do. The 
classification of a human embryo in its early stage is problematic, because it does not 
exhibit most of the typical characteristics of humans that are candidates for morally 
relevant properties. Similarly, the classification of nonhuman primates is vexing, since many 
of them exhibit astonishing feats of language use and problem solving. Even more so is the 
positioning of human (or nonhuman) individuals that are atypical: take the brain-damaged 
adult or the anencephalic infant, or flatland gorilla Koko who has, over decades, learnt 
hundreds of words in sign language and who has complex relationships with animals and 
humans alike.342  
It could be interjected here that it might be morally wrong, in general, to create beings 
whose moral status we do not know in advance. I do not think that is a useful point, simply 
because every living being that is born is novel in the sense that we do not know for sure 
which capacities it will develop, especially since many capacities – like language, complex 
problem solving, etc. – only unveil after extensive training and stimulation. There is also 
the possibility of genetic mutation that brings about atypical individuals in every species, be 
it human or non–human. If we were limited to creating beings whose future moral status 
we can determine beforehand, having children (at least having children "the natural way", 
without genetic screening) would have to be regarded as morally reprehensible.343 
The fact that this complication is not unique to interspecifics does not render void arguing 
against their creation by pointing out the problem of complicated determinability. Because 
such beings are novel and, in particular cases, without precedent, determining their moral 
status could be so costly as to render moot or outbalance the possibly beneficial effects of 
interspecific research. This added cost would then be a valid argument against chimera 
creation from complicated determinability – a point David Castle also touches on when 
stating: 
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"What is ethically worrying (…) is if [Human-Animal Interspecifics] are 
viable creatures that add an extra dimension of complexity to borderline moral 
reflection and decision making. Deciding these cases could be highly unsettling 
and does not seem likely to be worth whatever benefits the biotechnology might 
bring."344 
Note that this problem of complicated determinability (which is not an absolute argument, 
but needs to be included in a cost-benefit-analysis) would also apply to nonhuman 
interspecifics. One need not go as far as Castle, who hypothesizes: 
"(…) were it possible, crossing lobsters with cows to make the ultimate surf-
and-turf organism might raise eyebrows at first (…), but then issues of how to 
humanely cultivate, transport, and slaughter the organism would float to the 
surface."345 
Slightly more realistic (though still speculative) cases are conceivable: if we acknowledge 
that primates deserve a treatment different from that of dogs (as is recognized e.g. in the 
higher standards of animal welfare concerns regarding research in primates vs. other 
mammals), we would encounter a problem when trying to devise ethical standards for the 
treatment of dog-primate interspecifics that show a high rate of mixing or "primate 
behaviour".  
To sum up, firstly, every moral status classification brings with it profound epistemological 
and ethical problems or questions – this is not a problem limited to novel interspecifics. 
Secondly, there are atypical beings – among them individuals that do not exhibit species-
typical characteristics because of being in a certain developmental stage, because they are 
diseased, have been subject to especially beneficial or harmful environments, training, or 
stimulation, because of genetic mutation or because they are chimeric or other interspecific 
beings. In the latter cases, moral status classification is particularly difficult, but not 
categorically more so – except if we make species membership the determinant of moral 
status, i.e. embrace Strong Speciesism. Thirdly, it cannot be stated in general that creating 
beings whose moral status we do not know beforehand is wrong as such. If we do not 
assume Speciesism, human-animal chimeras are not categorically more morally confusing 
than other beings. Nor is their creation wrong due to the fact that we cannot anticipate 
their moral status. A point against interspecific creation that is independent of Speciesist 
                                                 
344 Castle deems human-nonhuman interspecifics not to be morally confusing, but just "worrying." This is a 
matter of nomenclature which corresponds to my distinguishing absolute, total or conceptual confusion from 
"normal" or "relative confusion." Castle (2003), "Hopes against Hopeful Monsters", American Journal of 
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assumptions can be made by including costs for moral status determination in a cost-
benefit analysis. These points are, to a lesser degree, also valid for animal-animal 
interspecifics. 
2. Absolute confusion  
Given some moral axioms or rather presuppositions regarding moral status, interspecifics – 
human-nonhuman interspecifics, in particular – can evoke "absolute" confusion that goes 
far beyond the mainly epistemological problems, or problems of uncertainty, I described 
above. There is one specific position which is a candidate for evoking absolute confusion: 
the conviction that human beings, and only human beings, have, in virtue of being a 
member of the species Homo sapiens, a moral status that is superior to that of nonhuman 
beings (Strong Speciesism).  
When one uses such a Strong Speciesist framework in order to assign human and 
nonhuman beings moral status, one will have a hard time when confronted with beings that 
are, in some sense, between being human and being nonhuman. It can be doubted at this 
point that any of the human-animal chimeras presented in chapter 1, secion B.4 above fulfil 
the condition of being ambiguous in this sense. Are they not just clearly nonhuman animals 
that have some, often very few, human cells in their body? Ambiguity in the sense of not 
clearly being a member of one or the other species might be more apparent in hybrids or 
cybrids: a "humanzee" (a hybrid of human and chimpanzee), if there were such a being, 
could not easily be characterized as human or nonhuman. Cybrids – which consist of an 
enucleated animal egg into which a human nucleus is introduced – also fulfil the condition 
of ambiguity. What else is considered ambiguous in the field of interspecifics depends on 
the conditions one assumes for belonging to the human species (i.e. one's definition of 
species membership). There are, as I will show below, numerous definitions for biological 
species, and numerous concurring ways of understanding "human being" (in the biological 
and in other ways), and therefore numerous ways in which a being can be "species-
ambiguous".  
Robert and Baylis, in their seminal 2003 article,346 make clear that no matter what species 
concept one entertains, unambiguous classification of all beings as either human or 
nonhuman is not possible. There is, so they claim, no "human essence", and this is why 
arguments that are based on the sacredness of a "boundary" between the human and other 
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species do not work. Yet, Robert and Baylis try to construct an argument against the 
creation of chimeras that does not depend on "boundary" concepts (though they, as they 
made clear in a 2007 article, do not endorse this construction themselves). Their argument 
from "moral confusion" is based on the notorious moral ambiguity of human-animal 
chimeras. Ambiguity is problematic, for once, because we do not know what kind of 
obligations we would have towards part-humans – this founds the concerns regarding 
inadequate treatment of chimeras discussed in section C.2.c above. Secondly, thinking 
about what properties human (and, possibly, nonhuman) beings have that are morally 
relevant would, as Robert and Baylis put it, endanger the "clear but fragile moral 
demarcation line"347 between human and nonhuman animals.  
There are two branches of argument here: on one of them, classification in human or 
nonhuman is indeed impossible. This could be the case when confronted with human-
animal hybrids or cybrids, or chimeras with a very high rate of mixing. One could argue 
that creation of such novel beings would be wrong because we have no ethical tool at hand 
with which we could ascertain their moral status and thereby make sure they are treated 
properly – inadequate treatment, the concern voiced in chapter 2, section C.2.c above, 
would be the consequence. Robert and Baylis contentrate on another, second branch of 
argument. 
3. Robert's and Baylis' argument from moral confusion 
Robert and Baylis are concerned with a more indirect issue. Short of absolute confusion, 
the candidate criterion employed to single out beings which should be accorded high and 
direct moral status might, in the process of classification of novel beings, become more and 
more dubious. Newly developed criteria, on the other hand, could lead to unwanted 
consequences regarding the moral status classification of human and nonhuman beings. 
Once they are applied not only to novel, but also to "conventional" beings, they might call 
into question the traditional consensus on moral status assignment, and, in turn, our 
treatment of humans and nonhumans. Robert and Baylis put it this way: 
"Asking – let alone answering – a question about the moral status of part-
human interspecies hybrids and chimeras threatens the social fabric in untold 
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ways; countless social institutions, structures, and practices depend upon the 
moral distinction drawn between human and nonhuman animals."348 
The "moral distinction" mentioned here is easily identified as Speciesism: it is assumed that 
nonhuman beings are subject to a moral framework that is fundamentally different from 
(and incommensurable to) that applied to humans. While the latter enjoy "categorical" 
moral status, the status of the former is "contingent on the will of regnant human 
beings".349 
But where exactly are the threats for our "social fabric"? Let us assume that the starting 
point is a Strong Speciesism which assumes that "being human" is defined in terms such as 
"organism with human DNA". Confronted with ambiguous beings "between" human and 
animal, a Strong Speciesist can, on one hand, change his definition of "being human" in 
order to accommodate beings that are deemed morally superior to "normal" animals. He 
could, for example, state that beings which show typical human behaviour like language 
use, problem solving, or human-like appearance, should "count" as full human beings. 
Alternatively, the Strong Speciesist could give up Strong Speciesism and admit beings that 
are not human according to his standards into the circle of beings with high moral status 
(as soon as they fulfil certain criteria). This would result in a position where "being human" 
in the biological sense (i.e. species membership) would not be a necessary condition for 
high moral status anymore. This, in turn, would call into question many of our current 
practices regarding nonhuman beings, such as hunting for sport, animal testing, etc., since 
the exculpatory remark "It's just animals" would not be persuasive anymore. (This is not to 
say many of our exploitative practices regarding animals could not be justified otherwise, 
but justification would have to consist in more than the simple declaration that "they're not 
human, after all.").  
This perceived threat goes in the opposite direction, too. If species membership were, in 
this way, driven from the throne of morally relevant properties, other candidate properties 
would be put forward, such as rationality, language, free will, etc. Strong Speciesism could 
be substituted by Qualified Speciesism, i.e. the view that only some beings are, in virtue of 
having properties like rationality, capacity for moral agency, or self-awareness, morally 
superior, while, in general only human beings fulfil these conditions (and, possibly, some 
lucky human-nonhuman interspecifics). When trying to construct a consistent view of 
Qualified Speciesism, it is remarkably hard not to end up with a position that states that 
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human species membership is not only not necessary, but also not sufficient for high moral 
status – we will encounter this problem in the form of the Marginal Cases Problem in 
chapter 3, secion B.2 below. This is, I think, another danger Robert and Baylis see 
embedded in the debate around chimeras: it could surface that being human in the 
biological sense (species membership) would not be a sufficient condition for high moral 
status anymore; which would, in turn, challenge the categorical, high moral status of human 
beings that do not exhibit the properties one has worked out as morally relevant. Atypical 
human beings like embryos, infants, comatose and severely mentally handicapped 
individuals would then lose the prima facie privileged status they enjoy in Strong Speciesist 
accounts in virtue of their species membership. Asking the question of how human-animal 
chimeras should be classified morally could trigger a landslide that ends not only with 
questioning our treatment of nonhuman animals, but also challenges the high moral status 
we, as a matter of course, assign all human beings no matter their properties and capacities 
aside from "being human" in the biological sense. This looming danger could ultimately be 
used as an argument for strict regulation or even prohibition of human-animal interspecific 
creation. 
Whether one finds this kind of argument persuasive (and many, including Robert and 
Baylis themselves, do not) crucially depends on the importance one assigns to keeping up a 
fundamental moral difference between human and nonhuman beings. For someone who 
does not assume such a fundamental difference (i.e. a non-speciesist), Robert's and Baylis' 
confusion argument will not be very compelling. To give three examples of its failure to 
persuade non-speciesists, Hilary Bok states that "Chimeras do not introduce confusion into 
our moral views. They reveal ways in which those views are inadequate and make us think 
about how we might improve them."350 In a similar vein, David Castle thinks chimeras are 
"no more ambiguous then any other living thing."351 He points out that chimeras must not 
be seen as made up of parts ("fallacy of composition"), but as organisms in their own right, 
and that "they will get whatever moral consideration they deserve on the same grounds that 
apply to any other organism, including human beings."352 Julian Savulescu goes even 
further when, in turn, attacking the conservative speciesist impetus the confusion argument 
is based on:  
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"The social costs of acceding to irrational confusion are, at least historically, 
much greater than the costs of clearing it up and reforming society. (…) Our 
job is to clear this up (…), not to perpetuate it or allow it to persist or base 
social policy on it."353 
At this point we can see how Robert's and Baylis' confusion argument can be turned 
around in order to make speciesism (Strong Speciesism in particular) dubious, rather than 
defending or supporting it – a fact that will be important to our further discussion of the 
chimera debates' possible influence on questions of animal versus human moral status. 
Robert's and Baylis' confusion argument, like many arguments in this debate, hinges on the 
question whether speciesist attitudes are defensible. I have already explained that 
speciesism is a position which claims that the moral status of human beings (however 
defined) is fundamentally different from that of nonhuman beings. In order to understand 
and put in context this type of view – and, consequently, decide whether it should play a 
role in arguing against the creation of human-animal interspecifics – it is necessary that we 
understand what exactly speciesism is and what its problems are. To do this, I will in the 
next chapter include an excursus on the concept of moral status, which is crucial for 
Speciesism approaches as presented here. Building on this, I will elaborate on the problems 
of finding a suitable ethical principle of Speciesism. I will come back to an in-depth, 
concluding analysis of concerns against creating interspecifics in the last chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3: Excursus on Moral Status and 
Speciesism 
Several of the threads of argumentation presented above rely on the concept of "moral 
status". For example, I discussed the implications of what I called "moral status shifts" in 
chapter 2, section C.2.d above, and I assumed that some properties of human and 
nonhuman beings could be somehow relevant for this moral status, while others were 
irrelevant in this respect (see my discussion of "violation of human dignity" in chapter 2, 
section B.4 above). Also, I have already mentioned that Speciesism builds on this concept, 
and can be characterized as stating that humans have a fundamentally different (higher) 
moral status than nonhumans.  
This chapter will be concerned with the concept of "moral status" (in section A) and, 
consequently, with the ethical principle of Speciesism (in section B). I will present a 
detailed concept of "moral status" and describe how the latter is assigned to entities by 
moral agents, present this concept's advantages and disadvantages, and discuss whether it is 
appropriate for the task at hand. I will then describe differing types of Speciesism and give 
a cursory outline of their main problems. 
A. The concept of moral status: General considerations 
1. Defining moral status 
"Status" refers to the state, i.e. the mode or condition of being, of an entity; or its position 
in a complex system or hierarchy. Moral status refers to the position of an entity in the 
hierarchy or system of entities that come into question when gauging the scope (and 
intensity) of moral consideration. Moral status – like legal or social status – is ascribed to 
entities by the moral community and individual moral agents. Status, in the case of legal, 
social, but also of moral status, is based on norms – beings which are accorded status are 
treated according to certain rules (e.g. the legal status of citizens is determined by the rules 
of law).354 When saying an entity has moral status, this can be understood as saying that the 
entity is in the category of beings that are to be considered morally (i.e. that there are rules 
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according to which it demands to be treated). Warren, e.g., understands "having moral 
status" to mean "being worthy of moral consideration".355  
In a wider sense, which I use here, moral status is open to the question whether a being or 
thing is, in fact, directly morally considerable. Just as the question for "marital status" can 
be answered by "single", the question for "moral status" can be answered by "does not 
deserve/is not accorded any moral consideration". For example, in most moral systems, 
stones are not considered morally, so their moral status is "not to be considered (directly)"; 
in my interpretation of the term, stones do have a moral status, though (i.e. the status of 
not being morally considerable). 
From this it follows that the concept of moral status is not necessarily directly concerned 
with the question of whether the entities that are to be classified are addressees (subjects) 
of moral rules or obligations – having a "moral status" does not mean, as such, that the 
entity is subject to moral norms. This question can still play an indirect role, as in some 
approaches (e.g. Kant's) a being can only reach full moral status if he or she is also a moral 
agent and thereby subject to morality. In fact, many aspects of the superior moral status 
that is commonly accorded to human beings or persons do crucially depend on the ability 
of the carrier of status to act and make autonomous decisions.356 
The moral status of beings can be understood in a prescriptive way (i.e. "status" tells us 
how a being ought to be treated) or as descriptive (i.e. "status" tells us how a being or type 
of being is actually treated). In my own discussion, I will commonly use moral status in a 
descriptive sense. Moral status will be seen as prescriptive within the specific moral 
framework it relates to; the moral status of a being can vary wildly depending on what 
ethical framework the assigner subscribes to.  
A simple model of moral status assignment could consist of a process involving three 
steps. When confronted with an entity and the question how to behave towards it, one first 
takes note of its properties (observed, relatively simple, properties, like "interacts with 
environment" or "is able to move" or "uttering sounds", but also derived properties, like 
"being alive", "possessing faculty of speech", "being a person", or "being human"). 
Employing the moral theory (or axioms) one subscribes to, one then assigns the being a 
moral status. In a common approach to moral status, there are three rough possibilities of 
classification here: 
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The lowest possible status ("not to be considered") is usually applied to inanimate objects. 
An intermediate status is usually ascribed to nonhuman animals (and sometimes, plants). 
Carriers of this status are to be considered indirectly, on certain conditions, i.e. when a 
certain value is ascribed to them.357 Indirect consideration is also imaginable regarding 
wholly inanimate objects: e.g., the lifeless body of a human being, in many moral (and legal) 
systems, demands respectful treatment, and it does so indirectly because certain values are 
ascribed to it. Finally, there is, in many moral approaches, a superior, overriding, or "full" 
moral status. This is usually assigned to human beings, or persons. Often, this ascription is 
regarded as a direct one, meaning that it takes place not because of a value that is ascribed to 
the carrier entity, but solely by virtue of the entity being human. The superior moral status 
of human beings can also be justified indirectly, by stating that humans possess certain 
characteristics that are valuable (consciousness, moral agency, free will, personhood, etc.); 
i.e. by the same process of value ascription that takes place in assessing nonhuman entities. 
This, in turn, leads to the problem of how to correctly determine the moral status of 
human beings who do not exhibit the valuable characteristics. This problem of human 
"marginal cases", as we will see, is crucial for the discussion of human vs. nonhuman moral 
status. 
After this assignment of moral status one derives (again, with the help of the moral system 
one subscribes to) the proper way one should treat, or rather, consider the entity – moral 
norms come into play. A rights theorist might, at this point, decide that the being has, 
because of its moral status, a certain right, and that we should act accordingly; a utilitarian 
decides now whether the entity should be counted in the felicific calculus.358  
The aim of this process, i.e. of determining the moral status of beings or groups of beings 
is described by Mary Ann Warren as a twofold one: "to specify minimum standards of 
acceptable behaviour towards entities of a given sort", and "to establish moral ideals".359 
Accordingly, we should keep in mind that the moral status concept is not, prima facie, 
geared towards making moral decisions under specific circumstances (i.e. whether one 
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358 Lori Gruen, in a similar approach, understands the moral status concept as involving two distinct steps, 
one of basic recognization and one of actual assessment. In her discussion of the moral status of animals, she 
distinguishes between "moral considerability" of a being, which she likens to "showing up on a moral radar 
screen" and "moral significance", which tells us "how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen." 
Cf. Gruen (2003), "The Moral Status of Animals", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 
Edition). 
359 Warren (1997), Moral Status - Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, p. 13. For another 
proponent of this two-step approach, see Pluhar (1995), Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human 
and Nonhuman Animals, p. 1. 
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should or should not create chimeras), but rather towards discussing, on an abstract level, 
values and value ascriptions to certain classes of entities. 
2. Advantages of the moral status concept 
The central issue in the context of moral status is the special, superior moral status of 
human beings. Often, this status is contrasted or compared to that of nonhuman animals 
or other nonhuman entities. In this context, I could also have used concepts like "rights", 
"dignity", or of "welfare" or "interest". Up to now I avoided these terms because they 
would have led to the implicit assumption of deontological or instrumental 
(consequentialistic) theories of rights (or, rather, to a commitment to rights-based or non-
rights-based approaches). The possibility of avoiding premature commitment in these 
respects is a central advantage of the moral status concept.  
Using the moral status concept also enables us to compare moral systems whose 
distinctness regarding vocabulary or moral axioms usually make comparisons difficult. 
Picking out this very abstract aspect, we can, e.g., compare Kant's position on animals (in 
his approach, they are not to be considered directly, while indirect consideration is regarded 
as advisable) to that of someone like Peter Singer (here, all sentient animals are to be 
considered directly). Asking whether there are "animal rights" in Kant's or Singer's 
approaches, respectively, would not really give us anything to work with, since it would 
presuppose extensive analysis of the concepts of "rights" Singer and Kant use. Most likely, 
this would result in the answer that their concepts are not measurable by a common 
standard. "Moral status", on the other hand, offers such a common standard. 
Another advantage of using the moral status concept at this point is that this term makes it 
easier to avoid an explicit commitment to (or rejection of) of speciesism. Concepts like 
"human rights" or "human dignity" allow only humans into their scope, assuming as a 
given that there is a fundamental moral difference between human and nonhuman beings. I 
spelled out this problem in my discussion of human dignity arguments against interspecific 
production (see p. 81), the same consideration applies to the term "human rights". The 
notion of "rights", as such, may not be inherently speciesist (after all, there are many who 
claim animal rights), yet often, it invokes the prima facie objection that only beings which 
also have obligations can have rights, at all. While this is not a necessary corollary of the 
term "rights", I still find it to introduce a certain tendency into the debate that is not 
intended and unnecessary at this point. 
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Putting aside the problem of speciesist tendencies, does it make a difference, at all, whether 
one speaks of "rights" that are accorded to beings or whether one prefers to refer to "high 
moral status" that is assigned? Are these concepts interchangeable? I think that, on a very 
basic level, they are not. This is because a being which "has a right" (as opposed to a being 
which "is to be morally considered") may not be violated in the respect the right protects, 
even if such a violation or disregard might be indicated by utilitarian reasons. This is true at 
least for some basic or absolute rights. Not all, but some rights are inviolable entitlements, 
at least in approaches which think that there are "real" rights (i.e. deontological approaches; 
cf. footnote 362 below). This implication of inviolability or absoluteness is the basic 
difference between using rights vocabulary and more restrained and neutral "moral status" 
vocabulary. 
When using the term "moral status" I do not mean to imply or point towards a status concept 
of rights. In such a theory, beings are identified as right-holders because they have certain 
attributes.360 "Status", in these deontological approaches, is a precondition or indicator for 
rights. This is contrasted to what Leif Wenar, in his introduction to the concept of "rights", 
calls instrumental or consequentialist approaches, where rights are only doled out to 
subjects if and in so far as the assigned rights further welfare or other aims.361 
So status is the basis of rights in (deontological) "status approaches". A more basic notion 
of moral status, though, is also crucial for the classification of objects of morality within 
approaches that work without "real" rights (without a strong reading of the rights concept), 
i.e. consequentialist/instrumentalist approaches. After all, one needs to decide whose 
interests count, and whose count more than others, and whose welfare is included in the 
maximization process (this discussion starts with the question which entities can be 
ascribed such a thing as welfare or interests, at all). Utilitarian approaches, depending on 
their respective answers to these questions, can be about furthering human welfare, about 
the welfare of some human and some nonhuman beings who share "typically human" 
traits, or about welfare of all sentient beings (such an approach would be called sentientism 
or pathocentrism). Utilitarians could even reach out to more holistic views, including the 
interests of plants, species or even inanimate objects. This question of very basic 
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classification is distinct from the question whether one later takes the line of "real" rights or 
whether one uses them only as instruments to further other aims. Consequently, the 
question of moral status is distinct from whether one prefers a "real" (deontological) rights 
approach or whether one is of a more consequentialistic bent. 
To sum up, the abstractness of moral status vocabulary is advantageous. One need not 
commit to big ethical systems or axioms in order to talk about moral status, and it 
therefore makes different approaches comparable; likewise, it is neutral regarding the 
question of speciesism. 
3. Groups, members, and the kind paradigm 
A tendency one frequently encounters in the context of of moral status is the preference to 
direct this concept towards groups, or individuals qua members of a group, rather than 
individuals as such. Warren states that moral status is "usually ascribed to members of a 
group, rather than merely to specific individuals", on "basis of some property or properties 
that are thought to be possessed by all or most group members."362 Indeed, moral status 
statements are usually (though not necessarily) about groups, referring to their members 
only by proxy. Exemplary statements are "All human beings have superior moral status" or 
"Inanimate objects have the lowest moral status; i.e. not to be considered." But this is not 
necessarily so – moral status statements about individuals without references to a group are 
possible, too, e.g. "This individual human being has superior moral status." The observance 
that moral status statements are often, yet not necessarily, about groups is not Warren's 
point, though. What Warren alludes to is the common paradigm that group-members are 
accorded/possess a certain moral status in virtue of their belonging to the group or of being of 
a kind that typically has certain traits. I will call this approach the "kind paradigm", since it 
assumes that belonging to a certain kind is crucial for moral status. An example of a moral 
status statement that conforms with this paradigm would be "Human embryos have 
superior moral status in virtue of belonging to the species Homo sapiens whose members 
typically have the characteristic of being moral agents." This position is distinct from that 
expressed in "Human embryos have superior moral status in virtue of being live human 
beings." Here, what is crucial are the actual characteristics of the embryo, i.e. its being alive 
and human, while its membership in the group of "alive and human beings" is secondary. 
To give an actual example of an approach that subscribes to the kind paradigm in regard to 
the moral status classification of humans, consider the statement: 
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"As opposed to inanimate objects, persons have their ethical status 
immediately/directly as members of humanity." [transl. CH]363 
Here, being of a kind (of the human kind) is crucial for moral status ascription.  
Summing up, moral status statements are often about groups, or about individuals qua 
members of groups of entities. Yet, there is a difference between moral status approaches 
which subscribe to the kind paradigm – i.e. which assume that belonging to a kind is crucial 
for moral status – and those which do not, i.e. which assume that actual properties or 
characteristics determine an entity's moral status.  
In this context, a distinction should also be made between the practice of classification and 
theoretical considerations. Regarding classification, group-membership can be regarded as 
an indicator for moral status (e.g. "Belonging to the species Homo sapiens indicates high 
moral status, other things being equal").364 This indicator function of group membership 
can mean that in some cases – i.e. when we know nothing but species membership of the 
creatures involved – the fact that one is human and the other is not will be decisive 
regarding our moral consideration towards it. This practical point is distinct from and does 
not imply the assumption that group-membership determines moral status – we will see 
later on that this distinction is crucial for understanding different types of speciesist 
attitudes. 
4. Variations of approaches to moral status 
As I pointed out in section 1 above, there is a standard or consensus view regarding the 
moral status of certain groups of entities. In this consensus view, human beings, or persons 
(these terms are often used equivalently or at least seen as intrinsically connected) are 
assigned the highest moral status – they are to be fully, and sometimes overridingly, 
considered. Inanimate objects have the lowest status, i.e. they are not to be considered 
directly. There are also views which differ from this standard. Some – like Jain Philosophy 
or Deep Environmentalism – assign higher moral status to what is usually regarded as 
inanimate entities. Others, like Racism and Sexism, deny some human beings highest moral 
status while granting it to others, and segment human beings into a hierarchy of moral 
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364 In a slightly different context, cf. Warren: "Genetic Humanity (…) is at best an indicator, not an 
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status where non-white or female humans are typically set below white and male human 
beings. Even inside the consensus view, there is a wide margin for dissent. Widely differing 
characteristics or criteria are brought forward to make moral status classifications, resulting 
in similarly diverse views on the moral status differences between entities or groups of 
entities. In preparation for the following sections, which will deal with the debate around 
the moral relevance of species membership, I will give a coarse taxonomy of differing 
views on moral status distribution which is primarily based on the distinction between 
speciesist and species-neutral or non-speciesist views.  
Speciesist views of moral status are either characterized as Strong Speciesism – such a view 
would assume that "being human" is the single criterion which can mark an entity for entry 
into the highest rank of moral status. On the other hand, there are Qualified Speciesism 
views: they assume that there is one, or that there are several, criteria, which make a being 
eligible for this highest rank; yet this criterion/bundle of criteria is distinct from "being 
human". Qualifying criteria which could be used by a Qualified Speciesist include sentience, 
personhood, reason, moral agency, the ability to enter into contracts, and many others. It is 
essential for Qualified Speciesism that these characteristics are thought to exclusively occur 
in human beings.  
Non-speciesist views of moral status, on the other hand, can assume that the very same 
criteria or criterion (such as sentience or personhood) are decisive, but deem them not to 
be (necessarily or contingently) exclusive characteristics of human beings. Some non-
speciesists argue that the characteristic(s) occur in nonhuman beings, as well. Other non-
speciesists deny that criteria like "being human" are morally relevant, as such (i.e. they deny 
Strong Speciesism). As a third possibility, non-speciesists explicitly lower the hurdle for 
entrance into the category of entities with highest or high moral status, denying that, e.g. 
characteristics like "being a moral agent" or "faculty of speech", or even sentience, are 
morally relevant – for example when assuming that "being alive" is the decisive criterion 
("Reverence for Life").  
Apart from the speciesist/non-speciesist distinction concerning theories about moral status 
distribution, there is another aspect such theories can vary in: the structure of the hierarchy 
they describe. One can, for example, assume that there is such a thing as "absolutely 
superior" or "overriding" moral status, a kind of trump that is usually ascribed to human 
beings (in analogy to Dworkin's metaphor of rights as trumps).365 This assumption of a 
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trump is not necessary in order to state that the moral statuses of entities differ, since such 
a difference can be marked on a relative scale, as well. Likewise, it is not necessary to 
entertain a trump assumption in order to defend speciesism – relative and continuous 
varieties of speciesism are imaginable. Accordingly, the question of whether some entities 
demand absolutely superior, overriding moral consideration takes place on a more abstract 
level and is, in this respect, analogous to that of whether there is an "ace of rights", i.e. a 
right that "has priority to absolutely all other normative considerations", as Wenar puts it.366 
Relative superiority of some entities' moral status over others', on the other hand, seems an 
indispensable assumption in order for moral status talk to make sense, at all.  
This superiority will also have to be pronounced enough to ultimately warrant real, 
noticeable differences between the consideration of human vs. nonhuman beings. How 
these differences play out in the end (i.e. in what way they influence actual treatment) is not 
only determined by moral status, as we will see in the next section. 
5. Moral status assignment: Caveat 
Up until now, I presented the moral status concept as a viable means of discussing 
different approaches regarding the ethical consideration of entities of all kinds (especially 
human vs. nonhuman beings). Yet there are some caveats or limitations one should keep in 
mind when dealing with this concept.  
One central limitation of the moral status concept is that it is quite a blunt tool. On one 
hand, this means that moral status statements do not delineate all moral obligations we 
might have towards a being: obligations that are justified in an indirect way are not covered 
by moral status concerns. Indirect consideration can lead to a final result that is very 
different from what initial statements about status might have implied. Therefore, we have 
to keep in mind that the decision for or against a certain general stance on the level of 
moral status consideration does not necessarily determine the actual overall normative 
outcome of an ethical theory. To illustrate this, imagine a theory in which nonhuman 
animals are assigned the moral status of non-consideration, but where at the same time 
cruel behaviour towards all kinds of beings is considered highly reprehensible, in principle 
(e.g. because it is thought to compromise human character, and thereby lead to cruelty 
towards human beings). Experimenting on animals, in this theory, could be extremely hard 
to justify. At the same time, a theory that accords all sentient beings basically the same 
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moral status may come to the conclusion that animal experimentation is easily justifiable as 
long as the benefits it produces outweighs the harm it does. So, surprisingly, a theory that 
at the first glance entirely devalues nonhuman beings may, on another level, grant them 
vigorous protection; while a theory that seems clearly "pro-animal", at a second glance puts 
animals in a quite precarious position.367 It is a somewhat counterintuitive result of these 
considerations that – although that is the usual paradigm – speciesism is not necessarily 
associated with the sanctioned maltreatment of animals, and that non-speciesism does not 
necessarily result in a very strong protection of nonhumans. While this is not a 
shortcoming of the moral status concept, it should be kept in mind that the informative 
value of general moral status assertions is limited by further moral considerations on more 
indirect levels. 
Adding to the bluntness of moral status statements is the fact that they, as I pointed out 
above, usually refer to groups of beings (such as "nonhuman animals", "sentient beings", 
"human beings") rather than individual entities. One central problem at this point is that 
the delineation of the groups that are picked out may be blurred or continuous. At what 
point, for example, do human sperm and egg, or human embryo, become a human being? 
Or, to remind of the subject of this dissertation which is an exemplary case of blurred 
boundaries, when do animal-human interspecifics? At what point does a being become 
sentient, or alive, or self-aware? One could, as a general point of criticism, note that the 
simple structuring into what is a limited number of levels of moral status is much too 
coarse to capture the continuous, vague reality of status distribution. Accordingly, one 
could also assume a "sliding scale" of moral status, where entities are assigned continuous 
variable moral consideration according to what actual properties or characteristics they 
have, taking into account that they may be inferior in one respect while they are equal in 
another. An approach that sees moral status as an infinitely graded continuum of different 
status levels of individuals is also imaginable, but would be beside the point here – this is 
because we will discuss moral status primarily within a moral framework of the ethical 
principle of Speciesism, which would not go along with particularism regarding moral 
status assignment. 
The bluntness of the tool of moral status makes it unlikely that particular cases, such as the 
question of how to treat one specific human-animal chimera, can be coped with in its 
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entirety by referring to moral status considerations. This, again, is not to say that such 
considerations are superfluous, but that their informative value is limited because results 
depend enormously on the specifications for terms such as "being human", "being 
sentient", etc.: two theories may both state that sentience is the single criterion for moral 
considerability, and yet come to extremely differing results. For an illustration of this 
principle, compare Carruthers' extreme pro-animal-testing stance to Singer's (albeit not 
absolute) condemnation of such practices – both regard sentience as the decisive criterion 
for moral status, but Carruthers believes that animals do not meet this criterion, and that 
they therefore do not qualify for high moral status.368 Again, decisions made on other levels 
(in this case, assumptions made in philosophy of mind regarding the presuppositions of 
phenomenological consciousness, which Carruthers deems to be dependent on a "theory of 
mind") lead to the result that isolated statements about moral status and its criteria have 
limited informative value.  
The possible variations – and limitations – of moral status assignments notwithstanding, 
note that, on a very basic level, the assessment of moral status can have extremely 
significant consequences. Moral status questions are not just relevant for seemingly exotic 
questions like the status of animals (or even chimeras). The inclusion in or exclusion from 
the realm of morally considerable, or "fully" considerable, beings is one of the most basic 
decisions of any moral system. Though consideration or non-consideration can be shaped 
in ways that differ widely regarding actual treatment, moral status assignment is probably 
the most powerful weapon in moral discourse: extremely morally reprehensible practices 
were and are often justified not by "fine-tuning" of normative rules (such as "murder is 
allowed, if you have good reasons" or "torture is ok for the greater good"). Rather, the 
construction used was, and is, typically one of explicit exclusion of certain subjects out of 
the moral realm (i.e. negative moral status assignment). Africans were simply not included 
in the realm of persons in times of slave trade, Jews did not "count" as to-be-considered 
subjects by the perpetrators of the holocaust, communist regimes styled the ostracising of 
non-compliant individuals not along the lines of "x does not follow moral rules and must 
be punished", rather, certain individuals were declared "class enemies", which were then 
fundamentally excluded from the realm of subjects to be considered morally (allegedly, 
moral philosophy books in the cold war Eastern Bloc stated as an example of an ethical 
principle with an admissible perception the phrase "Killing your mother is always wrong, 
                                                 
368 Cf.: Singer (1976), Animal Liberation - A New Ethics for Or Treatment of Animals; Carruthers (1992), 
The Animals Issue: Moral Theory In Practice. 
Chapter 3: Excursus on Moral Status and Speciesism  
 126
except if she is a class enemy.") So note that even if moral status assignment is a blunt 
instrument, it has, on the other hand, also the potential to be used as a drastic, incisive tool, 
with far-reaching consequences. 
6. General critique – and reality – of status assignment 
A very general criticism of the moral status framework claims that status classification of 
groups or types of beings according to certain criteria is a mistaken approach, as such, 
because status assignment, as a construct, has no leg to stand on, and is a fundamentally 
wrong approach to distribution of moral consideration.  
Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, sceptical of any general value ascription to entities in nature (which I 
understand to be analogous in many respects to what I here describe as "status 
assignment") notes that in this context "No hierarchy is without problems." [transl. CH]369 
His critique is not only aimed at holistic approaches which ascribe value according to 
function in the world's ecosystem or similar criteria, but also to pathocentric approaches. 
Any value ascription (or status assignment) is necessarily an anthropocentric one, 
Vossenkuhl states: it is always done by humans, out of a human mindset, and cannot take 
into account interests of nonhuman entities, since the latter are not accessible to us. 
Furthermore, while criteria like sentience are hard to ascertain, criteria like "utility within an 
ecosystem" are possibly even harder to establish, and, ultimately, have no moral relevance, 
Vossenkuhl argues. Consequently, value ascription systems and hierarchies are on a 
fundamentally wrong track, and should be given up altogether.  
In fact, many types of status hierarchy take into account criteria which I personally would 
not regard as morally relevant (be it "utility in ecosystem", "membership in a race", or 
"rationality"). These are valid points of concern, yet, rather than presenting this as a general 
critique, I would suggest a type of status assignment that makes use of criteria that are 
more to my taste and reflect my respective value assumptions. Still, I acknowledge that 
status assignment processes are always highly problematic no matter what criteria are 
employed. Each such process depends on countless potentially problematic empirical 
assumptions (e.g. about the physical structure and needs of other beings), inductive steps 
or hypotheses (e.g. about preferences or interests of fellow beings, be they human or 
nonhuman), and all status assignments are tainted by our human and our personal 
perspective, which, in certain respects, we cannot leave behind.  
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Yet, I believe that the model of status assignment describes quite well how moral 
consideration of types of entities does in fact happen in the real world. Robin Attfield's 
notorious statement that a human life is worth as much as one million trees is tacitly 
dismissed by Vossenkuhl, probably as indecent, morally reprehensible or at least 
demonstrably ridiculous.370 In fact, many such calculations are carried out implicitly in 
today's societies and by ourselves, maybe not with the same numerical result, but with the 
same variables being weighted against each other. Our governments do not spend all taxes 
on emergency healthcare or foreign aid (to save human lives), but use a sizeable proportion 
on the protection of animals (or even trees). Most governments or voters would hesitate to 
publicly make the calculation that "One life is worth n trees", yet these calculations are 
implicit in spending and other decisions. Regarding the value of human lives, government 
policy implicitly counts the lives and interests of natives far above the welfare and even 
lives of foreigners. Laws ensure that such hierarchical status assignments do have real 
world consequences, and they do not elicit much protest in public – as long as the status 
assignment is not made explicit.371 This is also true for individuals: every time you spend 
one Euro on free-range eggs rather than battery-hatched ones (out of animal welfare rather 
than culinary reasons), you make an implicit decision that ranks the interests of chickens 
above your own interest in buying something else with this amount of money. You weight 
chicken-welfare against human welfare, and have implicit assumptions about status 
hierarchies in this context (e.g. there is probably a quite low monetary limit above which 
you would not go in order to further chickens' interests).  
Granted, there rarely is explicit status assignment in these processes – but this does not 
mean that there is none. We can detect a de facto, real-world status hierarchy in the 
consideration given to certain groups of people (or types of beings or entities) by society, 
and by individuals – even if the very same societies and individuals would find making such 
status hierarchies explicit mistaken and wrong. Status assignment to groups or types of 
beings may ultimately not be the perfect approach to moral consideration, but moral status 
assignment, resulting in (relatively) clear hierarchies and discriminatory practices, is what we 
as individuals, our governments and societies actually engage in on a large scale. It is also a 
cornerstone of speciesist approaches, the subject matter of the next section. 
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B. Speciesism 
In chapter 2 above, I concluded that the success of several typical arguments against the 
creation of human-animal interspecifics depends on what I called speciesist positions. 
Arguments that presuppose speciesism or are based on the intention to preserve it include 
those from human dignity (see chapter 2, section B.4 above), some kinds of boundary 
arguments – i.e. those which claim that the boundary between humans and nonhumans is 
an inherently special or sacred boundary (see chapter 2, section B.3 above) – arguments 
that claim human-animal interspecifics could lead to the detrimental consequence of 
"absolute confusion" about their moral status (see chapter 2, section D.3 above), and the 
confusion argument reconstructed by Robert and Baylis,372 which states that human-animal 
interspecifics could wrongfully endanger speciesist attitudes and thereby put society's 
current values at risk (see chapter 2, section D.3 above). Arguments that are based on the 
belief in a particularly high moral status of human beings also include most concerns for 
the proper use of human material like gametes, DNA, and tissues, and the influential 
concern regarding the misuse and destruction of human embryos (see chapter 2, section 
C.2.b above). Since the validity of speciesist positions is a complex issue, and also because 
human-animal interspecifics emphasize interesting aspects of the speciesism question, I 
want to discuss speciesist approaches in this separate section. 
 "Speciesism" stands for diverse types of opinions and positions – their common 
denominator is the belief that nonhuman animals deserve less consideration than humans.  
Speciesism can present itself as a simple pragmatic rule of discriminatory decision-making. 
Such a rule of thumb could, e.g. say that you should favour humans over mosquitoes. This 
discriminatory approach to insects could, for example, be based on the assumption that, 
statistically speaking, it is highly likely that a human being is self-aware and conscious, while 
it is extremely improbable that an insect has these traits. Such a speciesist pragmatic rule 
allowing the swatting of annoying mosquitoes while forbidding the squashing of annoying 
humans could be based on pathocentric (i.e. non-speciesist) ethical principles. In my 
discussion of the process of assignment of moral status, I explained this effect with the 
"indicator function" of membership in certain groups (see p.121). 
In other cases, speciesist pragmatic rules concerning the treatment of humans and 
nonhumans will be based on general assumptions regarding the moral status of humans vs. 
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nonhumans. These are the positions I am concerned with in this chapter – I will call them 
"Speciesism" (with capital S) or "Speciesist ethical principles". 
Speciesist ethical principles come in different types. One possible way to classify them is 
according to the reason they offer for assigning humans higher moral status than 
nonhumans. One type of Speciesism states that human beings have high moral status 
because "being human" is valuable in itself (Strong or Simple Speciesism). More complex 
types of (Qualified) Speciesism state that humans have high moral status because of certain 
characteristics that are particularly valuable (such as self-awareness, language, 
consciousness, etc.).  
A second taxonomy could ask what classification system Speciesists use for distinguishing 
between human and nonhuman beings, in the first place. Very often, "human" is 
understood in the sense of biological taxonomy as "member of the species Homo sapiens". 
Others prefer a non-definitional approach – saying that we do not need to define "human" 
or even that it would be wrong and mistaken to reduce "being human" to a fixed list or 
bundle of necessary and sufficient properties. This table shows a matrix of Speciesist 
approaches along the lines of these two taxonomies: 
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As this table illustrates, all four main angles of Speciesist approaches bring with them a 
specific problem. Some of these problems are further emphasized by human-animal 
interspecifics – this, in turn, should influence our final judgment of Speciesism.  
The four problems of Speciesist approaches will be the subject matter of the following 
sections. 
1. The moral relevance problem 
This problem affects all Speciesist approaches which claim or assume that "being human" 
or "being a member of the species Homo sapiens" is valuable in itself and gives its carrier 
superior moral status (i.e. Strong Speciesism). Why, one could ask, should being human be 
relevant for moral status?  
The problem of moral relevance can be illustrated by an analogy of Speciesism to racism or 
sexism (the term "speciesism" originally alluded to this analogy, though it is understood by 
many, including myself, as a neutral term today). The racism/sexism analogy stems from 
Classification  
method:  
 
 
Reason for  
high moral  
status assignment 
Biological Taxonomy "Non-Definitional" 
 
Valuable in itself 
(Strong Speciesism) 
"Being a member of the 
species Homo sapiens 
confers high moral status 
to members of human 
species." 
"Being human, which 
cannot be reduced to 
natural properties, 
confers high moral 
status." 
 moral 
relevance 
problem,  
see 1. 
Valuable because of 
associated 
characteristics 
(Qualified 
Speciesism) 
"Members of the species 
Homo sapiens have 
characteristics which 
justify their high moral 
status." 
"Human beings have 
characteristics which 
justify their high moral 
status." 
 marginal 
cases 
problem,  
see 2. 
 classification problem, 
see 3. 
universalizability 
problem, see 4. 
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Peter Singer's seminal anti-speciesist work "Animal Liberation".373 Singer argued that, just 
like women are no doubt different from men, and white people demonstrably different 
from black people, animals are different from human beings. However, factual inequality of 
the sexes (or races) does nothing to justify sexism or racism, and, in the same way, factual 
differences between human and nonhuman beings do not justify discriminating against 
nonhumans. Singer argued that the "principle of equality", which demands equal 
consideration in spite of factual inequality, should be extended to nonhuman animals. In the 
light of Singer's analogy, Speciesism, as a moral position, is not just abstractly mistaken. It 
is untenable in the very same way, to the same degree, and for the very same reasons 
sexism or racism are, i.e. it is deemed systematically wrong. Speciesism, Singer says, must 
be condemned "in analogy with racism", and he finds it "obvious that the fundamental 
objections made to racism and sexism […] apply equally to speciesism", which he regards, 
just like other "-isms" as a "prejudice of attitude of bias in favor of the interests of 
members of one's own species and against those of members of other species."374  
Is the analogy between speciesism and sexism or racism persuasive as an argument against 
speciesism? Is speciesism "like racism" or "like sexism", and, if yes, in what regard? And 
does that mean speciesism is untenable? 
What Singer stresses in regard to both sexism/racism and speciesism is the fact that they 
base their moral distinction between man and woman (or white and non-white, or human 
and nonhuman) on qualities that are morally irrelevant. Singer's objection can be used to 
counter Strong Speciesism, which holds that species membership determines superior 
moral status. Why should the mere fact that a being belongs in a different biological species 
justify its having a different moral status, i.e., ultimately, ought to be treated differently? 
This seems like a naturalistic fallacy (drawing ethical conclusions from natural facts), and 
conspicuously similar to racist or sexist ideologies, which also claim that a biological 
disposition, like belonging to a race, or that of having or not having a Y chromosome, 
determines moral status. "Belonging to a nonhuman species", from this standpoint, appears 
to be a characteristic that is just as obviously morally irrelevant as "having dark skin" or 
"being female". Singer's analogy between speciesism and racism/sexism boils down to one 
basic accusation: it is claimed that speciesists, just like racists and sexists, base their 
discrimination between human and nonhuman animals on morally irrelevant 
characteristics.  
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This does not rule out Speciesism, once and for all. It could be the case that there is indeed 
one, or several, morally relevant characteristic(s) that all human (but no nonhuman) beings 
share – this leads towards the Qualified type of speciesism described above. Whether this 
route is a promising one will be discussed in the following section. 
In defence of Speciesism, one could also remark that the problem of moral relevance is not 
unique to Speciesism, but applies to any ethical system which discriminates between entities 
regarding moral status. Each of these systems has to own up to justifying its discrimination 
criteria. Although a discrimination criterion like sentience seems somewhat less in need of 
justification than one like genetic disposition, rarely do pathocentrists give an overt 
justification of why they deem sentience, or phenomenal experiences, to be more valuable 
than non-sentience, or absence of phenomenal experiences. These value statements seem 
self-evident to many, but they may not be evident to all. In turn, the moral relevance of 
species membership may be regarded as defensible or even evident by some. 
The question of Speciesism or Non-Speciesism, accordingly, is not settled once and for all 
with the assertion that speciesism is "like racism or sexism". It seems clear though that if 
species-membership itself is flaunted as "morally relevant characteristic", this approach will 
be quite hard to defend, or at least much harder to defend than non-speciesist accounts 
which use criteria like sentience or self-awareness. 
2. The marginal cases problem 
Qualified Speciesists, who justify the superior moral status of humans by pointing out that 
members of the species Homo sapiens have particularly valuable properties such as 
consciousness, self-awareness, intelligence, capacity to form complex social relationships, 
and so on, can avoid the problem of moral relevance or at least keep it to a minimum by 
referring to those typical human properties that seem evidently relevant for moral status. In 
turn, Qualified Speciesism is faced with another problem: biologically human beings who 
do not exhibit these properties. In the speciesism debate, such cases are called "marginal 
humans". This somewhat clumsy but by now customary term means to imply that those 
cases are on the borders of what is considered "typical" for a human being (rather than 
implying that they are "not really human").375  
What counts as a marginal human can vary wildly. It depends on which properties the 
Speciesist account in question uses: the more demanding the approach is, the more 
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biologically human beings will qualify as marginal. E.g. if rationality or even capacity for 
moral agency is declared to be the relevant property, children and mentally handicapped 
persons will not make this hurdle. Ultimately, even for the lowest of hurdles (e.g. sentience) 
there are biologically human beings which cannot jump it (e.g. anencephalic infants). 
Marginal cases are imaginable on both sides of the human-nonhuman divide. When 
Speciesism assumes a lower hurdle, stating that, e.g., "capacity to form social relationships" 
is the property which determines moral status, one will have to deal with the claim that 
there are nonhuman beings which also have this capacity. The scenario of animals that are 
somehow subject to a moral upshift by introduction of human material would constitute a 
paradigmatic case of a "marginal animal". The occurrence of mice or nonhuman primates 
which suddenly speak up, laugh, become self-aware etc. is, as we have seen above, a 
commonly discussed scenario in the interspecific debate – even if it is strictly hypothetical 
today, as human-animal interspecifics have not shown any kind of humanization in this 
sense. Still, marginal animals are a thought experiment which effectively highlights an actual 
problem of Speciesist approaches. 
The Qualified Speciesism account, facing marginal cases, ends up with two questions: Why 
should marginal humans be accorded high moral status, although they do not exhibit the 
properties allegedly responsible for this high moral status? And secondly, why should 
nonhumans which exhibit these properties not be accorded high moral status? 
A solution to this problem would be, first of all, in finding a property that all humans and 
no nonhumans have (as a second step, one would have to argue for its moral relevance). 
The search for such a property often leads Speciesists to scientific species classification 
concepts. Zoological taxonomy is assumed to deliver the desired mode of unambiguous 
distinction between human and nonhuman, the desired property that "all, and only, 
humans have". But does it? 
3. The classification problem 
Speciesism approaches which rely on biological taxonomy assume that members of the 
species Homo sapiens have a superior moral status in comparison to non-members of this 
species. Aside from justifications for this position, in order for this ethical principle to 
make sense, the Speciesist should be able to tell us (at least in theory) which entities are 
human in this sense, and which entities are not – otherwise, the principle could not offer 
any guidance in decisions about a general course of action concerning the treatment of 
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differing entities, which I deem to be a minimum requirement for ethical principles. So, 
what Speciesists try to derive from biological classification is an unambiguous, consistent 
way of carving up nature into different species or, rather, into humans and nonhumans. 
They assume an essentialist concept of species: for every species, they believe, there is a set 
of characteristics or properties all of which any member of that species must possess. At 
least, they believe that this is true for the human species. Does the concept of "species" in 
biology accommodate for such "essences"?  
a. Searching for a human species essence in biology 
There is a stunning variety of concepts of "species" and criteria for "species membership" 
in biology, far too many to describe them here. The classical species concept is the 
typological species, which goes along the lines of differing phenotypes; other species 
concepts (e.g. biological species) rely on the (actual or possible) reproduction of fertile 
offspring between species members; phylogenetic species describe one "branch" in the 
evolutionary tree. There is no generally predominant or most appropriate species concept 
in biology.  
We can look at the question of whether there is such a thing as "species essences" from a 
very general point of view, though. Modern biology assumes that all living beings are 
products of evolution. Spontaneous mutation is the motor of this process. And 
evolutionary theory states that, in principle, all characteristics of individuals can be subject 
to spontaneous mutation in the next generation. This means that over time, there is no 
room for something like an unchanging "species essence" that members of a species 
necessarily share. Ereshefsky concludes: "From a biological perspective, species 
essentialism is no longer a plausible position."376  
The lack of "species essences" goes counter folk taxonomy and confuses us. Essentialist 
perceptions in this field are still common standard. Today, they often come in the guise of 
a very modern concept: that of the gene, the basic transmission unit of biological heredity, 
which is included in the genome, the whole of hereditary information of an organism. In 
folk genetics, the genome has retained the reputation of determining, unambiguously, the 
species membership of an individual. Genetic sequences, accordingly, are referred to in 
species terms: there are "jellyfish genes",377 "human genes",378 and so on. Additionally, 
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genes are ascribed a quasi-magical deterministic power: they are the "blueprints" of 
organisms, from which the developing cells slavishly take orders concerning the setup of 
their surroundings. From this vantage point, it seems that species essentialism is still intact: 
members of the species Homo sapiens, in this view, can be distinguished from non-members 
by their bodies' content of "human genes". Any organism that contains such human genes, 
in turn, is a member of the species Homo sapiens, and accordingly has high moral status. 
There is no such thing as a "genetic essence", though. The "humanness" of a DNA set, for 
example, can only be assured by relational comparison to other DNA sets. There are no 
uniquely human DNA sequences which are common to all, and only, humans. Robert and 
Baylis put it this way: 
"(…) it is not the case that there is a certain part of an individual's genome 
that is 99.9% identical with every other human's genome. Although human 
beings might share 99.9% commonality at the genetic level, there is nothing as 
yet identifiable as absolutely common to all human beings. According to current 
biology, there is no genetic lowest common denominator, no genetic essence, 'no 
single, standard, normal DNA sequence that we all share.'"379 
The simple explanation for this fact is, again, that evolution is crucially dependent on 
variability of traits. Spontaneous mutation is based on the variability of DNA 
microstructure. In order to make adaption to the environment, the enabler of evolution, 
possible, each and every DNA sequence in an individual's genome is up for variation. The 
mechanism of evolution is not compatible with the development of a "genetic essence".  
Additionally – and this is crucial for the context of interspecies beings – the layman idea 
that genes are the ultimate determinator of living beings, functioning as "control centres" 
which effortlessly steer the development of organisms into every imaginable direction (i.e. 
the direction that is typical for "their" species), is mistaken. As the ISSCR Committee 
Forum points out: 
"(…) what does 'animal or human gene' or 'animal or human cell' actually 
mean? In the light of the evolutionary conservation of many signalling 
pathways, 'human or animal genes or cells' can refer only to the fact that these 
units have a human or animal origin. But from this it does not follow that an 
animal gene or cell, once put into a human, behaves as an independent unit of 
'animal agency' or vice versa."380 
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In the last decades, research on posttranslational and epigenetic processes has revealed the 
limitations of genetic determination. So, not only is there no such thing as a "species 
essence" to be found in genes. Genes are also not the single magic ingredient that 
determines living beings' properties, but rather, one puzzle piece in a complex, interacting 
system of numerous parts that are bound into feedback loops. The belief in genes 
understood as all-determining "blueprint" of organisms has, in fact, decreased so far over 
the last years that researchers have now declared the "post-genomic era", where the focus is 
less on deciphering DNA and, more holistically, in finding out "how novel functions and 
properties emerge from the dynamic web of interactions and feedbacks brought about by 
the molecules of a living organism."381 
This all does not mean that species or genes are irrelevant or non-existent. It only means 
that the term species, as Darwin himself stated, is: "one arbitrarily given, for the sake of 
convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other."382 Dunbar repeats this 
conventionalist interpretation: 
"Species, as we describe them, are matters of convenience rather than biological 
reality. The real world consists only of individuals who are more or less closely 
related to each other by virtue of descent from one or more common 
ancestors."383 
b. Consequences for Speciesism based on biological taxonomy or genetic disposition 
What does this mean for Speciesism? For views which claim that membership in the 
species Homo sapiens determines moral status, the moral relevance problem is emphasized 
by this discovery. "Species" are not a given category of nature, but rather a human 
convention. And as we know, the grouping of species is done for the sake of biological 
research, not for the sake of singling out morally superior beings. Why there should be a 
connection between these two realms stays unclear. Graft concludes:  
"The term species may have a meaning in the context of our everyday discourse 
or in the context of practical taxonomy, but those contexts are not coherent for 
use in the context of morality."384 
For views which claim that human species membership confers moral status because the 
human species has certain particularly valuable properties, a similar problem emerges: if 
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"human genes" are not the lone determinators of the characteristics of an organism, their 
existence in an organism loses at least some of its relevance.  
What is more, both strong and qualified speciesism views face a classification problem that 
is emphasized by interspecific beings. With a non-essentialist view of species, the species 
membership of a being is not necessarily ascertainable anymore: It is unclear whether the 
DNA of a (hypothetical) human-animal hybrid, e.g. between human and chimpanzee, 
would count as "human", and, in turn, whether such a being would have to be considered 
"human" or not. When a human-to-animal embryonic chimera contains human-typical 
DNA, this does not necessarily mean that the organism is a member of the species Homo 
sapiens. Other mixed entities, like human-animal cybrids, are similarly problematic: they 
contain human-typical DNA, but in an environment which is most likely not conducive to 
its development into a human organism. Are these entities "human"? A Speciesist view 
which tries to take refuge in biological classification methods will not be able to answer 
these questions, and, in turn, will not be able to ascertain the moral status of such entities. 
4. The universalizability problem 
This whole complex of problems is apparently bypassed by Speciesist approaches which 
avoid the classification question and state that "being human" cannot be reduced to a fixed 
list or bundle of natural properties and that the whole step of defining "human" is 
unnecessary or even mistaken. 
In this vein, one could state that "being human" just means that a being is assigned high 
moral status by the moral community. In this view, everything that the speaker(s) wants to 
be treated according to a superior status would be called "human". Declaring something 
"human" would simply be identical with assigning this specific being superior moral status 
(rather than referring to biological taxonomy). 
It seems in fact plausible to me that the way we use the term "human", especially in the 
moral context, is strongly influenced by our normative assumptions about what should be 
treated as human, e.g. which entities should be assigned high moral status. This is where 
our strong intuitions about what is human and what not come from, rather than, so to 
speak, from an internalized but inaccessible list of "essentially human" properties: human is 
whatever we want to be treated humanely. This understanding of "human" and 
"nonhuman" would make it easy to circumnavigate the problems described so far: the 
moral relevance of "being human" would be ascertained by the view that calling something 
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"human" is simply identical with assigning it moral status. Marginal cases of atypical 
humans could be called "human" and assigned high moral status without running into 
inconsistencies. Classification would be avoided as a whole.  
This strategy fails, though, because the result would not be an ethical principle of 
Speciesism, but rather a reduction to ethical particularism concerning status assignment. 
Such an outcome would go counter the whole concept of Speciesism as a guiding principle 
in assigning moral status. Universalizability is a minimum requirement of an ethical 
principle: it should be transferrable and applicable to similar particular cases. A rule of 
moral status assignment which does not offer any criteria for future classification would 
not meet this requirement. 
Differing varieties of Speciesism as an ethical principle are, as we have seen, riddled with 
severe problems: one is that the moral relevance of "being human" is hard to establish once 
we understand "being human" as membership in the species Homo sapiens. Another 
problem is that, once the superior moral status of human beings is somehow tied to their 
having particularly valuable properties, the occurrence of humans which lack these 
properties is hard to deal with. Interspecific "Marginal Animals" in the form of nonhuman 
beings to which valuable human properties have been transferred are a thought experiment 
that further emphasizes this problem of moral relevance. A third complex of problems is 
found in the concept of species, in general: its conventionality makes the case of moral 
relevance even harder to argue for; additionally, the reduced deterministic power of genes 
destroys the idea that species membership is essentially linked to certain characteristics like 
"having human genes". Additionally, novel human-animal interspecific mixtures show that 
classification into human and nonhuman can pose insurmountable problems for species 
concepts, which, in turn, would make the assignment of moral status impossible for 
Speciesist approaches. Finally, we have seen that Speciesism needs to rely on some kind of 
classification in order to constitute a generalizable ethical principle. Speciesist ethical 
principles, in the light of human-animal interspecific beings, but also independently of 
them, seem extremely hard to defend. 
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Chapter 4: Should We Prohibit Interspecific 
Creation?  
Our overview of possible arguments against the creation of interspecifics, in chapter 2, 
covered a wide array of possible concerns, ranging from very practical worries like the 
threat of zoonoses to highly theoretical remarks, e.g. on moral boundaries between species, 
human dignity concerns or different types of moral confusion. The excursus of chapter 3 
revealed that Speciesism, a position that some or even most of the arguments discussed 
rely on, is hard to defend and should, consequently, at least not be the main supporting 
beam of argumentation against the creation of interspecifics.  
After this comprehensive presentation, I will analyse the argument-types in order to answer 
the central question posed above: is there a persuasive argument for the general position 
that creating interspecifics (specifically: human-animal interspecifics) is wrong and should 
be prohibited?  
In answering this question, I will assume that, were creating interspecifics arguably morally 
wrong, governmental or other institutional prohibition of their creation would be advisable. 
Although usually the question of moral wrongness of an action and the admissibility of its 
prohibition are better treated separately, I will conflate the two here for simplicity's sake. In 
the case of high-profile, often governmentally funded research, which typically already is 
subject to heavy regulatory intervention, it seems that prohibition of certain actions seems 
to be an appropriate and also effective intervention – were these actions found to be 
morally wrong. What types of regulation or prohibition seem advisable in the light of my 
analysis will be discussed in section B below. 
A. Concise analysis of arguments 
To answer the question whether the creation of interspecifics is morally wrong, I will now 
give a distilled overview of the most important arguments presented above and focus on 
three aspects in each case:  
- Originality: Is the argument presented new and specific to the chimera debate, or where 
does it originate?  
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- Applicability: What types of interspecific beings would the argument apply to?  
- Persuasiveness: Does the argument convincingly state that creating interspecifics, or specific 
types of interspecifics, is morally wrong?  
Let us look once more at the argument types introduced previously. 
The type of arguments discussed under the catch phrase "Yuk Factor" is not unique to the 
chimera debate, rather, they stem from other areas of concern – Leon Kass' "Wisdom of 
Repugnance"385 was originally directed against cloning. The idea that mixtures as such are in 
some way repugnant or bewildering is found in many other areas as well (e.g. in the 
common reaction to transgendered persons). It is unclear what kinds of interspecific beings 
arguments from repugnance would refer to, exactly. Essentially, they could be directed 
against all kinds of mixed beings – including artificial interspecifics, but also "natural" 
animal-animal hybrids or transgenic plants. In all these cases, it could be argued that "the 
mere idea" of an animal-animal or human-animal mixture is revolting. The beings that are 
apparently most likely to create direct reactions of "yuk" are those that have human-typical 
features or parts. Vacanti's earmouse (see p. 12) would be one example which often has this 
effect on people – interestingly, tissue engineering can produce such "yucky" creatures 
without even mixing human and nonhuman material (Vacanti's mouse's ear was made of 
bovine cells, it could also be created from exclusively murine material). Most creatures or 
entities created in current interspecific research, on the other hand, would probably not 
evoke an intuitive "yuk" response: they seem inconspicuous and not monstrous at all, or, in 
the case of manipulated microscopic entities, much too unfamiliar to the layman to 
generate any direct emotional response. Thus, the specific direction of yuk-factor 
arguments remains unclear. Repugnance or "yuk factor" objections, I conclude, are not 
philosophically persuasive. Even after several rescue attempts and with a lot of charitable 
interpretation, they remain in the realm of appeals. Additionally, invoking "repugnance" or 
"yuk" is not helpful for the debate since these reactions vary greatly and cannot, as it were, 
be reasoned into people who do not feel them. However, an assessement of intuitive or 
emotional reactions to confrontation with the idea of chimerism can be helpful in finding 
out where the real arguments against chimera creation lie. To give but one example, the 
theory that the human face is an important signifier for high moral status can explain why 
many find the thought of creating animals with human features especially revolting. 
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The second type of arguments we looked at in chapter 2, section B.2 above were religious 
and quasi-religious arguments. Christian religious objections against the creation of 
interspecifics can be derived directly from the scripture (i.e. from the explicit prohibition of 
sex with animals), and are, in this sense, based on a very well-known moral taboo that 
exists in many cultures and religions. More indirect Christian arguments against human-
animal interspecifics can be derived from the concept of human dignity which will be 
discussed below. Religious or quasi-religious concerns stating that interspecific creation 
constitutes "Meddling with Nature" or "Playing God", i.e. hubris arguments, have been, 
analogously, aimed at new biotechnologies like genetic engineering or cloning. They are not 
new or specific to the chimera debate. Christian arguments against the creation of 
interspecifics often focus on the fundamental distinctiveness of humanity from other living 
beings – in this case, they are only applicable to human-animal interspecifics. More general 
religious arguments (i.e. from the "completeness of creation"), just as quasi-religious/hubris 
concerns, can potentially be used not only against the creation of human-animal chimeras, 
but also against the creation of interspecific animal-animal chimeras and transgenic animals 
and plants. Religious objections and what I called quasi-religious concerns (see chapter 2, 
section B.2) have the obvious disadvantage of being not persuasive to non-religious 
persons or persons who do not believe in a natural teleology. The mythical idea of hubris, 
today, is hard to defend in an intellectual argument, though it seems to have extensive 
influence on public debate.  
The third type of intrinsic argument I introduced above rely on the moral relevance of the 
boundary between species, especially between human and nonhuman species. These 
arguments are new and specific to the debate around chimeras, though one could argue 
that part of this argument already can be found in (rarely explicitly discussed) arguments 
against sexual contact with animals. Boundary arguments certainly become clearer, and 
much more intense, in the context of human-animal interspecific creation, though. 
Boundary arguments would, at first glance, apply to all kinds of novel, artificial interspecific 
beings and maybe even to "natural" animal-animal hybrids. What specific actions these 
arguments are directed against, however, depends on what exactly is identified as the 
"violation" of species boundaries. Since this is rarely discussed, the specific direction of 
boundary arguments remains unclear. Boundary arguments depend, firstly, on the 
assumption that there is a clear, hard boundary between species – an assumption that is not 
at all easy to make, as we have seen in chapter 2, section B.3 above. Explaining why 
biological disposition should be morally relevant presents another challenge for boundary 
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arguments. Even if these difficulties were overcome, I still see a problem in the most basic 
question concerning boundary arguments, i.e. the question in what way, or at what point, 
mixing constitutes a violation of boundaries (and what kinds of mixing are considered 
boundary-crossings). Accordingly, I do not think that boundary arguments show much 
promise as arguments against the creation of chimeras, even against human-nonhuman 
chimeras. 
Concerns for violations of human dignity (see chapter 2, secion B.4 above) are well known 
from many fields of bioethical discourse. In the specific case of human-animal interspecific 
creation, it is not clear what exactly the violation of human dignity – i.e. a transgression that 
exceeds a simple violation of interests – would consist in. It remains unclear which cases of 
interspecific research such arguments could apply to. I find the view that creating human-
animal interspecifics constitutes a violation of human dignity to be mistaken, since I could 
not identify which subject is robbed of valuable capacities or kept from exercising them as 
a result of creation of chimeric, hybridic or transgenic beings. There is, of course, the much 
more general objection that human embryonic stem cells or human embryos should not be 
used for research, at all, because this constitutes a violation of human dignity. This far-
reaching argument does not help to express the view that interspecies creation is especially 
violating to human dignity (much more than simply destroying an embryo e.g. in an 
abortive procedure), a view that objectors to chimera creation on grounds of human 
dignity seem to hold. Apart from these problems, using the language of "human dignity" is 
not very helpful in the area of moral classification of human-animal chimeras or other 
interspecifics, since it presupposes or at least hints at an assumption that, in my opinion, is 
questioned by the very idea of humanized chimeras (namely, that we can always determine 
who is and what isn't in the group of "humans"). Human dignity approaches, as I explained 
above, are based on the questionable doctrine of Speciesism. To sum up, human dignity 
concerns do not seem persuasive as arguments against the creation of interspecifics 
because the exact point at which interspecific creation, as such, results in a violation of 
dignity, remains unclear. But even indirect approaches (i.e. stating that all embryo use 
violates human dignity or that keeping part-humans in lab settings might) are dubitable 
since the concept of human dignity begs the question of what is relevant for moral status 
by assuming Speciesism. 
What about consequence-based arguments against creating interspecifics? The first aspect 
covered in our discussion were "classic" animal welfare concerns. The issue of animal 
welfare in medical or other experimentation settings is vigorously discussed not only in 
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cases of interspecific research. Maybe less obviously, the creation of beings that are 
designed with tacit acceptance or deliberate causation of sub-par quality of life is not 
limited to interspecific research. Concerns about the cruelty inherent in creating suffering 
animals also apply to animal models which are bred to model human diseases, but which 
are not necessarily a product of transgenesis or chimerism. The general concern for beings 
that are created in order to exhibit detrimental characteristics actually even predates 
modern engineering technologies: traditional animal husbandry often leads to pets and 
livestock with diminished quality of life. Animal welfare concerns can presumably pertain 
to all kinds of interspecific research. Often, the problem is not only in the experiment per 
se, but in detrimental keeping of animals (i.e. lack of proper habitat conditions, lack of 
social contact, etc.). Even research done in vitro (e.g. human-animal cybrid research) might 
be susceptible to concerns for animal welfare, because it makes use of animal material (e.g. 
cow or rabbit eggs) which might be obtained under morally despicable conditions. In 
effect, in vivo research involving adult nonhuman primates is most likely to raise animal 
welfare concerns; in vitro research, on the other hand, will probably raise the least 
concerns. The creation of interspecifics, as such, is no more objectionable than other kinds 
of research involving animals. In this sense, animal welfare seems not to be a powerful 
argument against interspecific research creation per se. Chimerisation is not outstandingly 
cruel, as such, and the same is true for hybridisation, transgenesis, and cybridisation. Fears 
of creating a "human trapped in an animal body" may be eerily intimidating, but seem 
extremely speculative and implausible; full-brain transplants are not planned, and: human 
characteristics develop according to the possibilities and stimulation that is provided. Even 
if a "human" brain would develop in a lab animal (e.g. a monkey or ape), it is doubtful 
whether this scenario would lead to a fully conscious and desperate being that, e.g., would 
not be able to make itself heard because of a larynx that cannot produce speech sounds. 
Rather, it would probably lead to a primate with slightly atypical behaviour. Animal welfare 
concerns can definitely be valid in certain cases of interspecific creation, just as in other 
kinds of research involving animals. Regulation and control of interspecific research with 
respect to animal welfare is necessary, but this does not translate to a need for prohibition 
of interspecific research. Animal welfare, if understood in a sense that is consistent with 
commonly used, moderate concepts practiced in the research context, does not work as a 
persuasive argument against creation of interspecific entities. In the light of chapter 3, 
section B above, it is not enough to justify animal experimentation by pointing out the 
differing moral status of human versus nonhuman beings. Justification of the use of 
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animals in research in a non-speciesist approach should be supported by more appropriate 
criteria – this could be, for example, the capacity (or lacking capacity) to feel pain, or have 
close and complex social relationships. Making use of these criteria as decisive instead of 
species membership/"being human" could lead to severe problems when trying to justify 
experimentation on nonhuman animals which exhibit these properties to some degree – 
especially nonhuman primates, maybe also mammals like rats. Giving up Speciesist 
justifications would not necessarily mean that research using nonhuman animals would not 
be justifiable, though. Also, it would not mean that research on marginal humans would 
become acceptable. 
Other consequence-based arguments (discussed in chapter 2, section C.2.b above) that 
refer to concerns for the proper treatment of human embryos, gametes, genes, and tissues 
in research are well-known from the stem cell or the abortion debate or addressed in 
ethical regulations for the therapeutic or scientific use of human tissues. Arguments of this 
type would pertain to all cases where such material is used, i.e. human-animal chimeric 
embryos (which often require the use of human embryonic stem cells), human-animal 
transgenic beings (which require the use of human-typical genes), human-to-animal 
chimeras (which require human tissue), and human-animal hybrids (which would require 
the use of human gametes). It is unclear whether these concerns would also pertain to 
cybrids: firstly, can the use of single human cell nuclei for injection still be regarded as a 
case of "human tissue" use? Secondly, and more important, do human-animal cybrids 
count as human embryos? Scientists assume that they do not and that consequently, 
arguments for human embryo protection do not apply to cybrids. Whether one shares this 
view depends on one's definition of "human embryo". Concerns for the proper treatment 
of cells, gametes and genes are not stronger in the case of chimerism than in all other areas 
where human material is used, still, they must be considered. Yet I think it is unlikely that 
such concerns in themselves will offer a strong argument against the creation of human-
animal chimeras. Exceptions from this rule are positions that demand absolute protection 
of human embryos from conception on. If the use of human embryos and pre-embryos 
cannot be morally justified, this would warrant the prohibition of all human-to-animal 
chimera creation which requires human embryonic stem cells or cells derived from hESCs. 
Many areas of interspecific research would not be affected by this argument, though: e.g. 
xenografts of stem cells that are not derived from human embryos, xenotransplantation, 
transgenesis, (hypothetical) human-animal hybridisation and probably also human-animal 
cybrids. An argument against the creation of human-animal interspecifics that is rooted in 
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absolute protection for human embryos seems, to me, more persuasive than many other 
approaches in the field, but it would only warrant the prohibition of some areas of 
interspecific creation, and not a general prohibition of human-animal interspecific research. 
It should be noted that many, if not all, arguments for the stringent protection of human 
embryos and pre-embryos are based on dubitable Speciesist premises; the problems of 
Speciesism outlined in chapter 3 therefore also apply to these views. 
The related, but distinct concern for inadequate treatment (see chapter 2, section C.2.c 
above) is not necessarily a consequence of research involving interspecific beings – as 
mentioned above, all animal experimentation is subject to allegations of "inadequate 
treatment" of animals. Yet, as I spelled out, chimeras and other artificial interspecifics are at 
a particularly high risk of inadequate treatment – this is because, firstly, there are no 
precedents (this is a property they share with other novel beings) and, secondly, because 
some ethical systems have fundamental difficulties with determining their moral status. So 
– and this is the fundamental difference to other occurrences of animal experimentation – 
even if the researcher is willing to do all he can to acknowledge the moral status of the 
being he creates, and assuming for the sake of the argument he even knows the right 
morally relevant properties to look out for, he might still have difficulties to find out or 
decide how to properly treat the research subject. Inadequate treatment becomes a 
particularly challenging and genuinely new threat when the chimeric research subjects are 
characterized as "part-humans". None of the human-animal chimeras or interspecifics 
created today are sufficiently "humanized" in this sense as to justify concerns of inadequate 
treatment, but this could be a real problem in the future, and is already treated as such by 
ethics committees and authorities. In this context, interspecific research has to confront 
what I called a "catch 22": most types of interspecific research relies on the "humanization" 
of human-animal interspecifics, as this is what makes them interesting as assay systems or 
disease models in the first place. In some areas, e.g. emulation of the human brain in animal 
models, properties that are interesting for research could coincide with the properties 
relevant for moral status (e.g. higher brain function, which might lead to an emergence of 
consciousness). In these (limited) areas, the catch 22 of inadequate treatment poses a severe 
problem, which is already recognized by ethics committees. 
Inadequate treatment concerns offer a persuasive argument against research that would 
lead to human-animal interspecifics which exhibit especially morally valuable properties. It 
is an indirect argument, because it would not directly justify the prohibition of the creation 
of such "humanized" human-animal interspecifics, but rather, their use in laboratory 
Chapter 4: Should We Prohibit Interspecific Creation?  
 146
research contexts – still, it can be quite persuasive, specifically against interspecific research 
which meets the criteria of "catch 22" (e.g. where scientifically interesting properties 
brought about by humanization coincide with morally relevant properties). Concerns for 
inadequate treatment can, but need not necessarily be based on Speciesist premises: they 
can be applied only in regard to beings which "become human" or "are part-human", but 
also to beings which exhibit special, valued capacities (which may be human-typical or not). 
What about the concern that status shifting in itself could be a disadvantageous 
consequence of interspecific creation (see chapter 2, section C.2.d above)? Status shifts 
seem, at first view, quite extraordinary – as Streiffer notes, the moral evaluation of research 
"normally presupposes a fixed moral status for the subject."386 This is only literally true, 
though, in ethical systems that assume, prima facie, that a being's moral status is 
determined by its being or not being human. If we assume an ethical system that uses other 
criteria for determining moral status, human beings' moral status changes over time. For 
example, fetal and adult phases, or demented/comatose and mentally healthy phases of the 
same human being result, at least prima facie, in the assignment of different moral statuses 
in approaches where self-awareness or consciousness are deemed morally relevant 
properties. In the same way, animals' moral status could be said to change (even without 
xenografts): it could be stated that animals are made more human-like by stimuli and a 
special environment. As the Working Group at John Hopkins points out, "Human-
Nonhuman primate neural grafting may not be unique in having the potential to alter the 
capacities of nonhuman primates. Chimps reared with humans behave in a more humanlike 
way than chimps reared by chimps."387 Such human-like behaviour, at some point, could 
lead to an upwards shift in moral status (the process is sometimes called "cultural uplift"). 
So could, to give more speculative examples, genetic manipulation of individuals or 
treatment with substances that influence morally relevant factors like consciousness, 
intelligence, etc ("biological uplift"). Advanced computational models of neural processes 
("Artificial Intelligence") could, in the future, present us with a similar case of status shift, 
resulting in a piece of software that shows human-typical response patterns. Let us 
therefore keep in mind that moral status shifts are only unique for chimeras once we 
assume a speciesist background – in non-speciesist ethical frameworks, moral status shifts 
are not uncommon and, in a way, to be expected as morally relevant properties in 
                                                 
386 Streiffer (2005), "At the Edge of Humanity: Human Stem Cells, Chimeras, and Moral Status", The 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 15(4), p. 348. 
387 Greene, Schill, et al. (2005), "The Working Group on the Criteria for Cell-Based Therapies, John Hopkins 
University: Moral Issues of Human-Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting", Science, 309. 
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individuals change over time, due to "natural" development of the being/entity or due to 
environmental influences of diverse kinds. The allegation of intentional "status shift" does 
not apply to the human-animal interspecifics created today, since none of them exhibit 
human-typical valuable properties to an increased degree. It is imaginable that e.g. the 
massive introduction of human stem cells into developing animal organisms of nonhuman-
primate origin could lead to the emergence of human-like cognitive properties in a "human 
neuron chimpanzee". Likewise, the scenario of "downshift" is not applicable to any of the 
human-animal interspecific experimentation done today. That the possible consequence of 
"status shifts" might be morally problematic seems not persuasive in the case of upshift. 
Downshifts, on the other hand, would evidently be morally problematic, but they are 
neither planned nor would they offer advantages for research. "Subhuman" creation by 
"dumbing down" human beings would clearly constitute a morally reprehensive practice, 
but this is not due to chimerisation but due to violation and harm done to a human being, 
in general. Shifting moral status as such is not disadvantageous and does not offer an 
argument against chimera creation. 
The most direct, palpable risk discussed in chapter 2, section C.III – the direct danger to 
human populations by increasing the risk of zoonoses and "species jumps" of pathogens 
that could lead to pandemics of highly lethal diseases – is not unique to interspecific 
experimentation. Animal-to-human transfer of pathogens, in general, is a well known 
health risk in other contexts that do not involve human-animal chimerisation or 
hybridisation (cf. bird and swine flu, HIV, SARS). Certain factors increase this risk in the 
case of human-animal xenografts. The threat of zoonotic pandemic originates in animal-to-
human xenotransplantation. In vivo or in vitro laboratory research involving human-to-
animal chimeric creatures poses this risk to a much lesser degree. The zoonosis transfer risk 
is negligible in regard to human-animal cybrid research. Concerns for the development of 
zoonoses and zoonotic pandemics are valid and need to be considered, yet they do not 
seem to suffice as persuasive arguments against the creation of human-animal chimeras or 
other interspecifics in general. Zoonosis concerns are persuasive in a limited area, i.e. in 
justifying the close control and regulation of xenotransplantation that is already in place in 
most legislations. 
The argument that Risk-Cost-Benefit-Analysis is somehow not applicable to the scenario 
of interspecific creation since it misrepresents uncertain outcomes which cannot be 
quantified was discussed under the keyword of "precaution" (in chapter 2, section C.4 
above). The idea that precautionary principles should be applied in risk assessment is well 
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known from many areas (e.g. environmental regulation, medical decision-making). It would 
be applicable specifically to those scenarios of interspecific creation where there is a great 
degree of uncertainty concerning potential outcomes – e.g. the creation of human-to-
animal chimeras with humanized brains, regarding the concern of emergence of human-
typical capacities; or the release of transgenetically manipulated animals into the wild, 
regarding risks for the equilibrium of ecosystems. The persuasiveness of precautionary 
arguments is severely limited though because their direction is unclear. A preference for 
risk-aversion does not tell us how to act or not to act. "Precaution" can only be understood 
in this context as a minimum requirement of risk assessment methods; in this sense, it does 
not offer an argument against creating interspecific beings by itself. 
The last three types of arguments I assessed were under the label of "moral confusion" 
(chapter 2, section D above). Non-speciesist and qualified speciesist accounts will have a 
problem with assigning chimeras moral status. This is due to the fact that artificial chimeras 
are novel beings without precedents, and it is unclear at first what properties, capacities, 
and needs they have or could potentially develop. Consequently, "relative confusion" is not 
a problem that is unique to chimeras. Other novel beings or entities, and, in fact, all kinds 
of "atypical" individuals, give rise to similar complicated determinability, as I called this 
problem above. The problem of complicated determinability can not only apply to human-
animal, but potentially all kinds of interspecific beings. It would probably be most pressing 
in cases where the original species involved have very different capacities, needs, and moral 
status levels (e.g. human/mouse). The interspecific beings created today are not affected by 
these considerations. The argument of complicated determinability is convincing, and also 
works against the creation of all kinds of novel beings. Finding out the moral status of a 
new being has costs which must be considered in a cost-benefit analysis. These costs can, 
ultimately, be so high that the creation of the being is not advisable anymore. This is not a 
direct argument for prohibiting interspecific creation, but it may be used as an argument 
against the creation of beings (interspecific or not) whose moral status is not easily 
determinable. This type of argument does not depend on Speciesist assumptions. 
The second type of "moral confusion" I looked at was construed differently: Strong 
Speciesists, who believe that moral status is derived directly from (human) species 
membership, will face a unique problem when confronted with species-ambiguous human-
animal chimeric and other interspecific beings ("absolute confusion", see chapter 2, section 
D.2 above). Some use this as an argument against creating human-animal beings. This 
argument is genuinely unique to the debate around artificial interspecifics, since human-
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animal interspecifics do not appear naturally. What kinds of interspecifics trigger "total 
confusion" depends on the particular design of the moral background (namely on 
convictions regarding species membership) – hybrids and cybrids seem to be especially 
difficult and "ambiguous" in this regard. Whether one finds this argument persuasive 
depends on whether one supports speciesism. If, as I have done here, one rejects Speciesist 
ethical principles, the argument from "absolute confusion" does not work; on the contrary, 
the confusion described can be turned around and used as an argument against Speciesism 
itself. 
The last type of argument discussed was one reconstructed by Robert and Baylis in their 
2003 article "Crossing Species Boundaries"388 (see chapter 2, section D.3 above). Having to 
deal with human-animal interspecifics could lead to the point where both the assumption 
that human species membership is necessary for high moral status and that it is sufficient 
are questioned and thrown overboard, and social practices that depend on these 
assumptions are no longer defensible. General threats to unique human status are not new: 
from Freud's classic three offenses to mankind (Galileo, Darwin, and his own discoveries) 
to contemporary findings of allegedly "unique" capacities in nonhuman animals, the 
anthropocentric paradigm has had many attackers. More specifically, the deconstruction or 
questioning of (Qualified) Speciesism need not necessarily rely on the example of human-
animal chimeras or interspecifics. All kinds of "marginal" or atypical cases (both on the 
human and the nonhuman side) make it hard to defend Speciesism. What is unique about 
interspecifics is that some kinds of artificial human-animal interspecifics, namely hybrids 
and cybrids, whose species membership is unclear, make Strong Speciesism conceptually 
untenable – this problem is described elsewhere as "absolute confusion" about the moral 
status of novel beings. The second case of human-animal interspecifics that could be 
problematic in this sense would be the (hypothetical) case of interspecifics that exhibit 
human-typical properties, such as language capacity, or consciousness, but which are not 
evidently human. In these two senses, the threat of moral confusion is unique to human-
animal interspecifics. Which interspecifics would be dangerous in this regard depends on 
what properties one wishes to regard as "quintessentially human". Presumably, adult 
human-to-animal chimeras with emerging cognitive capacities would be one case, human-
animal hybrids (if at all possible) another. Cybridic entities seem less obviously threatening 
here. According to Robert and Baylis' reconstruction of an "argument from moral 
confusion", confrontation with chimeras could lead to cognitive dissonance and, as the 
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final result, to giving up the assumption that all and only human beings have superior 
moral status. In analogy to the second argument from confusion, the persuasiveness of this 
argument depends on the question of whether one finds Speciesism attractive. Additionally, 
it also depends on whether one agrees with the prognosis that thinking about Strong 
Speciesism and discovering inconsistencies will lead to people giving up this view, which is 
not self-evident, in my view. 
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B. Conclusions and recommendations 
From my analysis of the legal situation in chapter 1, section D above, one could argue that 
in Germany, the question of regulation of chimeric and other interspecific research is not a 
pressing issue at the moment: interspecific research is already strictly limited by the 
restrictive regulation of the use of human embryonic stem cells. Still, interspecific research 
involving human embryonic stem cells and their derivatives is carried out in many 
countries, most prominently the U.S.A., South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Israel. A 
future review of German laws on the use of human embryonic stem cells cannot be ruled 
out, especially if stem cell cures should become successful in the therapeutic context – this 
would necessitate the use of chimeric animals as assay systems. It is also possible that 
"reprogramming" of adult cells to pluripotency could become accessible in the long term, 
thereby allowing chimeric research without having to face the moral problems (and legal 
restrictions) surrounding human embryonic stem cells.  
What kind of policies would be advisable in regard to interspecific research? What are the 
results of my work in this respect? Are there good arguments for prohibiting human-animal 
interspecific creation and research (aside from the problematicity of human Embryonic 
Stem Cell use)? If prohibition is not advisable, how should interspecific research be 
regulated? How should public discussion of this subject move forward in order to reach a 
satisfying consensus or compromise? 
One pragmatically relevant result of my analysis is that although interspecific beings elicit 
an exorbitantly vehement emotive response in many people, these "yuk" responses are 
usually vague and can be mitigated by information and discussion. This does not mean that 
"yuk factor" objections should be disregarded – rather, they should be understood as an 
indicator of a lack of information regarding what is going on in research labs, which needs 
to be addressed and remedied. The same is true for allegations of hubris of researchers: 
these should be understood not as philosophical arguments for the moral wrongness of 
interspecific creation, but as implicit calls for explanation, justification and clarification of 
the procedures carried out by scientists. It is crucial in this respect to understand that if 
such information is withheld or not spelled out in a manner that is understandable for non-
experts, this will probably lead to an indiscriminate overall rejection of all types of 
interspecific research. Other analysts also support this point – as Nature's editorial put it in 
2007,  
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"Scientists should identify the various research protocols defining interspecies 
research involving human cells and embryos, and the associated risks, ethical 
issues and benefits of each. They should put forward clear and comprehensive 
recommendations to the public and to regulatory bodies. If they don't, they risk 
having regulation and funding restrictions imposed on their research that are 
out of proportion to the ethical or safety risks involved. Even worse, they could 
face prohibitions that lump together research with vast disparities in intent and 
in the balance of risk and benefit — ultimately penalizing those who stand to 
gain from the therapies that might emerge."389 
Robert makes a similar point when stating that 
"Judging from the negative public response to proposals to create part-human 
animals (…) stem cell researchers will have a difficult task in disabusing the 
image of mad scientists run amok. Well-articulated scientific justifications may 
help to dispel the appearance of hubris and irresponsibility."390 
Another practically relevant result of my analysis is that certain concepts – specifically that 
of a boundary between human and nonhuman, but also that of human dignity – are not 
conducive to a clarification of the ethical problems of interspecific research. Instead, these 
concepts lead to further obfuscation of problems and to talking at cross purposes, and 
should be avoided in discussion. Other argument types were similarly vague and unhelpful: 
namely, the idea that risk-cost-benefit-analysis is not suitable for such complex cases as 
interspecific creation and that we should follow a "precautionary principle", instead. Vague 
concerns, which offer no clear analysis of what exactly is problematic about the creation of 
human-animal interspecifics, should be subject to objective scrutiny and not accepted as 
general arguments for a prohibition of chimera or other interspecific creation. 
My negative results concerning Speciesist approaches may seem far-reaching, but they 
actually have only limited practical relevance: most importantly, a rejection of Speciesism 
will mean that justification for experimentation on nonhuman animals will have to be more 
elaborate. Stating that the research subjects are "not human" is not a satisfying justification 
for sacrificing animals in research. Considering the advanced capacities of nonhuman 
primates, it will be particularly difficult to justify their use in research once we give up 
Speciesist argumentation. Rejection of Speciesist argumentation will also mean that the 
high moral status of human embryos and atypical ("marginal") human beings will be harder 
to defend. This, again, need not mean that preferential treatment of biologically human 
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beings cannot be justified; only that its justification will be considerably more difficult, and 
cannot be established as a prima facie ethical principle.  
All in all, concerns about the inadequate treatment of interspecifics seem to be the 
strongest arguments for a strict regulation of the creation of human-animal interspecifics. 
This is because such concerns can be made independently of Speciesist assumptions. 
Additionally, they are sometimes hard to avoid because of the "catch 22" of interspecific 
research: humanization is needed as scientific justification, but some types of "humanization" 
can, at the same time, mean that scientific use of the humanized subject is not morally 
justifiable. Inadequate treatment concerns are a strong argument, but are they strong 
enough to justify the prohibition of human-nonhuman interspecifics? I believe that this is 
not the case because the "catch 22" problem only arises in an extremely limited area of 
interspecific research, namely, in those cases where the aspects of "humanization" in the 
research subject concern morally relevant properties like consciousness or self-awareness, 
which would clash with a use of the research subject in experiments. This applies only to a 
very limited amount of cases. Regulation, e.g. in the form of oversight committees, should 
make sure that this aspect is kept in mind, but a complete prohibition of human-animal 
interspecific creation would be exaggerated and unnecessary.  
A procedural approach to regulation is reflected in the idea of a state licence, which is 
already a requirement in many countries regarding hESC research, such as in Germany 
(ZES) and in the UK (HFEA). Another task of oversight committees will be to assess the 
health risks of interspecific experimentation where this is necessary – this practice is already 
well established (and well justified) in the area of animal-to-human xenotransplantation. 
Newer forms of interspecific research, like the creation of human-animal cybrids and 
transgenetically manipulated animals, justify similar, but not categorically more stringent 
regulation – creating an interspecific entity is not particularly dangerous, as such. 
There are, however, certain scenarios of human-animal interspecific creation which clash so 
violently with public perceptions of what is morally justifiable in research that prohibition 
is justified.  
Three extreme scenarios, in my view, qualify for absolute prohibition: 
1. Bringing to term or long cultivation (i.e. longer than a fortnight) of massively 
chimerically manipulated human embryos,  
2. Bringing to term or long cultivation of human-animal true hybrid embryos; and the 
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3. Bringing to term or long cultivation of transgenetically manipulated human embryos. 
These three scenarios, in my opinion, would also be perceived as not justifiable by non-
speciesist consequentialist approaches when taking into account the interests of the 
creatures involved (and the dim potential benefits of such experiments, on the other hand).  
Notably, all these scenarios are already prohibited under German law (and in many other 
countries). Although it is unclear whether anyone would be actually interested in 
performing such experiments, i.e. whether there are potential perpetrators, at all, a 
prohibition of these scenarios works as an important symbolic stop-point. Explicit 
prohibition of these extreme scenarios can ease public concerns regarding interspecific 
research, in general, by serving as a visible statement that the proverbial slope of research is 
only as slippery as we allow it to be. 
My selection of scenarios that warrant prohibition is a very limited one – which suggests 
the conclusion that some of the prohibitions that are currently in place, or are suggested in 
Germany and other countries, are not justified in my view. This includes the prohibition of 
the creation of true hybrids between human and nonhuman gametes – if the cultivation 
period is limited to a fortnight, this scenario seems well justifiable, in my view. The same is 
true for transgenesis experimentation and chimeric manipulation in human pre-embryos, as 
long as the cultivation period is strictly limited. In these cases, a general prohibition is not 
consistent with other policies concerning protection of human embryos, not necessary, and 
not justified, in my view.  
Today, the "artificial interspecific" scenarios described in chapter 1 are largely unfamiliar to 
most laymen; just as the naturally occurrence of mixed beings. The details of research 
involving human-nonhuman interspecifics are unclear, and rarely cleared up by reporting 
and interest groups, which often prefer sensationalist tones. Most scientists, on the other 
hand, try to keep a low profile and stay out of the focus of public opinion, taking a 
defensive approach to publicity and information. In order to reach the point where an 
informed and sensible debate is possible, bioethicists and other commentators now have 
the important task to make the practices of interspecific research accessible and 
understandable, and to point out the actual ethical issues as well as unfounded or 
exaggerated concerns. An exemplary instance of public discussion in this regard is the 
German stem cell debate, where wide parts of the public have reached detailed knowledge 
about biological circumstances and are therefore well equipped to discuss ethical 
implications of dealing with hESC research (a fact that is even recognized by experts of 
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stem cell science). The "chimera debate", which actually concerns various types of 
interspecifics – chimeras, hybrids, cybrids and transgenic beings – should follow this 
example. 
The chimera debate has distinctive features which make it more than a subset of the stem 
cell discussion and which bring with it genuinely new ethical problems. As I hope to have 
shown, human-animal interspecifics reveal the problematicity of concepts like human 
dignity, the idea of fixed species boundaries, and of Speciesism as an ethical principle. 
Approaching the ethical issues around human-animal interspecifics requires an approach 
which can accommodate new scientific possibilities of mixing (human and nonhuman) 
species, an approach that does not crucially rely on classification into human/nonhuman 
categories.  
Jens Reich concluded his presentation before the Nationaler Ethikrat with this warning – 
or promise? – concerning research on interspecific beings: 
"With these developments on the horizon, we can expect surprising, 
adventurous, amazing, and alarming advances from experimental 
developmental biology; on a grand scale and with surprising twists, in the face 
of which our present concepts will be of no avail." [transl. CH]391 
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Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache 
Im Zentrum dieser Arbeit steht die ethische Debatte um Chimären, die sich in den 
vergangenen Jahren vor allem im englischsprachigen Raum abgespielt hat, und hierbei vor 
allem die Frage, ob es ein schlüssiges, überzeugendes Argument gegen die Herstellung von 
Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen gibt.  
Voraussetzung für eine sinnvolle Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Frage ist zunächst einmal 
eine Untersuchung darüber, was der Begriff "Chimären" in dieser Debatte eigentlich 
bezeichnet. Sieht man sich den Begriff der Chimäre in der Biologie an, so bemerkt man, 
dass es neben den heute heiß diskutierten, neuartigen Chimären das Phänomen des 
Chimerismus in der Natur schon immer gab. Chimären sind grob gesprochen Organismen, 
deren Zellen aus zwei oder mehr unterschiedlichen Zygoten stammen. In der Natur 
tauschen der Organismus der Mutter und der des ungeborenen Kindes, aber auch zweieiige 
Zwillingsembryonen mitunter Zellen aus, was zum Vorhandensein "genetisch fremder" 
Zellen im erwachsenen Organismus von Mensch und Tier führt. Empfänger von 
Allotransplantaten lassen sich übrigens ebenfalls als Chimären charakterisieren. Neben 
diesen eigentlichen Chimären finden wir in der Natur auch noch andere Mischungen, auch 
zwischen verschiedenen Arten: so gibt es bekanntermaßen Hybridformen oder 
"Kreuzungen" zwischen verschiedenen (nahe verwandten) Tierarten, die manchmal auch 
ihrerseits fruchtbar sind. Solche Hybride enthalten – im Gegensatz zu Chimären – in jeder 
Zelle ihres Körpers die gleiche Erbinformation; bei ihnen findet die Durchmischung auf 
Ebene der DNA und nicht auf Zellebene statt. 
Die neuartigen, künstlichen Mischwesen, die die Chimärendebatte angestoßen haben, 
überschreiten nun interessanterweise nicht nur die Grenzen zwischen den Tierarten, 
sondern mitunter auch die zwischen Tier und Mensch. Die Herstellung von Mensch-Tier-
Chimären war und ist für die Forschung aus ganz unterschiedlichen Gründen interessant: 
zum einen lassen sich dadurch, dass man menschliche Zellen in Tiere einbringt, 
"Tiermodelle" herstellen, d.h. menschliche Krankheiten im tierischen Organismus 
simulieren und erforschen. Zweitens will man erkunden, wie sich menschliche Zellen 
eigentlich genau in einem lebenden Organismus ausdifferenzieren und entwickeln und will 
dafür aus naheliegenden Gründen einen Tier- statt einen Menschenorganismus verwenden. 
Drittens erscheint es verlockend, irgendwann im tierischen Organismus Zellen oder gar 
Organe züchten zu können, die sich für die Transplantation eignen. Dies waren die 
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Hauptmotive dafür, sogenannte Mensch-Tier-Chimären herzustellen. Im Standardfall 
handelt es sich dabei um Tiere, in die menschliche Zellen so eingebracht werden, dass sie 
"weiterleben" und funktionsfähig bleiben. Diese Übertragung von Fremdzellen kann bei 
adulten Tieren, aber auch in embryonalen Stadien geschehen, übertragen werden dabei 
üblicherweise Stammzellen, die noch ein gewisses Differenzierungspotential haben, 
darunter auch (aber nicht notwendigerweise) embryonale Stammzellen. Wir kennen aber 
auch den umgekehrten Weg, nämlich die Übertragung tierischen Materials in (adulte) 
Menschen: so etwa bei der klassischen Xenotransplantation von Tierorganen und bei 
neueren Methoden, wo nur einzelne Zellen (tierische Stamm- oder Vorläuferzellen) 
übertragen werden, um abgestorbene Zellen, etwa bei Diabetes oder neurodegenerativen 
Erkrankungen, zu ersetzen.  
Neben diesen Chimären im engeren Sinne dreht sich die "Chimärendebatte" aber auch um 
andere, nicht chimärenartige, artifizielle Mischwesen zwischen Mensch und Tier. Dazu 
gehören zunächst transgene Tiere, also solche, in deren Genom man nicht-arttypische 
DNA eingeschleust hat – hier käme die Einschleusung typisch menschlicher DNA in Tiere 
in Frage, etwa um Krankheiten in Tiermodellen zu simulieren oder schlicht um die 
Wirkung und Interaktion bestimmter originär menschlicher Gensequenzen zu erforschen. 
In der Diskussion tauchen manchmal auch "Mensch-Tier-Hybriden" auf. Im Sinne einer 
schlichten Kreuzung zwischen Mensch und Tier sind solche Wesen nur schwer vorstellbar; 
jedoch gab es tatsächlich über lange Zeit Forschungen zur Hybridisierung von Mensch und 
Menschenaffe und es ist nicht vollständig klar, ob eine solche Kreuzung wirklich 
unmöglich wäre. Als "Mensch-Tier-Hybriden" werden seit neuestem aber auch sogenannte 
Nukleo-Zytoplasma-Hybriden (Cybrids) bezeichnet – entkernte menschliche Eizellen, 
denen ein tierischer Zellkern eingepflanzt wurde und die zur Gewinnung von 
Stammzelllinien dienen sollen. In Großbritannien gab es eine große Debatte um diesen 
Anwendungsfall. 
Bei näherer Betrachtung stellt sich also heraus, dass das, was als "Chimärendebatte" 
bezeichnet wird, sich nicht auf alle Chimären und nicht allein auf Chimären bezieht: in der 
Natur vorkommende Chimären und auch viele künstliche Chimären (wie etwa Empfänger 
von Allotransplantaten) scheinen ethisch nicht besonders problematisch oder 
aufsehenerregend zu sein. Andererseits sehen wir, dass es neben den eigentlichen Chimären 
noch ganz andere Arten von Mischwesen gibt, die oft in ähnlicher oder gleicher Art und 
Weise Probleme aufwerfen wie die als ethisch problematisch empfundenen Mensch-Tier-
Chimären.  
Zusammenfassung 
 178
Eine genaue Betrachtung der biologischen Grundlagen zeigt uns hier also, dass die 
Chimären-Debatte sich eigentlich ganz allgemein um Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen ("Human-
Animal Interspecifics") dreht, dass aber von diesen anscheinend wiederum nur bestimmte 
Typen als ethisch problematisch empfunden werden. 
Welche das sind, hängt nun davon ab, mit welcher Art von Argument man gegen die 
Herstellung solcher Lebewesen oder Entitäten vorgeht. Die Argumente gegen die 
Herstellung von Mischwesen lassen sich zunächst grob in intrinsische und 
konsequenzbasierte Einwände einteilen.  
Als Vertreter der intrinsischen Argumente findet sich hier zunächst das "Ekel-Argument" 
(Argument from Repugnance), das nur selten direkt vorgebracht, aber sehr oft implizit 
angedeutet wird: die verbreitete Reaktion von Abscheu oder Angst, die (insbesondere 
Mensch-Tier-)Mischwesen hervorrufen, so wird argumentiert, sei ein deutliches Zeichen 
dafür, dass ihre Herstellung moralisch falsch sei. Von Vertretern religiöser Strömungen 
wird mitunter vertreten, die Vermischung von Tierarten, insbesondere aber von Mensch 
und Tier, sei aus religiösen Gründen abzulehnen. Auch quasi-religiöse Argumente 
appellieren (ohne dabei Heilige Schrift oder Konzepte wie Gottesebenbildlichkeit ins Spiel 
zu bringen) an das Konzept der Hybris oder Anmaßung: die Vorwürfe des "Gott Spielens" 
und "der Natur ins Handwerk Pfuschens" sind typisch für diesen Argumenttyp. Spezifisch 
für die Chimärendebatte ist der Hinweis auf die inhärente Schutzwürdigkeit von 
Artgrenzen (insbesondere der Grenze zwischen Mensch und Tier), die – so wird 
argumentiert – eine Überschreitung dieser Grenzen an sich schon moralisch falsch macht. 
Analog wird behauptet, die Herstellung von Mischwesen verletze die Menschenwürde und 
sei daher nicht rechtfertigbar. 
Aber auch konsequenzbasierte Argumente gegen die Herstellung von Mischwesen sind 
zahlreich: zunächst stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern man aus der Herstellung solcher 
Chimären, Hybride oder transgener Wesen wissenschaftlichen Nutzen ziehen kann. 
Schwerpunktmäßig muss dann analysiert werden, welche Kosten die 
Mischwesenherstellung mit sich bringen könnte: zunächst spielen hier schlichte 
Tierschutzaspekte eine Rolle, dann aber auch die Sorge um die richtige Behandlung bzw. 
Verwendung menschlicher Materialien und an vorderster Stelle die Sorge um das Wohl 
ungeborenen menschlichen Lebens. Auch die neu erschaffenen Lebewesen könnten Leiden 
ausgesetzt sein – so etwa durch eine Behandlung bzw. Haltung, die ihrem moralischen 
Status nicht angemessen ist. Problematisch könnte dann auch noch sein, dass der 
moralische Status von Lebewesen, die einer Einmischung artfremder Materialen 
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unterzogen werden, sich ändern könnte, was manche schon unabhängig von etwaiger 
unangemessener Behandlung als problematisch ansehen. Etwas greifbarer sind die 
Gesundheitsrisiken, die von der Herstellung von Mischwesen (hier insbesondere von der 
Xenotransplantation) anerkanntermaßen ausgehen: man befürchtet eine xenogene 
Pandemie durch Übertragung von Krankheitserregern auf den Menschen. Fraglich ist hier 
noch, ob der Apparat der Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse dem Umgang mit Risiken solcher Art 
überhaupt angemessen ist oder ob man sich hier lieber auf ein Vorsichtsprinzip 
("Precautionary Principle") berufen sollte.  
Konsequenzbasierte Einwände können auch indirekter gestaltet werden, so etwa beim 
Argument, Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen könnten auf verschiedene Arten und Weisen 
moralische Verwirrung stiften: einmal dadurch, dass ihr moralischer Status aus 
epistemischen Gründen schlecht bzw. nur unter hohen Kosten zu ermitteln ist. Dann 
dadurch, dass ihnen in gewissen ethischen Entwürfen gar kein moralischer Status 
zugewiesen werden kann, weil sie keine Menschen, keine Tiere, sondern "weder noch" 
sind. Schließlich droht durch die Existenz von Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen der überragende 
moralische Status von Menschen in Frage gestellt zu werden, wie Robert und Baylis es in 
ihrem vieldiskutierten Artikel392 beschreiben. 
In der Diskussion der Einwände stoßen wir auf zwei zusammenhängende Konzepte, die in 
einem Exkurs noch näher beleuchtet werden, um die Argumente abschließend zu bewerten 
– nämlich einmal den Begriff des "Moralischen Status" und außerdem den des 
"Speziesismus." Es stellt sich bald heraus, dass Speziesismus – d.i. das moralische Prinzip, 
nach dem das "Mensch-Sein" bzw. "Nicht-Mensch-Sein" entscheidend ist für den 
moralischen Status einer Entität – aus mehreren Gründen nur schwer zu vertreten ist; 
wobei Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen seine Vertretbarkeit sogar noch schmälern. Das heißt 
wiederum, dass in der Argumentation gegen die Herstellung von Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen 
auf Einwände verzichtet werden sollte, die nur unter Bezugnahme auf speziesistische 
Annahmen funktionieren.  
In der abschließenden Analyse der Argumente gegen die Herstellung von Mischwesen 
stehen drei Fragen im Vordergrund: Handelt es sich um ein genuin neues, für diese 
Debatte spezifisches Argument, oder kennen wir es bereits aus anderen Gebieten? Auf 
welche Arten von Mischwesen bezieht es sich? Und natürlich: überzeugt es? In dieser 
Analyse wird deutlich, dass intrinsische Argumente – also Abscheu-Argumente, Hybris-
                                                 
392 Robert and Baylis (2003), "Crossing Species Boundaries", American Journal of Bioethics, 3(3). 
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Argumente, Argumente, die auf die moralische Relevanz von Artgrenzen abstellen sowie 
Menschenwürde-Argumente nicht besonders schlagkräftig sind, da sie zu vage und 
unspezifisch bleiben und zudem üblicherweise auf Speziesismus aufbauen. 
Konsequenzbasierte Argumente scheinen überzeugender, wobei hier besonders stichhaltig 
das Argument der unangemessenen Behandlung wäre, das allerdings wieder nur auf eine 
stark begrenzten Bereich von Mischwesen (und auf keine der aktuell hergestellten 
Mischwesen) zutrifft. Ähnlich ist es bei der recht greifbaren Bedrohung durch Zoonosen: 
dies wäre tatsächlich ein gutes Argument gegen die Herstellung von Mensch-Tier-
Mischwesen, doch ein solches Risiko scheint nur von ganz bestimmten Anwendungsfällen 
(insbesondere in der Xenotransplantation) auszugehen und bietet kein umfassendes, 
allgemeines Argument gegen die Forschung mit Mischwesen. Die "moralische Konfusion", 
die Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen auslösen können, kann tatsächlich auch als Argument gegen 
ihre Herstellung verstanden werden – allerdings, wie die Analyse klar macht, nur in einem 
ganz eng begrenzten Sinne, der sich wiederum nur auf ganz bestimmte Fälle bezieht. 
Zusammenfassend ist zunächst zu bemerken, dass das Problem der Mensch-Tier-
Mischwesen momentan in Deutschland nicht besonders im Vordergrund steht, da es von 
der Stammzellendebatte sozusagen verdeckt wird. Dies ist allerdings nicht überall so, und 
wird sich voraussichtlich auch in Deutschland in Zukunft ändern.  
An für die Chimärendebatte pragmatisch relevanten Ergebnissen kann festgehalten werden, 
dass Mischwesen oft vehemente, emotionale Reaktionen hervorrufen, die allerdings durch 
Information erheblich gemildert werden können. Skandalisierende Parolen und entrüstete 
Aufschreie in dieser Debatte sollten keinesfalls ignoriert, auf der anderen Seite aber auch 
nicht als philosophische Argumente missverstanden werden: sie sind implizite Aufrufe zur 
Aufklärung, Information und Rechtfertigung, denen Forscher sachlich nachkommen 
sollten. Andernfalls drohen alle Experimente, die Mischwesen verwenden – unabhängig 
von Details und tatsächlicher ethischer Relevanz – in einen Topf geworfen und verdammt 
zu werden. Es stellte sich des Weiteren heraus, dass bestimmte Konzepte in der 
Chimärendebatte nicht hilfreich, ja sogar schädlich sind. Dazu gehören unter anderem ein 
moralisch aufgeladener Bergriff der "Artgrenze" sowie der Begriff der "Menschenwürde." 
Ein generelles Verbot der Herstellung von Mischwesen oder Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen 
scheint nach meiner Analyse nicht gerechtfertigt. Nur ganz extreme Szenarien – etwa die 
Kultivation massiv chimerisch manipulierter menschlicher Embryonen, echter Mensch-
Tier-Hybriden oder transgenetisch manipulierter menschlicher Embryonen über einen eng 
begrenzten Zeitrahmen hinaus – rechtfertigen ein Verbot. Diese Szenarien sind in 
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Deutschland, und in vielen anderen Ländern, bereits zu Recht verboten. Einige der in 
Deutschland bestehenden Verbote betreffend Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen hingegen scheinen 
nicht nötig und auch nicht konsistent – nämlich das Hybridisierungsverbot und das Verbot 
chimerischer und transgenetischer Manipulation von menschlichen Embryonen 
(wohlgemerkt nur dann, solange es um einen sehr eng begrenzten Zeitraum bis zur 
Gastrulation geht). Forschung, die keine der oben genannten "extremen" Szenarien 
anstrebt, sollte erlaubt sein – dies allerdings unter strenger externer Aufsicht und 
Regulation, die nicht nur medizinische, sondern auch ethische Probleme berücksichtigt. 
Es wird Aufgabe der Bioethik sein, die Öffentlichkeit über die Details und die spezifischen 
ethischen Probleme der Forschung mit Chimären und anderen Mischwesen zu 
informieren. Dabei kann man sich z.B. an der sinnvoll und auf recht hohem Niveau 
verlaufenden Stammzelldebatte orientieren, muss aber die Spezifika, die Mensch-Tier-
Mischwesen mit sich bringen, beachten. Insbesondere werden Entwürfe, die moralischen 
Status untrennbar mit der Klassifikation in "menschlich" und "nicht-menschlich" 
verbinden, dieser Aufgabe ab einem gewissen Punkt nicht mehr gewachsen sein. Eine 
gründliche Vorbereitung auf die ethischen Probleme, die Mensch-Tier-Mischwesen in 
Zukunft mit sich bringen könnten, ist also vonnöten – auch wenn die Mischungen aus 
Mensch und Tier, die es heute gibt, noch relativ unproblematisch erscheinen. 
 
Lebenslauf 
 182
Lebenslauf 
Name: Constanze Carolin Elisabeth Huther 
Staatsangehörigkeit: Deutsch 
Geburtsort und -datum: München, den 31. Oktober 1979 
 
 
20.1.2009 Disputation zum Dr. phil. an der LMU München 
10/2007 – 2/2009 Elitestipendium der Universität Bayern e.V. 
9/2005 – 9/2008 Promotionsstudium an der LMU München (Hauptfach 
Philosophie, Nebenfach Wissenschaftstheorie) 
07/2005 Abschluss Magister Philosophiae (M.Phil.), LMU München 
10/2003 – 6/2004 Gaststudium an der University of Oxford 
10/2001 – 8/2005 Studium der Philosophie, Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie 
im "Reformstudiengang M.Phil." an der LMU München 
10/2000 – 10/2001 Studium der Philosophie an der Hochschule für Philosophie 
der Jesuiten, München 
10/1999 – 10/2000 Studium der Rechtswissenschaften an der LMU München 
10/1998 – 10/1999 Studium der Rechtswissenschaften an der Universität Passau 
6/1998 Abitur am Hans-Carossa-Gymnasium, Landshut 
 
